

MARX, ENGELS, AND MARXISMS

Selected Writings of Jean Jaurès

On Socialism, Pacifism and Marxism

Edited by
Jean-Numa Ducange
Elisa Marcobelli

Translated by David Broder

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Editors
Jean-Numa Ducange
University of Rouen
Mont St. Aignan, France

Elisa Marcobelli
University of Rouen
Mont St. Aignan, France

Translated by
David Broder
London School of Economics
Paris, France

ISSN 2524-7123 ISSN 2524-7131 (electronic)
Marx, Engels, and Marxisms
ISBN 978-3-030-71958-6 ISBN 978-3-030-71959-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3

This book is supported by GRHIS-Rouen, IRHIS-Rouen, RIN-PEACE. Thanks to Natasha Piazzini for the help with the translation.

Cover illustration: Universal Art Archive/Alamy Stock Photo

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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Introduction

Jean Jaurès is one of France's most famous political figures. Many French people have heard of Jaurès because of the streets and public buildings named after him, or even the shops situated on a "Rue Jean-Jaurès," in their own way recalling the socialist tribune's memory. In early 2014, Toulouse University was renamed in his honor, as part of the buildup to commemorations marking the centenary of his assassination in July 1914. But outside the ranks of history buffs and a few hardened militants, how many people actually know Jaurès's works? Surely, very few. Beyond France itself he is even less well known. Only specialists in the history of French socialism or the Third Republic know his name and his writings. Indeed, as soon as we cross the Alps from France into Italy his name disappears from the toponymy: Milan's "Via Jean Jaurès" is 'the only one nationwide. This anthology is intended to help those little-familiar with Jaurès to discover him. It does so through a selection of his most emblematic texts, covering some of the great political questions of his time.

From the Republic to Socialism

Born in 1859 to a bourgeois family in Castres, Jaurès was hardly fated to become one of history's great socialist leaders. His first steps in public life did little to distinguish him from other "opportunist" republicans—as the men of the center-left were called, in this period. This brilliant

student, educated at the École normale supérieure (where he achieved an *agrégation* in philosophy) and university lecturer, then became deputy mayor of Toulouse and, already in 1885, a young MP. Initially hostile to the socialists, he could have settled for a comfortable political career in the South of France, just like many others did.

But over the years from 1889 to 1892, Jaurès gradually "passed across to socialism."[1] There were two major factors at work in this "conversion," which has long been a subject of discussion among historians. One was Jaurès's study of German philosophy: he devoted his complementary thesis to *The Origins of German Socialism* (1892), a topic which he discovered especially thanks to his discussions with the École normale supérieure librarian Lucien Herr. The other was the importance of the social question, of which he became conscious through his contact with the miners of Carmaux—men facing often horrific working conditions, whom he met during a major strike in 1892. By this point, Jaurès had very much become a socialist. In that era, socialists were still a scattered array of loosely organized circles; ten years later, Jaurès would urgently set about uniting these different currents. For the moment, he was, at least, certainly to be counted among socialist ranks, and in 1893 he was elected an MP for the Tarn on the basis of the programme of the Parti Ouvrier led by Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue—men both close, in this period, to the ideas of Karl Marx. But more than these others, Jaurès's socialism would preserve its republican moorings, which a good proportion of the socialists influenced by Marxism in fact considered rather suspect. Was the Republic not fundamentally "bourgeois"—as its violent anti-worker repression tended to demonstrate?

Jaurès, for his part, thought that there was a deep bond of continuity between the Republic and socialism. For sure, the *current* Republic was imperfect. But for him, it remained the best political regime in existence, and it was within the Republic that socialism could be gradually developed. For Jaurès, the social Republic could not spring from some great cataclysm, as Marx and Engels had forecast in 1848, but rather would arise from a gradualist approach which took proper account of republicanism's achievements. This political outlook also ought to be set in connection with Jaurès's great admiration for the legacy of the French Revolution of

[1] Jean Jaurès, 'Le Passage au socialisme (1889–1893)', in *Œuvres*, vol. II, Paris, Fayard, 2011.

1789. Over 1889–90, he established a close continuity between the revolutionary struggles of 1789 and contemporary socialism. Between 1900 and 1904 he published the first volumes (and they were several thousand pages long!) of a vast *Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine* he had launched; these initial tomes were dedicated to the early years of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1794. To read the introduction (1900) and conclusion (1908) to these volumes—texts reproduced in this present anthology—offers us a marvelous understanding of who Jaurès was and what his vision of socialism was. These pages are deeply imbued with an incorrigible optimism in the future, which especially shines through from the 1908 conclusion.

Jaurès, the Republicans, the Socialists, and the Syndicalists

If we cannot understand Jaurès without reading him, we also need to situate him in relation to the other great political figures and forces of his time. During his own lifetime, Jaurès was no better known than Jules Guesde or other republican personalities, even though posterity has often had much less of a place for these latter. Fundamentally, he never broke with the republicans and especially the radicals, with whom he had, as Rémy Pech put it, "a dispute but not a rupture."[2] His relations with the different socialist currents (of which there were five, at the end of the nineteenth century!) varied with the times. Jaurès had difficult relations with the "Guesdists," the partisans of Jules Guesde considered to have first introduced Marxism to France. An important cleavage divided him from the allies of Jules Guesde and Édouard Vaillant over the decisive question of the state, or more precisely, of governmental participation. In 1899, Alexandre Millerand became the first socialist minister to join a government, as part of Waldeck-Rousseau's cabinet. In the context of the Dreyfus affair and the threat to the republican regime, for some the notion of a government of "republican defense" justified participation in exercising power. Jaurès was part of this latter camp, while Guesde and Vaillant damned what they saw as an inadmissible compromise.

[2] Jean-Michel Ducomte and Rémy Pech, *Jaurès et les radicaux: une dispute sans rupture*, Toulouse, Privat, 2011.

This dividing line would split them also with regard to their attitudes toward captain Dreyfus: whereas Guesde considered it damaging to throw workers into struggle on behalf of a bourgeois army officer, Jaurès—after a little hesitation—invoked a principle of humanity that stood above class divides. For the socialist tribune, it was necessary to stand alongside figures like Zola, who accused the justice system of partiality and complicity in the military's efforts to cover up its institutional failings. *Les Preuves*—whose foreword is included in this volume—was one of Jaurès's great texts on this subject. Yet on some points, there were bridges between Jaurès and the Guesdists; sometimes these latter were fairly quick to give up on some of their more doctrinaire aspects, for instance on the question of small peasant property. While in some Marxists' estimation, the small property would disappear together with capitalist concentration, the majority of French socialists considered it something that needed to be defended. At the Nantes Congress of the (Guesdist) Parti ouvrier français in 1894, there was agreement between Jaurès and Karl Marx's son-in-law Lafargue—a Guesde ally—on this point.[3] But from 1899 onward, such areas of agreement rather thinned out. There were, indeed, two different methods—the *deux méthodes* which Guesde and Jaurès debated at a memorable public meeting in 1900, upon the invitation of the mayor of Lille.[4] Two years later, Jaurès's support for Émile Combes's new government followed this same logic: backing the Radicals' reform measures, but this time without direct socialist participation in government, Jaurès was elected vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies. He now became the most important political figure, alongside Aristide Briand, in allowing the vote on—and then the promulgation of—the law on the separation of churches and state in late 1905. Some socialists asked why Jaurès went so far in this alliance with the Radicals on the question of state secularism: wasn't the essential thing to conquer new social and political rights for workers, taking up a perspective of overthrowing capitalism? For Jaurès, who never abandoned the horizon of revolution, it was necessary to break workers from the grip of Catholicism. How could anyone imagine that a society still operating under the orders of the Church could be receptive to socialist ideas? Anything that could allow for a secularization of

[3] Gilles Candar and Jean-Numa Ducange, 'Paul Lafargue: la propriété paysanne et l'évolution économique', *Cahiers Jaurès*, no 195–196, pp. 70–80.

[4] Jean Jaurès, Jules Guesde, Rosa Luxemburg, *Les Discours des deux méthodes*, Paris, Le Passager clandestin, 2014 (2nd edition).

citizens' minds, even while respecting individual religious beliefs, was a step forward for socialism. Again, here, there was a sharp difference of method. Yet in the meantime, a few months before the law on separation of churches and state, the splits among France's socialists had finally been healed: whatever their differences, they all came together at the Le Globe congress in Paris in April 1905 to found the Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO), the now unified socialist party. More than anything, Jaurès feared that this unity would crack and thus socialism would fall back into the fragmented condition it had been in before 1905. Unity had been one of his life's great works, and he had a particular attachment to it. The subsequent splits in the French Left would likely have badly wounded him…

Formally speaking, the rhetoric of Guesde's supporters prevailed in the new party's statutes.[5] But at the SFIO's Toulouse Congress in 1908, there was no doubt that Jaurès's viewpoint chalked up some decisive victories. When, two years later, Guesde expressed opposition to the first law on "worker and peasant" pensions—to his eyes, the bill offered only weak guarantees to those on the lowest incomes—he was very much isolated compared to Jaurès who, despite the law's distinct weaknesses, voted for it because it would at least mean that the Republic would recognize the *principle* of pensions.[6] In the long run, it was, indeed, his perspective that prevailed among France's socialists, even though it would continue to be counterbalanced by other political choices.

What, at root, was Jaurès's perspective? A sensible gradualist and reformist attitude, as against the other socialists who wanted to overthrow capitalism? We should be careful not to plaster the realities of another era onto the socialism of 1900: the oppositions and ruptures that emerged after the Russian Revolution of 1917 were not already evident in Jaurès's own time. Some have spoken of a typically Jauresian "revolutionary reformism",[7] a "Jauresian synthesis" which resists any over simplistic oppositions incapable of capturing the thought of a plural and complex French socialism. Indeed, there was no ready-made model

[5] Claude Willard, *Jules Guesde, l'apôtre et la loi*, Paris, Éditions ouvrières, 1991.

[6] Gilles Candar et Guy Dreux, *Une loi pour les retraites. Débats socialistes et syndicalistes autour de la loi de 1910*, Lormont, Le Bord de l'eau, 2010.

[7] See especially Bruno Antonini, *État et socialisme chez Jean Jaurès*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2004.

for revolution such as the Bolshevik revolution later proposed, notably including the centralized party-form as theorized by Lenin. Jaurès had no theory of the party, and even if he opposed the most centralizing tendencies among the Guesdists inspired by the German model, he proposed no alternative conception. This, even as he remained attached to the existence of a political party that would be pluralist yet united on the essential questions. Doubtless, he had no hesitation in referring to the example of the French Revolution of 1789–1794. But he did this less with a view to repeating the particular phases it had gone through, than as a matter of drawing inspiration from the great principles which had bloomed in that era. And when great upheavals struck other countries and revolution again seemed to be on the order of the day, Jaurès's thoughts would spontaneously turn to the French Revolution. When, in January 1905, a revolution began on the soil of the Tsar's despised authoritarianism—raising hopes across Europe—his lyrical speeches spontaneously mobilized the glorious French revolutionary tradition. The word "revolution" was, indeed, very much part of the Jauresian vocabulary, but it did not appear to stand in contradiction with partial victories through reforms. Tellingly, in expounding his political vision Jaurès used the formula "revolutionary evolution," which he had early on adopted from a formula used by Karl Marx.[8] If one wanted to apply a label to Jaurès, at the very limit one could term him a "radical reformist": deeply pacifist, he was distrustful of violent and brutal ruptures and, in this sense, he clearly distinguished himself from many other socialists with a stronger inclination toward a revolutionary rupture with the existing order. But he also distrusted the republicans' conservatism—and had no hesitation in speaking up for political and social reforms that some considered dangerous or impossible. Here again, his decision to defend particular laws (on pensions, on secularism) was well-indicative of his approach.

Jaurès was, moreover, a socialist attentive to other sensibilities, convinced as he was that the appropriateness of a given political line would become clear through debate—even if that debate was robust and sometimes violent. This is the spirit in which we should understand his creation of *l'Humanité* in April 1904. He never saw this "socialist daily" as an organ subservient to the party, but rather as a free tribune for the working-class and socialist movements of the time. He stuck to this

[8] Jean-Paul Scot, *Jaurès et le réformisme révolutionnaire*, Paris, Seuil, 2014.

pluralist decision to the last, even if it sometimes risked stormy polemics and splits with some of his friends. For evidence of this, we need only look to a 1911 editorial in *l'Humanité* where he paid an emphatic tribute to Paul Lafargue, who had just committed suicide together with his wife. This article came just a few weeks after Lafargue and Jaurès had clashed over major disagreements with a manifest harshness of tone. For Jaurès, his activity as a journalist was essential: before (and sometimes in parallel with) his work for *l'Humanité*, he was an active contributor to *La Dépêche* and *La Petite République*. A man of action, he published hundreds of newspaper articles, often much longer and denser than one might read today; for proof of that, one need only consult some of his pieces, which could at times even be difficult to follow given the sheer volume of historical and philosophical references they mobilized. Jaurès the journalist was a remarkable example of a politician who kept pace with the most immediate current events, without ever losing a depth of analysis that was bound to a vast culture.[9]

One particular point worth mentioning regards trade unionism. The situation in the France of this period was rather particular. The Confédération générale du travail (CGT), founded in 1895 was animated by a revolutionary-syndicalist majority very hostile to political parties and parliamentarism, who considered the "general strike" as the working class's main means of action and who characterized universal suffrage as a sham which prevented the active mobilization of the popular masses.[10]

At the Amiens congress in 1906, the CGT jealously defended its autonomy from the SFIO, in a text that has gone down in history as the "Charter of Amiens." Jaurès obviously opposed the CGT members' ideas as expressed in this document, for he remained attached to parliamentary, republican forms of political action. But there was a notable evolution in his understanding of the general strike after 1905: well aware of the strength that the CGT's syndicalism represented, and perhaps also conscious of the limits of parliamentary democracy, which could not alone suffice, he came to consider specific uses of the general strike as a useful means of action. A real—and fruitful—dialogue thus developed between Jaurès and the revolutionary-syndicalist CGT starting in the years from

[9] Charles Silvestre, *Jaurès, la passion du journaliste*, Pantin, Le Temps des cerises, 2010.

[10] Miguel Chueca, *Déposséder les possédants. La grève générale aux « temps héroïques » du syndicalisme révolutionnaire (1895–1906)*, Marseilles, Agone, 2008.

1906 to 1908, in a context in which Georges Clemenceau's government repressed workers' strikes.[11] Jaurès again distinguished himself from the partisans of Guesde, who wanted to subordinate the union to the party and saw the former only as an appendage of the latter. We again see this in Jaurès's attitudes toward the cooperative movement: unlike other socialists who held that it had to be placed in service of the party, Jaurès saw it as one of the means of social emancipation, alongside the SFIO and the union. He arrived at the consideration that a socialist militant must find their place in all three poles of party, union and cooperative. This showed his real feeling for the workers' movement's diverse forms of expression, where others insisted that one form must necessarily be prioritized over the others. He paid occasional tributes to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, father of anarchism and an influential figure in the workers' movements of the 1840s–60s, himself attached to the cooperative idea. Obviously, as against the anarchists, Jaurès believed in the regulating action of the state. But he also sometimes showed his attentiveness to arguments criticizing the bureaucracy and authoritarianism of certain republican and socialist currents. There was a Proudhonian or even libertarian streak in Jaurès, even though it was not the dominant one.

Jaurès, Germany and Marxism

Jaurès could understand and read German much better than English—indeed, this was often true in the international socialist milieu of the time. He had many friends in Europe, especially among the Belgian socialists, like Émile Vandervelde, leader of the Parti ouvrier belge and sometime president of the Socialist International. But in this period, German socialism was very much the model. Jaurès entertained a rather particular relationship with German socialism and its developments. As we have said, his *thèse complémentaire*, written in Latin, was a study of the origins of this movement and, most importantly, he regularly referred to it in many articles and speeches. There were several reasons for this focus. Firstly, Jaurès was a philosopher by training, and the Germany of Kant and Hegel was an essential reference point in this era. When Jaurès became a historian, with his *Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine*, he took a close

[11] Alain Boscus, *Jean Jaurès, la CGT et le syndicalisme révolutionnaire*, Toulouse, Institut CGT d'histoire sociale, 2010.

interest in the French Revolution's impact on Germany, and he personally wrote the 1907 volume dedicated to the Franco-German war of 1870. Germany was also the country where the first independent workers' party in Europe had been founded, by Ferdinand Lassalle back in 1863; this was one of the components of what would become the Social Democratic Party in 1890. Of course, this was also the land of origin of Marx and Engels, and indeed of "Marxism" (a term which entered general use in the 1880s)—the doctrinal reference point for the SPD, the most powerful party in the Socialist International founded in 1889. Without this International, coordination among Europe's socialists and their collective action in the face of the danger of war would have been impossible. This explains why, despite the distance which separated Jaurès's republicanism from the Marxism of the German Social Democrats, the French socialist tribune always maintained a keen eye toward developments in that party and was active in the International's own structures. He published multiple articles on the SPD's internal debates and especially with regard to the "revision" of Marxism, revolving around Eduard Bernstein.

One of the great moments of this friendship, colored by intense debates and even sharp opposition, was the Amsterdam Congress of the Socialist International in 1904, which saw a notable clash between Jaurès's ideas and those of SPD party president August Bebel. Amsterdam was a decisively important congress, for the French: a motion was passed strongly exhorting the French socialists to unite, and this would encourage the creation of the SFIO in 1905. But the Republic was also a focus of debate. Formally at least, the SPD continued to call for a German Republic, in continuity with the ideals of the revolution of 1848. But this demand was increasingly pushed into the background. As we have seen, Jaurès remained firmly attached to the republican form, an imperfect foundation but a necessary one for any further advance to be made. Yet Bebel as well as many German Marxists like Karl Kautsky—the great intellectual authority of this era—considered Jaurès imbued with "republican superstitions." For them—and, as we have emphasized, French Marxists like Guesde and Lafargue—the republican form at most opened the way to a clearer expression of class struggles, allowing the clash between bourgeoisie and proletariat to appear with sharper contours. Sometimes they considered it outright superfluous, in light of political developments in France and Germany: had Bismarck's German empire not granted much more generous social guarantees than those offered by the French Republic? What good was there in celebrating a Republic which seemed

to lag behind the Reich when it came to social policy? Jaurès challenged this interpretation of the political struggle in France, which he considered an overly narrow reading, wasn't it, rather, that the Social Democrats no longer demanded the establishment of a Republic because they no longer dared to confront the imperial powers that be in Germany? In other words, behind their oh-so radical Marxist formulas, were there perhaps concealed other motives which they would have been less eager to admit? Paradoxically, though she was very critical of the French socialist tribune, a few years later Rosa Luxemburg recognized that he was correct on this point, at least. In 1910, she broke with her old friend Karl Kautsky when he refused to publish an article… which demanded that the party should propagandize for the German Republic!

From this point of view—and beyond what was specifically at stake in the republican question—there was a real distance between Jaurès and Marxism such as his German counterparts understood it. For Jaurès, there were indeed "class struggles": in his writings, we regularly find the expression "working class"; historical materialism was very much part of his intellectual hinterland, especially when it came to interpreting a process like the French Revolution. Moreover, Jaurès did not stand so far from Friedrich Engels's late reflection (before his death in 1895) considering the state not only as the instrument of a social class ("the bourgeois state") but as one of the sites where the contradictions among social classes expressed themselves. In such a reading, it was thus necessary to intervene at the state level and embrace compromises, but this did not invariably mean an abandonment of the perspective of socialism. But Jaurès accorded a much higher importance to institutional forms of politics and believed in the virtue of republican values.

There was also a certain moral dimension in Jaurès. This was apparent in his appreciation of the Republic, which made him rather unique—even if this aspect ought not be overstated. After all, on this point the French socialist could certainly be compared to those in Germany who made a "return to Kant" the better to attack what they considered the analytical rigidities resulting from the dialectical method. The religious dimension of Jaurès's political engagement has also been the focus of several important studies; it would, indeed, be senseless to portray this socialist leader as an intransigent atheist, given the mystical strands that

ran throughout his career and his writings.[12] What is more, Jaurès repeatedly sought to distance himself from an overly rigid materialism, which he detected especially in Paul Lafargue's historical writings; in this sense, he quite clearly distinguished himself from Marx, even if it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on his relationship with the great German socialist theorist. Jaurès was a politician who wrote editorials day after day; he read an enormous amount, but he also cited from memory—and sometimes in rather approximate fashion—authors whom he had not always been at leisure to study in any great depth, Marx first among them. Without doubt, he took a certain distance from the self-styled Marxists of his time; but his relationship with Marx's *oeuvre* is rather more difficult to parse.

Jaurès was, certainly, a sharp critic of certain "catastrophist" predictions among those who, taking *Manifesto of the Communist Party* in the most literal terms, swore that capitalism's collapse was imminent. Moreover, one can only be struck by the weak presence—or absence—in Jaurès of any reflection on political economy, an absence which he also shared with other French socialists like Guesde. In contrast, his German Social Democratic friends—across all tendencies—paid a striking amount of attention to economic problems and to the nature of capitalism. In France, one would have to search among academic economists to find any serious discussion on this terrain. As a philosopher and historian, Jaurès did clearly take an interest in the world's economic developments, as shown by his reading of one work much-discussed in this era, Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance* Capital (1910).[13] He concerned himself with the problem of the distribution of wealth, and of questions of fiscal and tariffs policy. But we would search in vain for any original economic thinking. His intellectual formation and his tireless political activity did not push him into any in-depth analysis of the country's industrial and agricultural developments. Hence the absence of such questions from this anthology—which may seem rather surprising—does not owe to any deliberate choice on our part, but rather reflects their objectively limited place in his oeuvre.

[12] See in particular the works of Jordi Blanc and his volume of philosophical texts (Valencia, Vent terral, 2014).

[13] Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, London: Routledge, 1981 [1910].

Jaurès, Peace and the World

For all the divergences—and the polemics—with the German Social Democrats, there were also great moments of fraternity. One such instance was the speech that Jaurès was meant to give in Berlin in 1905, only for the authorities to refuse him entry into German territory. For Jaurès, right up till his final hours, it was utterly essential to establish closer bonds with the SPD, as he sought to save what remained his fundamental ambition—peace.

Jaurès, a martyr for peace. This is, without, the great cause that has made his name in France and around the world. On this point, we should emphasize that Jaurès was always a convinced patriot and a defender of his country and its values. This was true even to the extent that during his first years of political engagement—and even once his socialist beliefs were well-established—he remained convinced of the need for colonization in North Africa in order to bring French civilization to the indigenous population. This colonization would, supposedly, provide the first, indispensable step before emancipation. Jaurès remained "pro-colonial" up till the early 1890s.[14] In his days as a moderate republican, he had defended colonization, in an era in which certain left-Radicals like Clemenceau had already taken a strong stance against the dichotomy between "higher" and "lower" races, as advanced by the famous Jules Ferry. This latter brought compulsory, secular public schooling to France but was also the man of "Ferry-Tonkin"—that is, the conquest of Indochina…

The chronology speaks for itself: the more we proceed through time, the more Jaurès critiqued and condemned France's "colonial policy." The brutalities of military conquest would make him more and more circumspect, and in Parliament he became one of the fiercest opponents of colonial policy—earning him virulent attacks from the right wing of the Chamber.[15] Jaurès never went so far as to challenge the very principle of colonialism, but his colonial reformism went much further than many socialists of the time, even ones more radical on other questions than he was. Here, we can grasp how far his patriotism was melded with a vigorous internationalism. For, even beyond the friendships around Europe, which he continued to develop till the end of his days—and this despite many

[14] Gilles Candar, *Jaurès et l'extrême-orient. La patrie, les colonies, l'Internationale*, Paris, Fondation Jean Jaurès, 2011.

[15] See Jean Jaurès, 'Le Pluralisme culturel', in *Œuvres*, vol. XVII, Paris, Fayard, 2014.

ideological clashes and tensions—Jaurès was also one of the few figures to turn his attention toward non-European peoples. Doubtless, he did so within a perspective that may seem narrow and limited for us, today; but it was undeniably a bold one in the context of his own times. Indeed, his interests were highly varied: for example, his foreword to Turot's book on the Philippines' struggle to free itself from the colonial yoke, and the *l'Humanité* piece he devoted to the situation of the Peruvian workers inhumanly exploited by the British in the rubber plantations.

It was no accident, then, that Jaurès was one of the first figures to take an interest in anti-colonial movements, as he prepared his *Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine*. Where most historians of the French Revolution had haughtily ignored the struggles outside the metropoles, Jaurès offered a first insight that would later be hailed by historians of colonization. This constant attention to the situation of non-Western peoples should also be connected to the Socialist International's own positions. At the Amsterdam Congress in 1904—the same congress which imposed on the French socialists the unification which resulted in the creation of the SFIO the following year—another resolution exhorted them to "intransigently oppose colonial expeditions."[16] The influence of the International, to which Jaurès accorded such great importance, undoubtedly contributed to this turn of his. The cycle that began with the Russian Revolution in 1905 and continued at least up till the 1908 Young Turk revolution in the Ottoman empire stirred great enthusiasms in Jaurès. "Red Sunday" in St. Petersburg and all that followed was hailed in lyrical tones. These events opened up new hopes for French socialism, and all the more so given a crucial part of the context: namely, that the Left would more gladly accept a French-Russian alliance if this was to be sealed with a Russian Republic and not with the Romanov monarchy… If, by conceding a few reforms, Russia ultimately remained under the Tsar's leadership, the Russian Revolution had nonetheless shaken the certainties of many European socialists. On the one hand, the revolution would not necessarily break out in one of the "great" countries of the West, but instead in the "Orient." On the other hand, the revolution was also intertwined with the Russo-Japanese war, which ended in Russian defeat: so, what was called a "yellow" people could defeat "whites." This was

[16] *Sixième congrès socialiste international tenu à Amsterdam du 14 au 20 août 1904. Compte rendu analytique par le Secrétariat socialiste international*, Brussels, 1904, p. 43.

a stinging and historic refutation of then-widespread racial theories on the "yellow" peoples. Similar factors explain Jaurès's enthusiasm for the Chinese Revolution of 1911. It is worth mentioning that this latter revolution's main leader Sun Yat-Sen had spent a spell in France, reflected on the Western revolutionary experiences of the nineteenth century and even been interviewed in *l'Humanité*. Of course, this revolution did not put an end to the "century of humiliations" that had begun with the "unequal treaties" of the mid-nineteenth century which carved up China and transformed much of its coastline, now almost entirely under the heel of the Western powers. But China had embarked upon a long movement that would lead to its national liberation—and this challenge to the domination of one people over another was welcomed by Jaurès, even as many others constantly denounced the "Yellow Peril."

To understand Jaurès, it is worth keeping in mind his line in *L'Armée nouvelle*, "A little internationalism takes us further away from our homeland: a lot of internationalism brings us closer to it." The one did not rule out the other. In this regard, *L'Armée nouvelle* deserves particular attention: alongside the *Histoire socialiste*, this was his other main book. This had originated in 1910 as a parliamentary bill but was later transformed into a volume for J. Rouff, the same publisher which issued the *Histoire socialiste*.[17] Reading this work allows us to avoid the many misinterpretations regarding Jaurès's pacifism, which was neither abstract nor absolute, and took its place within a specific context.

Jaurès did not dismiss either borders or the various contingent measures associated with protecting the *patrie*. He sought a root-and-branch reform of the military in order to preserve peace, but efforts to avert conflict could not rely on an anti-militarism that stood outside time and space. Clearly, Jaurès did all he could to oppose the ambient jingoism and the mood of revanchism against Germany—widespread among much of the French political class. The plans set forth in *L'Armée nouvelle* were not adopted, and the law stipulating three years' military service—against which he and the socialists had demonstrated at the Pré-Saint Gervais—was passed in 1913. But Jaurès also distinguished himself from a socialist like Gustave Hervé[18]—the champion of a virulent anti-militarism,

[17] Jean-François Chanet (ed.), 'Lire L'Armée nouvelle', *Cahiers Jaurès*, nos. 207–208, January–June 2013.

[18] Gilles Heuré, *Gustave Hervé. Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, Paris, La Découverte, 1997.

hostile to any reform of the army—as well as all those who advocated a radical internationalism which sought the disappearance of all borders. For example, in her review of *L'Armée nouvelle* Rosa Luxemburg sharply polemicized with Jaurès: she accused him of abandoning the socialist movement's traditional demands and in particular the dissolution of the standing army in favor of worker militias.[19]

Jaurès's Legacy

The link between patriotism and internationalism—and the complex relationship between the two—was one of Jaurès's most enduring legacies to the French left, across its various branches. But, having been assassinated by a nationalist fanatic on July 31, 1914, on the eve of World War I, he was not there in August 1914 to pronounce on the attitude socialists should take toward national defense. Would he have opposed the "union sacrée"? What would he have done, faced with the Russian Revolution of 1917, especially after the Bolsheviks took power? We ought not to try to make dead men speak. Even at the moment of his burial, Jaurès was immediately mobilized to justify the union sacrée; yet a few years later, he would become the very symbol of peace. A discussion of the political and historical *uses* of Jaurès could itself fill hundreds of pages: indeed, there have been studies on this particular theme, showing the incredible mobilization of this socialist tribune in the most varied of causes![20]

Here, we will simply cite some telling examples, which show how hard it is to dissociate the knowledge of Jaurès's work from the various ways it was used over the twentieth century. After the Tours Congress of 1920, which marked the definitive separation between the Socialists and Communists, these latter initially attempted to recuperate this figure to their own ends—an effort facilitated by their takeover of *l'Humanité*, which became the central daily organ of the Parti Communiste Français. But then, the Communists wavered between rejecting a man who appeared flatly "reformist," in contrast to Leninist revolutionary audacity, or else (especially during periods of left unity) foregrounding the *l'Humanité* founder and ardent fighter for peace. Jaurès would also have a

[19] Rosa Luxemburg, *Le Socialisme en France*, Marseille, Agone, 2013.

[20] Vincent Duclert, *Jean Jaurès. La politique et la légende*, Paris, Autrement, 2013.

long posterity in Socialist memory—though this was not free of contradiction, either. His friend Léon Blum, the future head of the Popular Front government in 1936, made impassioned references to Jaurès. But this figure's "popularity" did not stop there. During the German occupation, some of the "pacifist" collaborationist forces—advocating a new "French-German friendship" within the framework of the new order of 1940—were quick to identify themselves with Jaurès's tradition, in an operation driven by several long-standing Socialists-become-collaborationists![21] Parallel to these various political uses of Jaurès, scholarly studies of Jaurès got underway in 1959 with the creation of a Société d'études jaurésiennes successively chaired by Ernest Labrousse, Madeleine Rebérioux and, to this day, Gilles Candar. Among Jaurès's great legacies it is worth emphasizing the singular importance of his *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, repeatedly republished on account of its reputation as a work which founded a whole tradition of studies. The greatest historians of the Revolution, from Albert Mathiez to Michel Vovelle, have identified with this same tradition, and even a historian sharply critical of these latter like François Furet saw Jaurès as one of the few authors who had provided a strong interpretation of the revolutionary process.[22] Jaurès's commitment to publishing historical documents would also leave a lasting trace. He initiated a parliamentary commission for the study of documents concerning economic history in the period of the Revolution, later nicknamed the "Commission Jaurès." It would continue its work until 2000.[23] But if scholarly studies of Jaurès have continued apace, he has never become just a cold historical artifact. The 2007 and 2012 French presidential elections provided a rather striking demonstration of this: candidates across the political spectrum laid claim to his legacy, including—and most surprisingly—on the Right, which was eager to highlight his role as defender of "work" and of "the *patrie*"…[24] In

[21] Guillaume Pollack, 'Une mémoire improbable: Jaurès sous l'Occupation (1940–1944)', *Cahiers Jaurès*, no. 211, January–March 2014, pp. 95–114.

[22] Christophe Prochasson, 'Sur une réception de l'Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française: François Furet lecteur de Jean Jaurès', *Cahiers Jaurès*, no. 200, April–June 2011, pp. 49–67.

[23] Michel Vovelle, 'Un centenaire qui n'aura pas lieu', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, no. 332, April–June 2003, pp. 179–182.

[24] Marion Fontaine, 'Les usages politiques de Jaurès', *Cahiers Jaurès*, no. 200, April–June 2011, pp. 17–35.

April 2014, president François Hollande gave a speech in Carmaux paying tribute to Jaurès's "optimism"[25]; just a day later, Jean-Luc Mélenchon gave another in Castres, laying claim to Jaurès's militant ardor as he advocated a "left-wing opposition" against a president accused of abandoning the popular classes so important to the tribune assassinated in 1914. In all this, should we see a betrayal of Jaurès? A posthumous triumph? Or, more simply, multiple (ab)uses of a figure who represents a fundamental reference point in France's political history? An attentive reading of the texts, set back in their proper context, may perhaps allow us to decide. In any case, that is the modest goal that this anthology sets for itself, in bringing together both famous texts and others that have gone unpublished since their first appearance. The reader will then be able to develop their own opinion of Jean Jaurès—a figure often cited, but ultimately little-known.

[25] Vincent Chambarlhac, 'Une vidéo de l'Élysée… (Hollande dans la continuité de Jaurès?)', 22 April 2014, Comité de vigilance face aux usages publics de l'histoire. http://cvuh.blogspot.fr/2014/04/une-video-de-lelysee-hollande-dans-la.html.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

The Socialist and Republican

Jean Jaurès's socialism had deep roots in the heritage of the French Revolution of 1789. At first a moderate republican, he gradually became a socialist between 1889 and 1892. Yet unlike other socialists who insisted on seeing the Republic as nothing but the latest instrument of bourgeois domination, he never abandoned a republican political framework. This deep conviction was visible in his many battles, from his commitment to the Dreyfusard cause in 1898 to his stout secularism, and indeed everything from the value of strikes to the definition of peasant property and the merits of a partial nationalization of the economy. The great historian Ernest Labrousse once said that French socialism was a "maximalist republicanism." Such a definition applies wonderfully to Jaurès's texts included in this first part.

The Socialism of the French Revolution

At the moment he wrote this article for La Dépêche *in 1890, Jaurès was no longer an MP, following his election defeat the previous year. Now he was deputy mayor of Toulouse, responsible for public instruction—hence his early interest in educational matters. In this period, he was gradually becoming more convinced of socialist ideas, and in this text, we see how the legacy of the French Revolution, whose centenary republicans had celebrated the previous*

J.-N. Ducange and E. Marcobelli (eds.), *Selected Writings of Jean Jaurés*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3_1

year, allowed Jaurès gradually to make his journey from republicanism to socialism.

When we look at our socialist congresses, like the one in Calais,[1] which could almost be taken for a local strike, or the one in Châtellerault,[2] where the members of the Workers' Party miserably fell out and insulted each other, we see small gatherings wracked with tumult. And when we compare them to the magnificent assembly of the English trade unions, definitively pledging their allegiance to socialism, or to the Halle congress,[3] where all the delegates of socialist Germany—from workers with calloused hands to millionaire merchants and doctors with gold-rimmed glasses—fraternally discussed the party's organization and program, one is tempted to believe that socialism is possible in England, mighty in Germany, but doomed to a dismal, abortive end in France. But this is not the case—and the retrograde and oligarchic parties are celebrating too soon.

Socialist schools may well transform into something else and socialist sects, even after providing some temporary service, may well perish because of their exclusive character. But in France there is an immense socialist party—one which is, quite simply, called the republican party. Neither England nor Germany have had a democratic Republic in their past such as the one proclaimed in France in 1792. So, the English and German workers' aspirations for emancipation do not take the same republican form, and this is why the party of popular reforms is, more specifically, called the socialist party. In France, however, the mere word "Republic," filled with the magnificent dreams of the first republican generations, itself carries all the promises of fraternal equality.

Maybe someday soon the real French republican party—the party which does not stop at taking the republic as an inevitable *fait accompli*, but which loves it, as the necessary form of right—will come to embrace the name "socialist-republican party." Maybe the French Republic will carry the name of socialist Republic throughout the world. I personally

[1] October 1890 congress of the Fédération nationale des syndicats ouvriers, dominated by partisans of Jules Guesde (1845–1922).

[2] October 1890 congress of the Fédération des travailleurs socialistes de France; the partisans of Jean Allemane (1843–1935) abandoned the hall and founded the so-called "Allemanist" Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire.

[3] The Halle Congress in 1890 was the German Social-Democrats' first after twelve years in clandestinity.

hope and believe this to be the case, and I will soon go on to say why that is so. But I shall start by saying that the French Republican party, which claims the legacy of the French Revolution, is a socialist party, whether it says so or not. For the Revolution itself contains the whole of socialism.

I am well aware that some have questioned this—and that exclusivist doctrinaires such as Louis Blanc, who only ever saw one side of things, have identified the French Revolution as the triumph of individualism.[4] But the French Revolution, in all it did, and in all it thought, was manifestly socialist.

It was socialist when it proclaimed the Republic. Today, when socialism rails against the exclusive ownership of the means of production by a handful of capitalists, orthodox political economy replies that manual workers had no part in the creation of the large companies which are the source of wealth. Doubtless, it says, these industrial firms would not have been possible if they had no workers. But their real creators are the people who have founded and directed them to this day. Their wage workers are the condition of their wealth, but not its cause, and, therefore, they are entitled to no stake in industrial capital and economic power.

In France, the champions of traditional monarchy, of such "legitimation," have always thought in that way. There is no doubt, they say, that without the masses of peasants and workers, without the honest, hard-working people of France, royalty could never have built modern France, strong and united. But ultimately it was one family, the royal family, which, through its initiative, its perseverance, its skill in war, its alliances and marriages, gradually created France. The dark and unpredictable masses were but a necessary tool in the hands of this family. This family holds legitimate ownership of sovereign power in perpetuity—and it can delegate part of this power, as it pleases, to the great and loyal families which so keenly aided it in its work of expansion and unity.

The Revolution provided its riposte to all these arguments. It answered that historical tradition could not forever be put before the rights of man—that it was impossible, worthless, to go looking in the past to pick out all the elements that combined to make up France. The Revolution answered that, from the day that men started to feel the need for freedom awakening within themselves, they had a right to this freedom. What,

[4] Indeed, Louis Blanc (1811–1882) considered the early phases of the Revolution of 1789 as primarily individualist and bourgeois.

then, did the Convention[5] do when it proclaimed the Republic? Rather than leave political ownership of France in the hands of a family intent on keeping it to itself indefinitely, on the pretext of having led its centuries-long establishment, the Convention handed this ownership to the whole nation. If you apply these principles to the economic order, you have absolute socialism.

The Revolution was socialist in its organization of the family. When it abolished or almost abolished the right of the family father to determine his inheritance, it set the will of the nation in place of the will of the sole creator of wealth and regulated the distribution of wealth within the family according to the principles of social equality. At the hour of death, it is not the father, the creator of wealth, who has rights over this wealth, but his children, who are most of the time alien to its formation. This is an almost absolute socialism within the family.

The Revolution was socialist in its organization of public education. The Convention had provided not only free primary schools, but also, in the main town of each département, free secondary schools, which were called central schools. Were we to follow the Convention's principles today, education would be entirely free in our middle and high schools, just as in our elementary schools, and the best pupils of our elementary schools would be entitled to a secondary education.

Thus, in the Convention's thinking, the level of education each child should receive was in no way determined by their parents' wealth, but rather by their own personal value. However, it would have been absurd if the poor man's child—through this higher level of education summoned to take up the leading functions in the social order—was then denied these functions on account of his lack of capital. Such an educational system thus had the immediate and necessary consequence of subordinating capital to man and property to personal value. The education system decreed by the Revolution was thus—in itself and through its immediate consequences—the boldest socialism that had yet been dreamed of.

The Revolution was socialist in its administration of the public domain. It would never have agreed to the dismantlement of the state's power to the profit of railroad companies. It despised all the monopolies that had been handed to private individuals—and broke them up. It itself

[5] The Convention: the revolutionary assembly which governed France from September 1789 to October 1795.

carried out all major public works, through state resources, instead of leaving them up to the financiers who have held France to ransom ever since Louis-Philippe. The Convention ordered great public sanitation projects, for which it was to be paid back by annuities paid by the owners. With a boldness amazing for us today, it commissioned its architects to rebuild the villages of France, at that time almost everywhere made up of miserable huts.

The Revolution was socialist in its conception of property. Before the unfortunate events of May 31,[6] both Girondins and Montagnards made a supreme effort to join together and discuss the new constitution of the Republic. In an outstanding speech, Vergniaud demonstrated why the French Republic should not restrict the rise of wealth, luxury, literature, and all the joys of civilization; rather, it should be a new and greater Athens without slaves. Robespierre also put his name to these views, saying "We do not mean to proscribe opulence, but to make poverty honourable"—meaning, to give the poor security and independence. But at the same time, Girondins and Montagnards agreed that they could not leave the economic relations between men up to the laws of chance and strength alone. Together they approved decisive proposals, which were definitively adopted after May 31 and became part of the 1793 Constitution.

Article 7: "Property is the right of each citizen to enjoy and dispose of the share of goods guaranteed to him by law." For the Convention, therefore, property is above all not a natural fact, but a social fact, and thus subjected to society's supreme control.

Article 9: "The right to property may not impair either the security, the freedom, the existence, or the property of others." However, with the development of mechanization and the gradual takeover of small industries, i.e., small property by joint-stock capital, bearing enormous impact on workers' political and religious consciousness, it is obvious that the current state and form of ownership in France no longer meet the imperative conditions put forward by the Convention.

Article 11: "Society is obliged to provide for the subsistence of all its members, either by providing them with work, or by guaranteeing those unable to work the means of existence." Such is the organization of assistance and of work.

[6] 31 May 1793 (and 2 June) was marked by the fall of the Girondins, in favor of the Montagnards Robespierre and Danton.

I have only barely touched on what is a vast subject. I think I have said enough to show that the Revolution, in its free development from 1789 to 1795, was imbued with socialism; and that from the day when it broke with the inconsistencies of the initial phase and the ill-fated attempt at constitutional monarchy, and thus proclaimed a Republic, it gave explicit formulation to the truths of socialism.

From this, I draw two conclusions. The first is that despite appearances to the contrary, there is in France a great socialist party, which is the party of the Revolution. And the second is that since socialism has been inherent within the republican idea from the outset, the most absolutist socialists work against their own interests when they isolate themselves from the great Republican Party.

For my part, I feel closer by heart and by reason to a republican, however moderate, who sees the Republic as not just the reality but the basis of right, than to so-called socialists who do not uphold the Republic or who remain aloof from the great Republican Party. Our goal should not be to found socialist sects outside of the Republican majority, but rather to bring the party of the Revolution to boldly, explicitly acknowledge itself for what it is—a socialist party. Before long, it will be compelled to do so.

La Dépêche, October 22, 1890.

For Dreyfus

This text, published at the height of the Dreyfus affair, commented among other things on the decision by Henri Brisson's government to refer the Dreyfus trial of December 1894 to the Cassation Court. If Jaurès doubted what result this might have, he considered the referral as a first step toward truth. This preface to Les Preuves, *a book in which he detailed his point of view on the Dreyfus affair, was presented at a rally in October 1898.*

I am putting together a book with the articles on the Dreyfus affair published in *La Petite République*. First of all, I wish to thank the readers of this newspaper for their indulgence as I delve into the details of this complicated case, and for kindly following me along some rather long chains of inferences.

It seems obvious that the proletariat no longer wants to stop at general formulas. It has an overall conception of the evolution of society, and the socialist idea sheds light on the path ahead of it. But it also wants a deep

understanding—right down to the smallest nuts and bolts—of the mechanism driving the great events. It knows that if it does not unravel the complicated intrigues of reaction, it will remain at the mercy of all manner of demagogic lies. And by thwarting a plot in which Rochefort was the Abbé Garnier's accomplice, it has just proven its intellectual strength.[7]

For the proletariat to gain a comprehensive understanding, it must grasp the general direction of the movement of the economy which leads to socialism, and penetrate, through analysis, into the details of a complex and moving reality. And from now on, the proletariat will be a force to be reckoned with in all major national crises.

One first great result has been achieved. The review process has been initiated and the case has now been presented before the Court of Cassation. But the battle is not over, and there is a great risk of being lulled to sleep. The men who devised the dreadful trial against Picquard[8] in order to prevent the reopening of the case will undoubtedly resort to the most shameless, most criminal initiatives, so as to disturb and distort the current review procedure, to panic people and mislead public opinion. To lay down our arms while they are engaging in the shadiest manoeuvres would be to betray the truth once again. It would also betray the working class, against which the high military reaction would unleash its full revenge. So, the battle continues.

We have no specific reason to doubt the good faith and courage of the Court of Cassation with regard to the Dreyfus affair. It may very well be that it understands the importance of its duty and its role, that it wants to put the truth on display, to bring all the crimes and all the dishonor into the light of day, to correct the mistakes and repress the violence of military justice. But it may also come up against tough obstacles, and its vigor may fail it. It will face two main difficulties. First, the terrain of the Dreyfus affair is, so to speak, congested with inept and unfair judicial decisions, which could stop or at least hinder the progress of the investigation. Esterhazy was acquitted after a real judicial comedy; but at least he was acquitted and it would probably be difficult to get him to come and

[7] Henri Rochefort (1831–1913), a former communard at one time close to the socialists, was now one of the figures most implacably opposed to Dreyfus. The Abbé Garnier (1850–1920) was an antisemite hostile to the socialists.

[8] The head of the army's statistical bureau, and himself an antisemite, Picquart was nonetheless convinced that Dreyfus was innocent. Sent abroad, he was arrested in July 1898 for having leaked secret documents, and thus became a Dreyfusard hero.

explain himself once more. Despite the overwhelming charges coming from the Bertulus inquiry, the indictment court exonerated Esterhazy, du Paty de Clam and Madame Pays of the "Speranza" forgery. The Court of Cassation may have baulked at these strange judgments, yet it was obliged to fundamentally confirm them and although for the Blanche forgery a path to prosecution remains open, there is still a large block obstructing the main road.

In the end, the military authorities captured Colonel Picquart by a procedure which is Jesuitic, but maybe not literally illegal. It will doubtless try, using the petit bleu [telegram], to keep the Dreyfus affair to itself, and to oppose the review with a criminal but legal condemnation of Colonel Picquart, strangled behind closed doors.

On the terrain that the Court of Cassation is meant to be combing, there is no fragment of truth that is not covered by a judicial lie. Will the Court of Cassation have the courage to disregard these legal lies—and search for the truth? Will it manage to combine the legal function the Code grants it with the almost revolutionary role granted it by events?

The Court of Cassation is the guardian of the law. But in this whole affair thus far, the law, which has been applied so monstrously, has worked against truth. Will the Court of Cassation be able to establish the truth without offending the law? And will it dislodge Esterhazy and Du Paty from the legal protection which governmental treachery provided for the spy and the forger? Such is the first difficulty.

There is another one. The Court of Cassation will most certainly discover some terrible truths during its investigation. The long series of forgeries produced by the War Office could certainly not have been fabricated without the complicity, or at least the indulgence, of the top leaders. Moreover, we have clear proof of general Mercier's misconduct in communicating to the judges—in violation of the law—documents of which the accused were not aware, even borrowing these documents from a case other than the Dreyfus affair itself. The heaviest responsibilities therefore lie with general Mercier.

Will the Court of Cassation have the energy to attack the great leaders, the great culprits? And knowing that scrutiny is deadly to them, will it dare to bring matters fully to light?

Once again, I do not mean to insult the Court of Cassation with these words. It may well be that it rises above all fear, above all false caution, and that it has the full courage to tell the whole truth.

I am just saying that the continuing crimes of the army tops and the long series of judicial lies have created such a terrible situation that perhaps no organized force in today's society could solve the problem without the passionate backing of public opinion. What institution is left standing? It has been proven that the courts-martial passed their judgment in the most deplorably biased way. It has been proven that the General Staff concocted dreadful forgeries in order to save the traitor Esterhazy and that the army tops were in communion with treason, through this type of forgery.

It has been proven that the public authorities, out of ignorance or cowardice, have been dragged along behind this lie for three years.

It has been proven that civilian magistrates, from President Delegorgue to Prosecutor Feuilloley,[9] have worked to use procedural devices to cover up military crimes.

And even universal suffrage itself, in its legal and parliamentary expression, has for too long done nothing but give these lies and fakes a national institutional legitimacy.

So, what institutions are still left standing? There is only one left, and it is France itself. For a moment, she was caught surprised. But she is pulling itself together. And even if all the flames of official authority have gone out, France's clear common sense can still push back the night.

France—and she alone—can take charge of the review. By this, I mean that all legal bodies, the Court of Cassation, the courts-martial, are now incapable of telling the whole truth, unless the French conscience itself daily demands the whole truth.

And that is why the citizens who have taken up the fight against the violence and fraud perpetrated by military justice must not lay down their arms. Rather, they must redouble their efforts to awaken and enlighten the country. That is also why we are determined to provide the proletariat with the arguments and proofs we have gathered.

Even many of those who initially opposed us were kind enough to tell us how our demonstration had shaken their thinking. But a doubt kept returning to their minds: how would it be possible, they asked, for seven French officers to condemn another officer if they did not have robust evidence? In truth, such a general argument would rule out any judicial

[9] Two figures who made every effort to frustrate the review process.

mistake a priori. But it is wrong to say that there is always and in every case such close solidarity between officers.

Yes, they do unite when they have to defend themselves against civilians or ordinary soldiers. But there is a terrible competition between them in terms of career, self-esteem and ambition. How many times generals have betrayed each other even on the battlefield itself, so as not to let some rival bask in the full lustre of victory!

And in recent years there has been fierce clan fighting within the army. The clerical party, having lost the leadership of public administrations and civil services during the republican period of the Republic, had taken refuge in the army. There, the former ruling classes, the descendants of Condé's army, gathered in a closed and haughty caste. There, the influence of the Jesuits, patient and subtle recruiters for the top ranks of the army, reigned sovereign. The watchword had become: close the door to the enemy, to the republican, to the dissident, whether he is Protestant or Jewish.

For years, the Catholic press had been reporting on the increasing number of Jews entering the army via the Ecole Polytechnique or the Ecole de Saint-Cyr. Drumont had kindled a sort of civil war against Jewish officers.[10] And now for the first time, a Jew entered the very core—the General Staff. No doubt others will follow in his footsteps. And now the intruder will put his feet under the table in the ancient domain which the clerical aristocracy—at one point excluded from other functions—had kept to itself.

We must put a stop to this scandal at once. Firstly, vague rumors and loose theories are being put about. Why, they say, does the French nation so imprudently welcome into the heart of its military institution members of this accursed race, the treacherous people who, no longer able to crucify God—withdrawn into the skies above—will now crucify the country?

And as soon as it is noticed that documents are being leaked from the High Command, furtive eyes turn toward the Jew: and how convenient it would be, if he were the one! What a favor from Providence, what a divine blessing it would be if treason had set into the first Jew who

[10] Édouard Drumont (1844–1917) is one of the best-known exponents of antisemitism in France. His book *La France juive* (1886) had a major impact, as did his newspaper *La Libre Parole*.

violated the sanctuary of the High Command by his mere presence! By him and through him, all the others would be discredited forever.

And so, when Du Paty de Clam detected some sort of similarity between the handwriting on the note and Dreyfus's own handwriting, all these sly hatreds, now having found their rallying point, surged forth—and got organized. How far were Du Paty de Clam and Henry, the two leaders of the Dreyfus trial, themselves the dupes of this onrush of opinion? Were they warmly indulgent toward the general prejudice? Or having taken the stance they had, were they fully conscious that they were striking against an innocent man? The truth will be known to us only once the investigation has been completed in full. We still cannot know for sure what was the importance of this half-voluntary impulse, and what was the share of scoundrel calculation.

But what is already certain is that, in the War Office, hearts and minds had long been ready to condemn the Jew. And this probably the original root of the error. But that was not enough. It also took the ambitious stupidity of a mediocre and unfaithful minister. General Mercier, hesitant at the beginning, was gradually dragged into this by a mixture of flattery and threats.

This simple, presumptuous mind, who claimed he could solve the most complicated technical problems, even without studying them, through his mere "intuition as an artilleryman," had been exhilarated by the applause following his banal words to the Chamber. He thought that, through the Dreyfus case, he could play a major role: beat down the Jews, save France from treacherous dealings, gain the favor of the Church, and the support of Rochefort, to rebuild the fortune Boulanger once enjoyed but on stronger foundations.[11] When his clerical entourage saw him looking favorably on this idea, they rushed him into it by handing the newspapers the name of the accused officer. Later on, *L'Eclair* bragged about how difficult it had been to get his consent. But once he had taken this step, when he had opened himself up to *La Libre Parole*, when he had staked all his ministerial fortune on this one card, he wanted to win the hand at all costs.

[11] Boulanger (1837–1891): a French officer who caused a grave political crisis in the Third Republic in the latter half of the 1880s. Wielding demagogic themes, he managed to rally around his own person many who had been disappointed by Bonapartism and monarchism and even some socialists. His rise was brought to a halt in 1889.

And when one adds to all this the stupidity of the army's legal personnel, and when one remembers Besson d'Ormescheville and Ravary's pathetic foolishness,[12] one can imagine that the biggest clanger could sprout in these tired brains.

As fate would have it, there was no artillery officer in the war council which had to judge Dreyfus. An artillery officer might have pointed out to the judges that the note includes details inconsistent with an artilleryman being the author. In particular, there is a mistake that an artillery officer could not have made—for the author of the note substituted the hydro-pneumatic brake with the hydraulic brake. Nobody on the council did manage to notify the judges. And, deliberating as they did on the basis of the imperative communication of secret documents, they convicted in the calmest of fashion.

Thus, we cannot be surprised by the conviction of the innocent Dreyfus: so much force of error and crime contributed to his defeat that it could almost have been taken for a miracle if he had escaped.

How can those who are surprised by Dreyfus' conviction not find it more astounding that deep into the nineteenth century, in the middle of republican France, under a regime of public opinion and control, the General Staff was secretly able to build up, for three years, the stack of crimes that Henry's confession brought to light?[13] Yes, for three years, as if it were in a deep shelter impenetrable to all light, the top ranks of France's army could create forgeries, and deploy all manner of lies, and perhaps even distance themselves from them through the crime of Lemercier Picard and Henry. If I may say so, it took an accident, an outburst of light, for the normal functioning of this villainy to attract the country's suspicions.

This war fought with fake papers seems like a reproduction of the sneaky war of poisoned chalices which the Italians fought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This is what is strange and surprising, and not that innocent Dreyfus was convicted.

We must, therefore, set this kind of prejudice aside and look straight at the facts. However, upon an examination of the facts, it is certain that Dreyfus is innocent. The military tops could assert his guilt. As long as

[12] The former was the officer responsible for the indictment during the first trial of Dreyfus; the latter was rapporteur to the first war council in 1897, and responsible for the indictment against Esterhazy, whom he entirely covered up for.

[13] Colonel Henry, linked to Esterhazy, committed suicide in August 1898.

they did so in general terms, their statement looked to be beyond discussion. But as soon as they tried to clarify matters and produce evidence, that evidence collapsed. Whenever they delve into this famous dossier, they pull some piece of foolishness or forgery to the surface of this mysterious well. Should we believe, perhaps, that some spell has been cast on them? All the sticks they rely on break in their hands: the wood is rotten. And when the reviewing starts and the trial is reopened in broad daylight, it will be difficult—or rather, impossible—for the General Staff to draw up an indictment, and it will itself plunge into the void.

And so the army tops, now giving up any hope of uncovering serious charges against Dreyfus, but helped by the weakness of the rulers and the sneaky complicity of the Elysée, attempted a last diversion by trying to discredit and cast off Colonel Picquart.

Hence the monstrous accusation of forgery made against him, with regard to the "petit bleu" document. We had already responded to this accusation in advance, in the series of articles today gathered in this volume. I only add, in this short preface, that this villainous conspiracy has been prepared for a long time. Of course, the General Staff itself finds this risky. As long as it hoped to escape and prevent the review without resorting to this supreme villainy, it put it on hold—and only when the threatening review was already upon it, did it strike this desperate blow.

But it had thought about it and held it in reserve for a while. The two counterfeiters, Henry and Du Paty, had been preparing the accusation of forgery against Picquart for quite some time. It first appeared in Henry's letter to Colonel Picquart in June 1897, in which he spoke of "the attempt to bribe two officers of the service to make them say that a classified document in the service was in the writing of a certain personality." Henry, who had already fabricated the false letter against Dreyfus, was now preparing false testimonies against Picquart.

Lauth's depositions,[14] both so perfidious and so incoherent, bore the mark of unfinished coaching.

Then, in November 1897, there was the fake Blanche dispatch in which Esterhazy and Du Paty told Colonel Picquart: "We have evidence that the petit bleu was fabricated by Georges." Thus, the accusation of forgery started to be ventured within a document that was itself a forgery; a forgery served as a nest for a lie that was still in its teething phase. But

[14] Henry's deputy.

then, a terrible question was posed to the liars and the forgers: why did you not officially denounce Colonel Picquart from the outset?

At Esterhazy's trial in January 1898, when it was necessary to save the Uhlan at all costs, the illustrious Ravary tried in his report to cast a doubt on the authenticity of this document. But now the question became even more crucial: Esterhazy was accused of treason. The former head of the intelligence service claims to have received from his agents a document establishing a suspicious relationship between Esterhazy and Mr. de Schwarzkoppen.[15]

If this document is a fake, Esterhazy is the victim of the most abominable conspiracy. If it is authentic, there is a serious presumption against him. The first duty of investigators and judges is, therefore, to clarify the authenticity of the *petit bleu*. But instead they are content with perfidious insinuations. They do not dare to officially declare this document a fake when they know that it is authentic. They simply discredit it with hints and innuendoes. Never before did a more heinous conspiracy spread more cynically.

So, before again taking up more thoroughly the discussion on this miserable accusation, we will wait to see if the General Staff persists in this manoeuvre. It is so repulsive to engage in sincere discussion with the organizers of such an ambush, that we have chosen to postpone the new and fundamental discussion that we could well provoke.

It would be easy for us to prove with Mr. Lauth's own words the falseness of several parts of his testimony and the authenticity of the *petit bleu*. But we want to wait for the General Staff to pull out the new fake documents it has presumably fabricated for this last-gasp attempt.

For the time being, it will be enough to warn citizens once again, that they must not allow Colonel Picquart to be tried behind the scenes. All we ask for is that he faces the accusations in broad daylight. We do not demand anything else; we are sure that the infamy of his accusers will burst out into the open. Nothing else behind closed doors! This is the republicans', all honest people's watchword. May it be our battle cry! And we shall win through the power of light alone. And our great generous France, once again facing the powers of reaction and darkness, will have earned the merit of the human race.

[15] Military attache to the German embassy, he had become connected to Esterhazy in 1894 before breaking with him two years later.

Les Preuves, foreword, September 29, 1898.

"Collectivism and the Peasants"

One of the main arguments against the socialists consisted of accusing them of wanting to attack all property without distinction, including small peasant holdings. It is true that socialists had long considered that the development of capitalism would favor the concentration of property ownership, the first necessary step toward socialization, and thus it was backward-looking to seek to oppose this process. Nonetheless, at the Nantes Congress of the French Workers' Party in 1894, both Jaurès and Paul Lafargue upheld the need to defend small peasant property ("the small field is the peasant's too, just like the trying plane for the joiner or the scalpel for the surgeon"). This angered Friedrich Engels, over the border in Germany, but years later Jaurès returned to this idea, elaborating his outlook on this question.

It would seem that socialism's opponents are starting to give up on calling us "sharers."[16] The notion that they attributed to us was so absurd that they met with nothing but outright disbelief. First, because the sharing would have to be started again from scratch, day after day. Further, the tendency of science and big industry is not to divide production into smaller pieces, but, on the contrary, to create vast organizations, huge factories, and railway networks that span entire countries. The idea of sharing everything out into individual parts, of fragmentation, goes against civilization itself. Finally, because the peasants whom they were, essentially, trying to frighten and to set against us with this talk of sharing and sharers, soon came up with quite a simple little piece of reasoning. If land is, indeed, at issue, then whom is it to be shared between?

The land workers, the day laborers, the sharecroppers' sons, and even small landowners' sons are leaving the countryside behind to go to the city, to the factories, where wages are higher. But on what possible grounds would anyone assume that the socialists' intention is to draw the workers back to the countryside, luring them with a piece of land from which all they would harvest is misery and suffering? No, this would be too absurd—and they are having to give up on imputing us such foolish thoughts. So, now they are trying to scare the peasants with collectivism.

[16] "Partageux," referring to the idea that socialists wanted to share everything, including properties, equally; the term was used by conservatives to frighten the peasants and turn them away from socialism.

I admit there is some improvement in the discussion, for the question will be drawn into sharper focus. So, they tell farmers: "Collectivists want the state to seize all properties; therefore, they want the state to seize all land. Which means collectivism will take the peasant's land from him."

I must answer this right away, in the most categorical and absolute terms: "No, collectivists do not want to take away the peasants' land."

I could simply answer: "if collectivism took their land away from them, what use would it have for it? Whom would it give it to? Who would it get to work the land? As soon as the little holdings had been taken from the peasant proprietors, it would be necessary to hand them straight back, only too glad to have someone to keep on working them."

Yes, I could settle for this common-sense reply. But I should elaborate further. First of all, it is wrong to say that collectivism wants to transfer *all* property, including industrial properties, to the state. Rather, what we are talking about transferring is big capitalist property—that property which has concentrated capital and men into large companies and separated property from labor. Nobody today—among the Radicals at least—is scandalized at the idea of the state taking over the bank, the railways and the mines; why not accept that this transformation of large capitalist companies into public services should extend to all large capitalist companies, such as glassworks, blast furnaces, sugar mills, large textiles factories, refineries, etc., etc., which by their growing scale are taking on an ever more social aspect? I cannot fathom how come the Radicals, after accepting state control over a number of large capitalist companies, can be scared off by the notion of socialization extending further. Perhaps they will argue that the Radical program talks only about a buy-out of the mines and railways, and that the Socialists instead talk about expropriation without compensation?

But first of all, if this does appear as a very important issue for a whole category of people, it does not affect the ultimate functioning of the social system. Even with the more or less heavy or long burden of paying compensation, public service, social service, would still end up replacing capitalist enterprise. Secondly, it is absolutely wrong to say that socialism has taken sides on the issue of such compensation. Marx often said, Engels tells us, that the "Social Revolution," i.e., the transformation of capitalist property into social property, would be achieved at the lowest possible price if a compensation was granted to the current owners of capital. By this, he meant that a kind of amiable arrangement between the new and sovereign force of the proletariat and the abolished capitalist

privilege would spare society of all manner of shocks and distress. What would this compensation be? It is puerile to try to determine its form in advance. But it is conceivable that it would be first and foremost be a kind of state annuity, which would gradually be converted, as collectivist production develops, into assignments on the products of social activity. It is of the utmost desirability that the transition be well prepared, and habits and interests respected as much as possible, in the inevitable transformation which justice requires, which reason demands and which the proletariat, through its growing organization, will be able to obtain.

Will anyone further argue that we do not want to stop at the form of a public state service? It is quite true that we do not at all conceive the great collectivist production on the model of today's public administrations, with their bureaucratic process and their hierarchy. The organized workers themselves will be called upon to intervene, alongside nature itself, in the direction of production, in the functioning of socialized industry. Their initially limited influence will gradually rise as their power in and over the state increases. The additional welfare they will draw from the now-transformed industry will also increase as the compensation granted to former capital owners is paid off and comes to an end. The creative initiative of local or regional groups will also increase, on the sole condition that no man can ever be exploited by other men—that the socialized industry will include only associates on an equal footing, with the same wage for the same work. In this way, big capitalist enterprises will first be transformed into a public service, and then this public service, under the action of industrial democracy, will gradually become the social property of organized workers. In this, there is no calamity or catastrophe, no abrupt emergence of the city of tomorrow. Rather, there is a profound evolution that may happen quickly, and which we will hasten with all our forces, but any of whose new forms will be firmly grounded on the pre-existing reality.

However, something else ought to be noted. This Social Revolution, which, like any human action or natural force, is necessarily subject to the law of continuity, this Social Revolution developed through successive forms and progressive steps, will not even have the effect of abolishing small individual property, which will remain in the hands of the artisan working in small industry. Today, this latter plays a subordinate role; it is repressed in many respects, and in any case subordinated by the big capitalist industry. But it has not been abolished. It lives on, it defends itself as well as it can against the fearsome competition coming from big

capital. It collects the crumbs of production or it slips into the intervals of large industry. And, given that it has not been suppressed by the competition coming from big capitalist industry, given that it has still preserved a distinct role, why should it suddenly be abolished by the transformation of the big capitalist industry first into a public service and then into social property? It would only gradually become part of it, by amiable arrangements and fair contracts, in which artisans, small industrialists and workers working with them would find the most comprehensive and most fraternal guarantees.

But to get back to the essential subject of this article, how could collectivism threaten small peasant property, when it will not even abolish small industrial property—but will instead lead it on smoother paths to better and more secure forms? I shall repeat in the clearest, most formal way, that it is false, absolutely false, to say that collectivist socialism has any notion of expropriating peasant owners. It never gave it a thought. It would be contrary to its entire principle. It would be contrary to all its statements. I will prove it in my next article, providing the decisive citations. And at the same time, I will not limit myself to the negative side of the question, limiting myself to saying what collectivism *will not* do to farmers. I will also say what it *will* do, what positive action it will take in the countryside for the benefit of agricultural workers and of agriculture itself. But henceforth, peasant proprietors can be assured that, far from threatening their rights, far from wanting to take away the share of independence they have conquered through heroic labor, collectivist socialism wants to guarantee their rights. It wants to increase their freedom, improve their condition and prepare them, without any spoliation, with their free consent, and more joyful every day, for higher forms of life and of civilization.

La Dépêche, October 2, 1901.

"Jaurès to His Constituents"

Defeated in the 1898 elections, Jaurès won back his seat in April 1902. He did so against the backdrop of the nationwide victory for the Bloc des gauches, which would pursue an offensive policy regarding the state's relations with the Church. This was the beginning of one of the most important moments of Jaurès's political involvement: as vice president of the Chamber of Deputies from early 1903, he backed the government and played a major role in preparing the bill on the separation of churches and state. Below appears the "profession of faith" he presented to his electorate in 1902.

Citizens, I come here as a republican and a socialist to again seek a mandate to defend the Republic, to strengthen democracy, to organize and emancipate industrial and agricultural workers.

This mandate was torn away from us four years ago through violence and calumny.

You remember the awful violence which destroyed any kind of freedom of speech in our region in 1898. And while reaction thus made night fall and silence rule, it shamelessly slandered me for my zeal regarding the Dreyfus case. It presented me as a Judas who had sold out to the country's enemies.

Now all of enlightened and loyal France knows the truth. It knows that an innocent man has been mistakenly convicted and that he has been kept in prison by rogue manoeuvres, by lying, perjury, and forgery.

It knows of the betrayal of the real culprit, Esterhazy, of the forger Henry's confession and of the judgment passed by the Cassation Court.

I am proud of having contributed to saving the innocent man and unmasking the traitors. Blind or despicable people have accused me of criminal acts, but I lay claim to these acts as the long-lasting honor of my life, as a man and as a citizen. Four years ago, reaction, taking advantage of the darkness it had cast over people's minds, once again tried to strangle the Republic, to kill the spirit of the Revolution in France.

The counter-revolutionary assault was repelled thanks to the union of all republicans.

This necessary and loyal union, which will assert itself everywhere in the general elections—in various forms, but with equal strength and success—does not imply confusion or abdication for any republican. When moderate republicans, radicals, and socialists are driven to vote all together against reaction, this does not mean that the moderates and the radicals agree on socialism, or that socialists give up on any of their

claims. By they jointly assert that republican freedom is a common inheritance and that it is the fundamental condition for the regular evolution of democracy.

The Socialist Party, whose entire doctrine and program I will always passionately and faithfully defend, has every right to appeal to all republicans. I say that because in times of crisis, this party has always fought in the front rank to uphold freedom, and because it has been involved in all the reforms prone to inspire love for the Republic.

It will never abandon its ideal. It will never close itself off in a muddled and sterile intransigence. It will back up all good intentions, stimulate whatever is hesitant, and shake off inertia. And, with all the power of the organized proletariat, it will break any egoistical resistance.

Citizens, in the many—always public—meetings I have been holding for forty-five days, I have explained before all of you the coming reforms: the tax system reform, the sharp reduction in the length of military service and the transformation of the entire military institution. I also explained my ideas on the first collectivist reforms, which will free the nation and the workers—those who work the land, as well as industrial workers—from capitalist domination and exploitation.

I repeat these explanations in the longer letter which I sent out to citizens.

Here, I simply wish to answer the crudest calumnies and sophisms leveled by reaction. They almost no longer dare say that we are "sharers," that we want to take the peasants' land away from them. Using their own good sense the peasants treated this nonsense just as it deserved to be. But I will also respond to it by action. I want to organize the rural workers of our region, owner-farmers and sharecroppers, into agricultural credit unions, into federated unions. I want to teach farmers, who are so distrustful of each other, so enclosed in a narrow individualism, what an incomparable strength association will give them, when peasant associations are supported by democratic communes, by a republican and socialist state.

But even if reaction has given up on using this particular calumny, it has not given up using calumnies.

Reaction lies when it says that the general, progressive income tax will be added on top of the other taxes and that it will weigh particularly heavily on farmers. General and progressive taxation will replace today's unfair taxes, including land taxes, and it will also hit the capitalist and rentier bourgeoisie, which does not pay its share today.

Reaction lies when, seeking to stir up religious fanaticism against us and drive people away from the work of reform, it says that we want to destroy religious beliefs by force and demolish or close churches. The freedom of any kind of belief, the freedom of all religions is an essential point in the republican and social program. For us, religion is a private matter which must remain the concern of each individual. And the state must not intervene to destroy it, any more than to tax it or promote it.

But the republican nation, which can only live through freedom and which can only progress through science, must ensure that all children in all schools receive an education complying with the principles of freedom and reliable scientific facts. It cannot allow financial, political and factional monks to prepare decades of civil war and of coup d'état by teaching counter-revolution. And the republican state must recover the right of sovereign control and effective leadership over all education, which was taken away from it in 1850 by the Jesuitic manoeuvres that prepared the events of 2 December.[17]

The reaction lies when it says that I foment strikes. During my five-year term, there was not a single strike in the mines. And if, at the beginning of the conflict, the big bosses of the glass industry had shown as much conciliatory spirit as the workers did, they would have spared themselves, the workers and the city a long trial, from which proletarian right prevailed but after too much cruel suffering. The real agitators, the people really fomenting strikes, are those who have tried, since 1885, to use the mine as a means of political domination.[18]

Citizens, do not be disturbed by all the clamor made by the counter-revolutionaries. With their impressive might, all socialists, all workers, all republicans, will overwhelm the enemy.

Reaction, at once both lazy and violent, incompetent, and trouble-making, did not serve your interests and rights in any way. It has only succeeded in sowing discord by bringing politics into the mines and the glassmaking industry. The republican and socialist victory in this constituency will be the signal for the lasting reconciliation among all the workers in the mines and in the glassmaking industry.

[17] An allusion to the Falloux Law of 15 March 1850 (on the freedom of secondary education), and to 2 December 1851 (Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte's coup, which marked the end of the Second Republic).

[18] An allusion to his rival, the Marquess of Solages; 1885 was the year of Jaurès's own first victorious election campaign in the Tarn.

Overcoming yesterday's quarrels and divisions, they will work in peace, with an ever-alert wisdom, for the common emancipation.

Long live the Social Republic!

La Petite République, April 28, 1902.

Secular Education

Secularism was one of Jaurès's main battles during Émile Combes's government from 1902 to 1905. Speaking in his own constituency, Jaurès expounded a notion of secularism close to that of certain Radicals but distinct from that of some Socialists who considered it a secondary question—hence the long train of arguments developed here. Here we especially see the importance of the education question, which Jaurès had followed closely since taking up his role in Toulouse city hall back in 1890.

Ladies and gentlemen, students,

I thank your city council—I might say, our city council[19]—for having given me, in this celebration of secular schools, the opportunity to remind you that rational and scientific education of the people is an essential need and a vital necessity for the Republic. This education must be the subject of constant attention, and there must be constant communication between the life of the nation and the life of the school. National education in a democracy is not a stationary and fixed structure; it is not a mechanism set up once and for all and then left to work on its own. Rather, education is linked to the whole evolution of politics and society and must be renewed and expanded as its problems themselves renew and expand.

Already thirty-four years ago, just after our country had been devastated by the terrible disasters unleashed by despotism, a loud cry was raised across the republican party: "France must be rebuilt; it must be enlightened, it must be educated."[20] Tyranny is the mother and daughter of ignorance, or rather it is ignorance itself. For, by subordinating all wills to one, by reducing the whole country's active forces to one dynasty or caste, it renders the intelligence of all useless, at least as far as the conduct of public affairs is concerned. And it is a law of nature that a useless organ

[19] In 1904, the Radical Louis Vieu had been elected head of Castres city council as part of a united left-wing slate.

[20] The Prussians' victory in 1870 was attributed to its soldiers' superior education.

should languish and disappear. It may well be true that, in complicated societies in which private interests are so varied and intense, intelligence will survive insofar as it is dedicated to handling these interests. And at first sight a superficial observer would not notice any lessening of thought in a servile nation. But when it is excluded from government and from the administration of social life, the intelligence of all loses its highest object and most vigorous strength; and as soon as a crisis arrives, it can no longer cope with the force of events.

Republican freedom, which gives each citizen the right to intervene in the conduct of public affairs—and indeed, establishes the duty for him to do so, which constantly obliges him to have an opinion and a will—is, therefore, a continuous call on all men to use their power of thought and of will. It is, therefore, the great and universal educator.

But this education through freedom would be insufficient, if it invested citizens with rights and duties beyond their faculties. It would be insufficient, if the nation did not enable all citizens to recognize themselves in the complexity of events, rising above the clash of egoisms to recognize the rights of each and the interests of all.

That is why the education of all citizens through republican freedom must be supported by universal education at school—by the school of the nation and of reason, by the civil and secular school. Yes, this is what the republicans and patriots cried out thirty-four years ago: "Let us rebuild France by educating all, educating all citizens through the Republic and through schooling, through active sovereignty for all, enlightenment for all, and responsibility for all." To apply Dante's vision to these tormented and tragic days, this was the first call made by the shipwrecked as soon as, after being rolled over by the waves, they reached the shore, still panting and almost suffocating. That is what Gambetta proposed to the country in his speeches in Bordeaux, Le Havre, Angers, Saint-Quentin, and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, wherever he carried his admirable republican apostolate, from 1871 to 1872, under the double burden of foreign occupation and the Versailles reaction.

And why did he not settle for calling for education for all, schooling for all? Why did he want this education to be civil and secular and exclusively so? No one would accuse him, I imagine, of being a sectarian. Indeed, the very people who today use this word to insult all us republicans devoted to the secularist cause also gladly invoke the breadth of Gambetta's thought and politics against us. No, he was not a sectarian. Of course, he knew that a government is strong and able to act only if it acts in accordance

with its principles, that is, with a party. He often said, "You only govern with your party." He even drew a singularly grave historical judgment from this. In September 1871, he stated that when the Government of National Defence in Paris proved unable to make full use of the energies that the great city then abounded in, letting them sink into torpor rather than stimulating and organizing them, this owed to the absence of a clear enough political leadership, a firm enough political action. It was "because there was no party ruling in Paris, and because the government was not a party government." He thus meant to say, more generally, that even when it comes to the preparation of national defence, even when it comes to the effort aimed at the salvation of all, at the well-being and grandeur of all, the center of impetus and the springboard for action must be in a party. That is, it must be based on a very defined and clear system of political and social ideas, without which any apparent conciliation of forces is nothing but stagnant confusion and impotence.

But if this party was the necessary and ardent centre of action—and even of the nation's action—he did not conceive it in narrow terms. He sought to attract as many different forces as possible, even formerly hostile ones. This was a man who said that his soul was broad enough to be devoted to both Voltaire and Joan the Maid of Orléans. He invoked the haughty glory of the old monarchy as well as the noble pride of the Revolution; he called on all forces both old and new, from revolutionary workers to Christians in the West. He exalted Hoche for his victory but above all for having imposed peace; he directed ardent words toward the peasants of France, these sons of the earth, raised above the silt by the liberating Revolution; he invited the survivors of the old classes and parties to enter the Republic with their fine spirit and morals and to become one of the jewels of the new France. Indeed, this man had none of the narrowmindedness of sectarian dogma. And if he proposed this secular program, which would necessarily prompt the most violent controversies and the most passionate resistance; if he, the man of national conciliation, presented to a still bruised and torn-apart France this concept of secularism which would irritate old divisions and provoke new ones; it was because he saw secular education a national necessity, a useful necessity, the very condition for rehabilitating the country and the institution of freedom, the soul, the spirit and the very breath of the Republic.

For him, even an aristocratic society that does not want to languish in superstitious routine or let itself be fascinated by mystical dreams,

that wants to live a natural, modern, active life, must appeal to a secular education and justify its autocracy's privilege not through investiture by clerical power, but through the exceptional social activity of this aristocracy. And the question cannot even arise in a democratic society, unless it has allowed itself to be invaded and corrupted to the core by the principles of bondage, under the pretext of liberalism.

Democracy and secularism are two identical terms. What is democracy? Royer-Collard, who arbitrarily restricted the application of the principle, but who saw this principle very well, gave the key definition: "Democracy is nothing other than equality of rights". However, there is no equality of rights if a citizen's attachment to a particular belief or religion is, for him, a cause of privilege or of disgrace. Democracy cannot let the religious question interfere, on a legal level, with any act of civil, political, or social life. It respects and ensures the complete and necessary freedom of all consciences, beliefs, and faiths, but it does not make any dogma into the rule and foundation of social life. In recognizing the right to life of the newborn, it does not ask to which confession he belongs, and it does not automatically register the child in any Church. When citizens want to start a family, and the state has to recognize and guarantee them all the rights that are attached to the family, it does not ask them what religion they will make the basis of their household life, or whether it has a religion at all. When a citizen wants to perform a sovereign act and cast his vote in the ballot box, it does not ask him what his religion is or if he has one. When individuals come before its judges to seek arbitration between them, it does not ask them to recognize, as well as the Civil Code, a religious or confessional code. It does not deny access to property, or the practice of one trade or another, to those who refuse to sign this or that form and confess this or that orthodoxy. It also protects the dignity of all funerals, without considering whether those who pass on have expressed their hopes in immortality before death, or whether, satisfied with the task they have accomplished, they have accepted death as the supreme and legitimate rest. And when the bell tolls to signal that the fatherland is in danger, democracy sends all its sons and citizens to face the same dangers on the same battlefields, without wondering if in the depths of their hearts they will seek some succor from the Christian promises of immortality, against the looming anguish of death. Nor does it wonder if they will only think of that social magnanimity by which the individual subordinates himself and sacrifices himself to a higher ideal, or to that natural magnanimity which despises the fear of death as the most

degrading form of bondage. But what does this mean? And if democracy bases all its institutions, all its political and social rights, the family, the fatherland, property, and sovereignty, only on the equal dignity of human beings, entitled to the same rights and invited to display mutual respect; if democracy moves without any dogmatic and supernatural intervention, solely by the lights of conscience and science; if it expects progress to come only from the progress of conscience and science, that is, from a bolder interpretation of the rights of man and a more effective domination of the mind over nature; then in that case, I have the right to say that democracy is fundamentally secular, in its essence and in its forms, in its principles and in its institutions, in its morals and in its economy. Or, rather, I have the right to repeat that democracy and secularism are identical.

But if secularism and democracy are inseparably bound, and if democracy can only fulfil its essence and function of ensuring equal rights through secularism, what deadly contradiction, what abandonment of its right and of all rights, would make democracy renounce the possibility of bringing secularism into education? That is, into the most essential institution, the one that dominates all others, and in which others become aware of themselves and their own principle? How could democracy, disseminating the principle of secularism throughout the whole organization of politics and society, allow the opposite principle to take root in education, at the very heart of the institution?

For citizens individually to complete, through one belief or another, through one ritual act or another, their secular functions, their civil status, marriages, and contracts, then that is their free right to do so. But, just as democracy has founded civil status, marriage, property, and political sovereignty on secular bases, it is on secular bases that it must found education.

How can a child be prepared to fearlessly exercise the rights that secular democracy recognizes for each man, if he has not been allowed to exercise in secular form the essential right to education, a right itself recognized by law? Later on, how can he properly make out the necessary distinction between the religious order, which is only a matter of individual conscience, and the social and legal order, which is essentially secular, if he himself, in the exercise of the first right granted to him and in the fulfillment of the first duty imposed on him by law, is handed over to a confessional organization and misled by the blurring of the religious and legal order? Duty and law necessarily go along with secularism. Monks

or priests are no longer allowed to take the place of civil registrars in the keeping of registers, in the social recording of marriages. No longer are they be allowed to be civil magistrates in the administration of justice and in applying the Code. Likewise, nor should they replace the nation's civil delegates, representatives of secular democracy, in the performance of their social duty of education.

That is why, as early as 1871, the republican party called simultaneously—and indivisibly—both for the Republic and for secularism in education. That is why, for the past thirty-five years, any retreat or lethargy on the Republic's part has meant the weakening or languor of secularism; and any progress, any awakening of the Republic, has gone together with a progress and an awakening of secularism.

But why should those called "believers," those who offer man the pursuit of mysterious and transcendent ends, a fervent and eternal life in truth and light, refuse fully to accept this modern civilization, which declares the rights of the human being and its faith in science, and is thus the sovereign affirmation of the human spirit? The religion that the believer professes, however divine he may consider it, nonetheless evolves within a natural and human society. This mystical force will only be an abstract and vain force, without any grip and without any virtue, if it does not communicate with social reality; and its loftiest hopes will dry up if they do not deeply take root in this reality, if they do not call on all the sap of life.

Of course, when Christianity first infiltrated and then settled in the ancient world, it did passionately stand up against pagan polytheism and against the great fury of unbridled appetites. But no matter how compelling its dogma was, it could not set aside the whole life of ancient thought. It was obliged to take account of all of Hellenism's philosophies and systems, with all its effort of wisdom and reason, with all its intelligent audacity; and, consciously or unconsciously, it incorporated the very substance of the free thought of the Greeks into its doctrine. It did not recruit its followers with artificial devices, isolating them, cloistering them, in a conventional discipline. It took its followers with their whole life, their whole thought, their whole nature. It captured them not through an automatic and exclusive education, but by an incredible exhilaration of hope which transfigured the energies of their anxious souls without erasing them.

And later, in the sixteenth century, when the Christian reformers sought to restore Christianity and said they would disrupt the idolatry of the Church, which had replaced the worship of Christ by the worship of a human hierarchy, did they repudiate the spirit of science and reason, which was so manifest during the Renaissance? There certainly are many antagonisms and contradictions between the Reformation and the Renaissance. The austere reformers blamed the humanists, the free and floating spirits of the Renaissance, for their half-skepticism and a kind of frivolity. They complained, first of all, that they only fought against Papism through sarcasm and gentle criticism, and that they did not have the courage for a revolutionary separation from a flawed ecclesiastical institution which even the harshest mockery could in no may amend. They also criticized them for enjoying and dwelling so well on the beauty of the ancient letters that they almost returned to pagan naturalism, and that as artists and inquiring minds they were bedazzled by a light that should have served above all, following the Reformation, for the renewal of religious life and the purification of Christian belief.

But despite everything, despite these concerns and divergences, the men of the Reformation breathed the Renaissance spirit. They were humanists, they were Hellenists, who were passionate about the Reformation. It seemed to them that during the centuries of the Middle Ages, the same barbarism, made of ignorance and superstition, had obscured the beauty of the ancient genius and the truth of the Christian religion. They wanted all things, divine and human, to be rid of ignorant or sordid intermediaries; they wanted the effigies of human genius and divine charity to be clean from scholastic and ecclesiastical rust; they wanted all books, man's books and God's books, to be rid of fraudulent or neglected comments, so as to go straight back to Homer, Plato or Virgil's text, as to the text of the Bible and the Gospel. In this way, one could find the way back to all the sources, the sacred sources of ancient beauty, the divine sources of new hope, which would blend their double virtue in the living unity of the renewed spirit.

What does this mean? It means that thus far, neither in the first centuries, nor in the sixteenth century, nor in the crisis of the origins nor in the crisis of the Reformation, was Christianity able to cut off its communications with life, nor to refuse the movement of sap, the free and profound work of the spirit. This, however transcendent its affirmation may have been and whatever anathematized power its doctrine may have begotten against nature and reason.

But now man has made two decisive conquests from the great effort that runs from the Reformation to the Revolution. He has recognized and asserted the right of the human being, independent of any belief, superior to any formula; and he has organized methodical, experimental and inductive science, which daily extends its grasp over the universe.

Yes, the human being's right freely to choose and affirm his belief, whatever this belief may be, the inviolable autonomy of conscience and spirit. And, at the same time, the power of organized science which, through verified and verifiable hypothesis, through observation, experimentation and calculation, interrogates nature and transmits its answers to us, without mutilating or distorting them at the convenience of some authority, a dogma or a book. These are the two decisive novelties that sum up the entire Revolution; these are the two essential principles, these are the two strengths of the modern world.

Today, these principles are so much the very condition, the foundation and the essence of life, that not a single belief could survive if it does not adapt to them, or even if it does not draw on them for inspiration. The question now is whether the advocates of dogma are willing to accept these vital principles clearly and to their core. What would they gain from standing up against them? They cannot do so without exposing themselves to incessant defeat and incessant disavowal.

In the last century, did they gain anything from launching their anathema in a booming document on modern freedom and rights, on the freedom of conscience and of thought, on the whole law of the Revolution? When they saw the scandal it caused, even among the vast majority of believers imbued by at least some of the modern spirit, they had to explain it so well, water it down so much, disguise it so far, that they all but retracted it.

Did they gain anything, from their long denunciations of the new system of the world as seen by Copernicus and Galileo, from rejecting it as unholy? They persisted in their resistance for a long time, since it was only in 1855 that they lifted their index banning Copernicus' works. But this resistance ended, as it was bound to, with a capitulation. And now the banishers boast of having astronomers dressed in monks' robes who question and calculate the movement of the stars according

to the system they had proscribed. Now they comment on Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei,[21] using the great discoveries of the mind that they had for centuries condemned to anathema and to the stake. They take truths they had once tried to abolish in the name of God, but now use them to praise him. And one does not know what is most to be admired in this long effort against science: its atrocities or its futility.

The dogmatists' resistance against the scientific application of the rules of criticism to the study of Old and New Testament texts will also prove impotent. Priests like Father Loisy, who recognize the necessity of this scientific method, are worried and struck, but we do see a beginning of hesitation in the hand that strikes; and they can be half-heartedly surprised and comforted at the sight of the movement that has occurred in the Church itself concerning the doctrine of transformism.

A little over thirty years ago, a vehement and illustrious bishop refused to sit at the French Academy alongside the noble and wise Littré, guilty of having accepted the hypothesis of vital evolution and of the transformation of species.[22] The same bishop, taking the speaker's stand in the National Assembly during the debate on freedom of education, exclaimed that it would be scandalous to allow these unholy and degrading doctrines to enter into education, and even into higher education. And this perpetual anathema against the effort of the mind and the growing truth offer grounds enough to pass judgment on confessional teaching. However, a few years later, representatives of Catholic orthodoxy who have not yet been disowned, Mr. de Vogüé and Mr. Brunetière,[23] tried to adapt this new conception of science to the religious tradition, and they interpreted evolution as the visible symbol through which the creative force manifested itself.

But if the holders of the dogma are thus obliged to surrender in detail to the progress of conscience and of science, and to reconcile with their doctrine truth after truth they at first denounced as incompatible with

[21] "The heavens declare the glory of God"—Psalm 19.

[22] An allusion to Mgr Dupanloup (1802–1878), bishop of Orléans, member of the Académie française, MP and then senator. Émile Littré (1801–1881), author of the *Dictionnaire*, was elected to the Académie française 1871.

[23] The viscount Eugène de Vogüé (1848–1910), a writer, member of the Académie française, and onetime MP, and Ferdinand Brunetière (1849–1906), a member of the Académie française and editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, were two important figures in Catholic circles.

their faith, if they are forced to drag along behind victorious human right and victorious human science, if they finally enter, staggering, and stumbling, down the very paths over which they shed blood with their persecutions and obstructed with their anathemas for so long, why don't they have the wisdom and courage to go all the way? Why do they not accept—to their core and with all their consequences—these two great principles of the modern world which they can no longer abolish, which are the vital element of all thought, and with which they will have to harmonize their transcendent hope if they do not want it dismally to fade away like a flame without fuel?

But if they accept these two principles, they must also accept secular schooling, which is only the application of these principles to teaching. For, on the one hand, by awakening in people's minds the need for reflection and verification, by removing all intellectual coercion from education, by submitting to people's minds the subjects on which conscience and reason are freely exercised, then this gives the human being a sense of his right and value. And, on the other hand, it does not limit the power of science by any dogmatism or by any confessional bias; it does not engage in any systematic aggression against any belief, but it does not subordinate the truths of science to the interests of dogma, out of servile indulgence.

Thus prejudice would be dispelled; thus fanaticisms would be calmed; thus the day will come when all citizens, whatever their worldview, Catholics, Protestants, free thinkers, will recognize the higher principle of secularism. And the conscience of all will ratify the necessary and beneficial laws, the next effect of which will hopefully be to bring together in secular schools, in the schools of the Republic and the nation, all the sons of the Republic, all the citizens of the nation.

And does it not tug at the heartstrings to see the children of one same nation, of this working people, still so suffering and so oppressed? If, for its full liberation, it would have to gather up all its energy and all its enlightenment, does it not tug at the heartstrings to see its children divided into two educational systems, as if into two enemy camps?

And at what point do they divide? At what moment do proletarians deny their children to the secular school, to the school of enlightenment and reason? This moment comes as the greatest of problems call for workers to make an effort: to reconcile Europe with itself, to reconcile humanity with itself, to abolish the old barbarism of hatred, wars and great collective murders, and at the same time to prepare the fraternal social justice, to emancipate and organize work.

It is those who refuse to accept secular education who go against this great work and are unholy to human rights and human progress. Workers of this city, workers of republican France, you will only prepare for the future, you will only free your class through secular schooling, through the school of the Republic and of reason.

Discours de Castres, July 30, 1904 (*L'Humanité*, August 2, 1904).

The General Strike and Universal Workers' Suffrage

After 1906 and the Amiens Congress, the CGT asserted its independence from political parties (through the "Charter of Amiens") and especially the newly created SFIO. One of the main points of divergence between the CGT and SFIO revolved around means of action. Whereas the former upheld the use of the general strike over universal suffrage—seen as a sham—the French socialists were divided over the question. For Jaurès, universal suffrage was sacred. Having been very hostile to the general strike, he gradually came to consider it a potential complementary means of action.

I still believe—despite the objections people make, which I consider futile—that the referendum, the call for universal workers' suffrage, is the condition for powerful trade union action. The trade union minority will not prove its strength and develop its action by isolating itself. Rather, it must deploy all means at hand, using all the workers' energies, and ensure the movement's unity by first consulting all forces concerned, making everyone aware of their responsibilities.

Just as with partial strikes—indeed, even more so—it is the universal workers' suffrage that will allow the general strike to achieve its fullest effectiveness, at critical moments in the evolution of society.

First, it is the very condition for the real success of the movement. The wider the field in which it must unfold, the more likely it is to fail, given that the workers will doubt their comrades' true feelings. They hesitate about taking risks, not knowing if others far away from them will march by their side.

This is the main reason for the tremendous failure of the general strike which the railway union tried to foster. The union was powerful. It thought it had taken the measure of the situation. It hoped it would be followed by the local sections. Nobody moved. And why? Because at the critical moment, when it comes to workers having to stake their daily

bread, their lives, their families' lives, each anxiously wonders if the others will make a decision; and so a terrible feeling of isolation hangs over each worker.

They can only be persuaded of the reliability of collective action through serious and public deliberation which leads to a vote. This was done in England two years ago by the railway workers and employees. The union put the general strike call before the workers' universal suffrage, and an overwhelming majority voted in favor of the strike, after discussion in meetings and in the press and by secret ballot. Faced with this serious threat, faced with this firm resolution, the Companies entered into dialogue.

Working-class England has debated a great deal whether the union has taken sufficient advantage of this show of strength and whether it would have been better to declare a general strike than to accept the complicated arrangements proposed by the English Minister Lloyd.[24] I do not wish to enter into this debate right now. But one thing is certain: after the workers' vote, no one in England doubted for a moment that the general strike, if it had been declared, would have been effective. The railway workers were assured of this; and this very assurance made a general strike possible.

They were not reduced to anxiously asking themselves: What will happen beyond the immediate horizon that we can see and measure? They felt supported by a great force of solidarity.

The deliberate and reasoned vote of all the workers involved in the conflict already provides a mass effect. It also provides an honor commitment for all workers. And without this, before throwing themselves into a fight that could suddenly deepen like an abyss, would they not fear the hesitations, defections and postponements of distant groups, whose will would not have been questioned and manifested? And when it comes to the general strike of a large number of diverse corporations, when it will be necessary to make the truly general strike no longer a word brandished in vain, but a real action—when it will be necessary, for example, to associate employees of the railways, mines and textile industry in one same movement of protest and demands, through the collective and simultaneous refusal of work, metallurgy, glassmaking, public services, typography, urban transport, lighting, large estates—do we really imagine

[24] David Lloyd George (1863–1945), British Chancellor of the exchequer, developed a social programme for workers' pensions and social insurance.

that to mobilize such an enormous and diverse mass, it will take only a watchword coming from above, called by a few unions or even by the General Confederation of Labour in which the unions join together?

A paralyzing doubt will grow within each individual, in proportion to the mass to be moved. Not only will each corporation, each employee, wonder if his unknown comrades, scattered all over the country, will obey the given signal, but each corporation will wonder if the other corporations will go along with it. It will be a mortal hesitation; and soon recriminations and bitter mistrust will grow between those who have risked themselves alone or in small groups and those who have abstained. There will be, to the greatest joy of the bourgeoisie looking on askance, a war inside the proletariat, as the ambitious effort of the workers falls back and crushes them, like a mass clumsily raised by incoherent and stupid arms.

There is but one way to allow light, trust and certainty into this movement, so full of such multiple elements. And that is to call for universal workers' suffrage, in all the corporations where organizing has begun in earnest, to pronounce on the general strike. I admire those who say that this would amount to some sort of abdication for them—quite the contrary! It is the unions that will pose the problem; it is they who will identify the complaints, grievances and confused demands of the working class and who will set the precise questions that will become the program of the general strike. These questions will be varied enough to directly stir each corporations on a few specific points, and vast enough to animate and impassion them all with shared ardor, with the same lofty hopes. Trade union activists will lead and coordinate the propaganda. And they will never find the working people more willing to listen, to reflect, to think. For at the end of all these free debates there will be a vote—that is to say an act that can be the prelude to a whole series of stirring acts. It will also be the means for them to deeply know the proletariat, to illuminate the various depths of this dark and sleeping ocean. They will know which problems do succeed in stirring the mass, on what the educational effort and propaganda should be focused. If the majority of wage earners across all the corporations, have decided in favor of a strike, but in one or another corporation the majority has decided against it, then they shall work on these latter strengthened by the authentic and clear decision taken by the majority of proletarians.

Could it be said that such mass movements will necessarily be rare? No doubt! But this is the absolute condition for their effectiveness. One

cannot think one will get away with exhausting the working class through foolishly regurgitated initiatives. The general strike itself, gradually degenerating into a series of clashes that would merely bear its name, would lose all prestige and virtue. The essential point is not that the general strike should occur frequently; that is an impossibility, a contradiction. Rather, it is that when it does occur, at decisive moments of evolution and social struggle—for serious reasons and over objects of primary importance—it must have the maximum effectiveness. A serious general strike carried forth by the whole proletariat would protect it for many years against any systematic attempt at the social reaction, against any attack and any threat on the freedom of its trade unions or the laws already won in the protection of the workers. It would force democracy for many years into applying workers' protection laws more faithfully and into hastening the work of social protection and the gradual emancipation of the proletariat. Watches that need to be wound up over and over again are not good ones. Similarly, general strikes that had to be repeated every minute would be no good either. They must be a huge shock, capable of spreading far and wide, like when how a massive rock falling into the water makes waves. It is certainly easier to throw handfuls of sand into the wind.

Could one say that, on account of this necessarily slow preparation and the public consultation through universal workers' suffrage, the proletariat would give the authorities and the bourgeoisie free rein to organize their own resistance or attack? But let us not be fooled by words. In fact, the authorities are always as prepared as they can be. They are served by a great administrative centralization and by a permanent military concentration. And the bourgeoisie will be better organized every day. It is unionizing, it is federating, it is trying to mount lockouts. It would be childish to imagine that it will be awakened from a state of sleep by a truly general strike, or that when this latter is instead decreed by a dictatorial Central Committee to which the working class has left all initiative, it cannot break like thunder. There will always be a need for deliberation and preparation. It will not form abruptly, like a wispy cloud suddenly becoming thick and grey. Rather, under the pretext of surprising the employers and the state—who will actually be prepared for it—the working class would deny itself the deep and vast preparation that is the absolute condition for victory. The working class itself would lose the prodigious power of the mass effect the general strike produces—a free and dazzling decision of the universal workers' suffrage.

L'Humanité, September 9, 1908.

"No Ambiguity"

Jaurès wrote little on economics and developed next to no original analysis of capitalism or "imperialism." This, even in a time when this question was the subject of bitter debates within the international socialist movement, especially revolving around Rudolf Hilferding's Finance Capital (1910). Nonetheless, in some texts such as the one below he did advance important considerations, especially regarding the question of nationalizations, at the heart of the French socialist left's programmatic demands from this era at least up to the 1980s.

When the Socialist Party demands the immediate nationalization or communalization of the capitalist monopolies that dominate the country's political and economic life, when it demands, for example, that the railways, mines, banking, sugar production and refining industries, insurance, chemical fertilizer production, and major food services, return to the nation, when it calls for the extension of the municipal domain and municipal management to local transport, buses and trams, lighting, gas and electricity and housing—it does not at all confound these nationalizations or municipalizations carried out within the framework and under the general laws of the still dominant capitalist system, with what the regime of socialized property will be in a world from which capitalism and wage labor have disappeared.

It knows very well that capitalist charges—through the interest and amortization of loans contracted for the repurchase or for the development of production—will still weigh on services thus nationalized or municipalized under the capitalist regime. It knows that working and wage conditions, while they may be raised high enough to serve as a model and a leading force, will nevertheless remain dominated by the overall conditions of production and subject to the general laws of the capitalist equilibrium. It knows all this—and it strongly reminds the proletarians of it, to warn them against any confusion and any illusion, at the very time when it is most vigorously struggling to increase the economic domain of the nation and of the municipalities. It knows that this is not even a partial realization of its supreme ideal, nor does it forget that it is only a part, a small part of the immediate work that it must do for the protection and extension of workers' freedom, for the protection, organization, and progressive emancipation of labor.

But the Socialist Party also knows—in this, following the instinct and the thought of socialism and of the militant working class for over a century—that the greatest interest for the proletariat lies in the path of weakening private capitalism, of reducing its moral and social influence by depriving it of the areas where its activity is carried out with a sovereign concentration. It will give great strength to socialism if it can demonstrate to a routinist and reticent democracy that the management of private capitalism, the lure of profit and dividend, the direction and initiative of capital oligarchies are not necessary for the functioning and the advancement of large firms. It is highly important for socialism to prove that in a democracy where the organized power of the proletariat is growing, the national or municipal community can exercise great economic functions under new conditions, with the participation of the associated consumers and organized workers in administration, initiative and control. That is the goal to be achieved. That is the effort to be carried forth. That is the battle to be fought. It is necessary to expand the economic domain of the state at the expense of private capitalism, while also bringing new habits into the state itself: the controlling power of democracy and consumers; and the controlling power of workers' organized freedom and their rights.

That is why, in this effort—in this battle that is just now being joined, this very moment marked by stirring acts, by the struggle of unionized and confederated teachers, by the protests and the dismissals of state railway workers' representatives, by the assertion of solidarity with the secular masters of the Federation of Public Service Employees—in this great, profound, inner struggle, socialism, trade unionism, and proletarian cooperation are three necessarily united forces.

The Socialist Party, being the party of social democracy, bears the idea of complete workers' emancipation, of the highest human civilization and of full democracy. Trade unionism pools the wage workers of any corporation into a vast unity where they become aware of their immediate strength and their strength for the future. Cooperativism represents and counts on the great but too-long dissipated and sterilized strength of consumers. These three distinct and united powers will transform the idea of public, bureaucratic, oligarchic and fiscal service into a vast organization of democracy and labor, into a magnificent learning of the forces and virtues by which the new order will one day fully function. Part of the profits now monopolized by capital, a part of the directing social influence

concentrated by the general staff of large capitalist companies and corporations, will pass to the national and municipal community, each day more impregnated by the democratic spirit and proletarian influences.

Thus, the state will gradually expand its economic domain and transform itself socially. In this way, a state of labor, of popular administration and equality, will begin to emerge, within the state of classes and privilege. And this new organization, as it develops, will help to prepare the truly socialist order in which the state will be nothing more than a society freed from classes and class violence. It will be nothing but the structure and the guarantee of mutual respect for the rights of individuals. Nothing but the bond of great and noble discipline granted by citizens and equal producers for the common effort of production and civilization. Nothing but the rallying point and the central organization for executing the wishes expressed by the professional groups associated with the municipalities, federated in a great national unity.

This is what all socialists, all communists,[25] all proletarians fighting for freedom and justice have anticipated since the French Revolution since the full emergence of the modern world. This was one of the first thoughts of the workers of France when a powerful class instinct first awakened in them as they faced the bourgeoisie, of which they were both allies against the ancien regime and opponents in the new regime. This spirit, this premonition, as early as 1792, inspired the miners and revolutionary democrats of Anzin. Having recognized that the tyranny of the lords of the ancient regime continued in the tyranny, in the counter-revolutionary manoeuvres, of the lords of capital, they called for the Assemblies of the Revolution to nationalize the mines, in a petition of great historical value that Mr. Schmidt found and published among the documents on the economic life of that great era. And in 1794 it was this same spirit, this will to increase the guarantees and power of the workers—waking up, under the storm clouds, to class life and the most sublime ambitions of the future—that drove the workers of Nièvre to call on their compatriot Chaumette to nationalize the forges, mines, and forestries, who forwarded their claim to the Commune, and thereby to the Convention. I found it in the newspapers of the time and published the text. It was under the pressure of the workers' forces that, after breaking

[25] Between 1880 and 1914 there was no sharp distinction between "communists" and "socialists"; one should not graft onto this period the later splits which resulted from the Russian Revolution of 1917.

with the Gironde, the Montagnard delegates, who could only save themselves and the Revolution with the support of the proletariat, threatened the bosses with the nationalization of the factories if they did not pay the workers a sufficient wage. I published the photograph of the meeting notes from the municipality of Castres, reproducing the imperious speech by Convention member Baudot. The delegates to the Convention everywhere threatened the bakers that they would create municipal bakeries, if they did not sell at reasonable prices. And in the days of the uprising, the nationalization of the grain trade was one of the suffering proletariat's most vehement demands.

The creation of major national and communal services also constitutes Babeuf's, then Buonarroti's transition program,[26] the preparation proposed to guide democracy towards communism. Marx and Engels, in *The Communist Manifesto*, pose great progressive nationalizations as a prelude to the overall work of social transformation, in the period when the proletariat is strong enough to give its direction to the social world but not enough to realize full communism. This nationalization formula burst forth in the workers' demands of 1848.

And through the invincible continuation of tradition, at the German social-democratic congresses Bebel and Liebknecht[27] insisted that nationalizations would be all the more useful and beneficial the more that democracy developed and, through this, the more effective the popular and proletarian control over the nationalized services. For them, therefore, it was an essential part of the working-class's program of action in the period when it would be strong enough to exercise real control, but would still further need to realize its entire revolutionary project.

Looking back to France, what message most roused the Parisian working class in the last municipal elections there? It was our militants' cry of outrage and revolt against the betrayals by the Radicals in City Hall, who handed the transport and lighting services—everything that the municipality had to keep in its own domain—over to capitalist companies. And what part of the program was most successful? It was the one where our friends claimed for the City of Paris the right to own and build

[26] Gracchus Babeuf and Filippo Buonarroti were two of the main figures behind the "Conspiracy of equals" of 1796–1797, which Marx considered the embryo of the future "communist party in action." Socialists thus granted them the greatest respect.

[27] Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826–1900) and August Bebel (1840–1913) were the main leaders of German social democracy. Both opposed the vote for war credits in 1870.

housing, in order to thwart the bourgeois landlords' abusive claims and their usurious rents.

But what trade unionist, among all the signatories of the open letter, then stood up and said that the Socialist Party was on the wrong track, and that it was the Radicals in City Hall who, by handing the most essential services over to private capitalism, had shown most concern for the best conditions for organizing the working class? Who among my immediate critics among the syndicalists protested when the General Congress of Railway Workers voted to nationalize the railways and when the General Congress of Miners voted to nationalize the mines?

Just a few days ago, the powerful English Trade Union Congress unanimously passed a resolution calling for the immediate nationalization of land, railways and factories. Will the English workers' organizations, ever more militant and increasingly penetrated by socialist thought and class spirit, be accused by citizens Griffuelhes and Jouhaux of working against the overall action of the working class and of developing a narrow corporatism that makes the proletarian organization more difficult?[28] And if this argument cannot be validly used against the railway workers and miners of France, who are such important elements of the Confederation, nor against the Miners' International Congress, nor against the unanimous decision of the English Trade Unions, by what right do Jouhaux, Griffuelhes and their friends use it against us? By what right do they try to divide trade unionism and socialism in France? It is not between them and us that they would create a gap, but between them and the whole French and European tradition of the militant proletariat, between them and the whole European proletariat.

But I have some further questions to ask about this.

L'Humanité, September 17, 1912.

[28] Victor Griffuelhes (1874–1923) and Léon Jouhaux (1879–1954) were two of the main CGT leaders.

CHAPTER 2

The Champion of French–German Unity

This second part concentrates on Jaurès's relations with Germany. This was a country of primary importance in his era, as the question of "revanchism" fuelled political debates. The texts reproduced here also shed new light on French–German relations, showing the premises of a Jaurèsian project for Europe based on peace and socialism. Jaurès sought to develop the bases of friendship between the two nations in order to avert any prospect of war.

Throughout his career he would, moreover, revisit the history of this country neighboring France. His disputes with his social-democratic friends in Germany displayed the real difficulties of grounding a French–German solidarity that could rise above the particular traits of each country's socialist movement.

German Socialism

Jaurès defended a complementary dissertation (at the time, written in Latin) on the origins of German socialism. His intellectual training owed a lot to the great philosophers like Kant and Hegel, but also Marx. He explains his approach in the first pages of this dissertation, where he related German philosophy to the political struggles of the nineteenth century.

J.-N. Ducange and E. Marcobelli (eds.), *Selected Writings of Jean Jaurés*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3_2

As we know, the reality is that German socialism is not a pure and contemplative philosophy; it struggles and fights to dismantle the foundations of today's civil society. It is not only a doctrine, but also a party in the state. But sometimes philosophy itself takes on a belligerent appearance, brandishes its weapons, and gets stuck into the political struggle; it does not only look at the sky, but also at the earth. If Socrates brought philosophy down from the sky, what socialism brings down from the sky is justice; that is, it seeks in the region of "ideas" practical views for the arrangement of this earthly life. Fichte, Lassalle, Marx, and Schäffle[1] were both pioneers and masters.

When one delves into German socialism, one finds it includes a philosophy, which claims that there is a certain dialectic in history and political economy that changes the forms of things and human relations. It defines freedom not as an abstract faculty of choosing between opposites or as a hypothetical independence of each individual citizen, but as the true basis for the equality of men and for their communion. Finally, this philosophy does not pursue a celestial phantom—a vain image of justice as separated from the world and from the natural order of things—rather, it claims a material justice mixed with and based on things themselves. German socialism therefore goes together with a solid dialectical doctrine of universal becoming, of human freedom, of Nature, and of God.

In order to get a full grasp of the link between socialism and German philosophy, we do not need a panorama on the whole history of this philosophy; we just need to ask about those men who have shaped German genius and thought, so to speak. It is not the mediocre and inferior talents that influence the events and courses of history, but the most elevated minds. And can anyone deny that Luther, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel count in the first rank among the German theologians or philosophers?

There is no reason to be surprised when we leave aside that materialist doctrine which proceeds from one of the aspects of Hegelian philosophy, although in economics it stands close to socialism. For example, Feuerbach was not the famous Marx's teacher but rather his fellow pupil. Both gave the same interpretation of Hegelianism: the one in philosophy, the other in political economy. Marx himself claims to have embraced the

[1] Albert Schäffle (1831–1903) was a conservative politician but sought to reconcile socialism with the Prussian state, and was thus considered one of the *Kathedersozialisten*.

Hegelian dialectic in order to convert it into materialism and to transform its vain trivialities into a worldly metal—iron, or gold. Moreover, since I do not link German socialism to the materialism of the "Hegelian far left" but to the idealists called Luther, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, I wish to reach the deep true sources of German socialism, but also to discover the future evolution of this socialism. Indeed, if today German socialism fights under materialistic appearances, behind the shield of materialism, it shows the aspect not of future peace, but only of the present struggle. Socialists claim themselves and believe themselves to be materialists for the convenience of their demonstration, so that this land, though delivered from all the ghosts of superstition, may appear under a harsh and raw light, all the more bristling with misery; but in the deep innards of socialism, the German breath of idealism lives on.

This will become obvious when we examine Luther, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel's contribution to socialism; it will also become clear that the socialists were the true disciples of German philosophy and also of the German genius itself.

First of all, it will show more clearly how much events stem from ideas, how much history depends on philosophy. At first sight, one might think that socialism has flourished mainly in England, since it is particularly in England that the new economic order, fundamentally based on money, has insolently grown. It was easy in any case to grasp the economic process in England. But who saw it and who described it? It is not an English philosopher, it is a German living in England, Karl Marx. If Marx had not had Hegelian dialectics engraved in his mind, he would not have linked the entire economic movement in England to this socialist dialectic. England provided the facts, but German philosophy interpreted them. Socialism was born in the German mind long before the unprecedented growth of big industry and the emergence of the conditions that constituted economic socialism.

Les Origines du socialisme allemand (1892), extract.

"The Enduring Problem"

In this text, Jaurès saluted the great work of Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle who, whatever their differences, both strove for the creation of the political forces which ultimately became, through their merger, the German Social-Democratic Party (taking the SPD name in 1890). But Jaurès also

criticised their intransigence and their disregard for the French republican traditions of which the German social democrats were also the heirs. This clash took on particular importance at the International's Amsterdam Congress in 1904, which called for the unity of French socialists—something achieved the following year with the creation of the SFIO.

Marx and Lassalle were not only the theoreticians and the organizers of German socialism; for they also provided great comfort for German thought. How painful it is for German thought to see the weakness, the inanity of democracy's attempts to establish a regime of freedom and human dignity! What a contrast between the boldness of the German *spirit*, capturing and shaping the universe, and the languor and impotence of German *action*! Even the great shock of the French Revolution did not energize liberty in Germany and create a real movement there. The proud autonomy of the will, as claimed by Kant, is instead reduced to living in the secrecy of conscience or in the humble sphere of private relations—unable, that is, to express itself in a political and social order consistent with its own principles. Fichte's fiery words are extinguished, like sparks on the pavement, as they fall on Germany's inert, heavy servitude.

But even when the Napoleonic regime of violence, conquest, plunder and insolence shook all Germany; when the whole of Germany stood up, both people and princes together, against foreign tyranny; and when, from this national collaboration of kings and people, one might expect that the day after victory would bring freedom and constitutional guarantees; instead the people were fooled by the kings—and let themselves be fooled! Violated and betrayed, freedom was reduced to the powerless conspiracies of the Tugendbund! What weakness and what humiliation—what suffering, for proud minds![2]

But even the fresh revolutionary tremor of 1830, which shook all of Europe, led in Germany only to incoherent and feeble initiatives. The German air remained asphyxiating for free men; Heine went into exile and shot his dazzling arrows at the sleeping German giant from afar.[3] Börne also went into exile; and from Paris, in one of his strident letters,

[2] A Prussian association which aimed to uphold Germanic values and mobilize them against Napoleonic domination, between 1808 and 1815.

[3] Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), one of the great German writers of the nineteenth century, an admirer of the French Revolution and a friend of Karl Marx.

he sang the ironic hymn: "O patience, turn towards us, Germans, your lunar face!"[4]

In the 1848 revolution, this distress and humiliation were further aggravated by all the misguided expectations that existed. The revolution collapsed, defeated by counterrevolution, without even leaving the people the strength that it might have drawn from a great memory; and it seems that it only served to discredit universal suffrage, which for a moment masked, like so much paper scenery, the enduring reality of bondage. Finally, as if to complete the defeat of German idealism, the great dream of German unity was fulfilled, but not at all in the manner that the most high-minded had dreamed. Now, led by Prussian militarism, iron and fire realized what the power of thought and democracy could not. Now Germany became a powerful nation among nations without becoming a free nation. And for a century now history has been inflicting on German idealism this double and growing defeat, this double and growing humiliation—first to deny the fulfilment of its dream, and then to accomplish it without it and against it.

Marx and Lassalle saved German idealism and German democracy from this despair and this seemingly irrevocable destiny. Despite superficial variations in their tactics and even sharp disagreements, their common, brilliant find was to identify and secure a new strength—one not compromised in the sad solidarity of humiliations and defeats—and to entrust the future to this latter. This strength, which they foresaw even before it was able to play an effective historical role, was the German proletariat. Marx's first concern, from the beginning of his reflection, was to pile on the German bourgeoisie all the weight of democracy's defeats, all the responsibility for the impotence of the German Revolution. Is such a sentence exclusive and biased? Yes, perhaps, in a way: for first of all the German bourgeoisie, in its patchwork of strivings toward emancipation, faced obstacles that even the revolutionary vigor of the French bourgeoisie would probably not have overcome. And it was not only the bourgeoisie, but German democracy as a whole—the poor elements among the proletariat and artisans as well as its bourgeois forces—which had been either inert or powerless in 1789, 1830, 1848. But it was true that German democracy failed miserably at the historical moments when the bourgeoisie aroused and led the revolutionary movement.

[4] Ludwig Börne (1786–1837), oppositional German writer and a leading figure among the so-called "Young Germans."

Thus, Marx had every right to hold the German bourgeoisie responsible for the disaster of democracy. Above all, he had every right to save the future by freeing this humble proletariat, whose growth alone could liberate Germany someday, from its solidarity with the defeat, by protecting it against the humiliations of history. And how he sensed the greatness of this proletariat, still weak and obscure! How he prepared its greatness, how he created it by defining it!

It would be up to this deprived proletariat to continue and in fact to practically realize high German idealism. The infinite freedom of the mind, affirmed by German philosophy, would take shape in this proletariat and in it alone. For having no constituted and compact interests, it has no prejudices or egoisms that oppose the development of the mind. And the ardent inner life of Fichte, a folded and repressed flame that could only be communicated by escaping a solid and compact world, would develop as a great social force within this necessarily generous proletariat, no part of whose soul draws itself away from the heat of this idea. Precisely because it is nothing but misery, bondage, ignorance, because it is the absolute of deprivation, the proletariat is the absolute of demands, the absolute of aspiration, that is, the absolute of humanity and of the spirit. So, it is through the proletariat that the great force of German thought will move onto the plane of reality.

Through the capitalist expropriation of small industry, the economic movement that creates and develops large industry prepares the ground for the socialist expropriation of capital. If only the proletariat could simply become aware of this dialectic; may this economic revolution, which is still only natural, be elevated to the Idea, to the conscious idea, to the idea "for itself," and the liberation of work and men will be accomplished. Thus, Marx made the proletariat the heir or rather the historical representative of the highest German thought. Thus, he built the great bridge on which German consciousness would march forward, without letting go of the most audacious speculations on the universe, to the audacity of social revolution, the highest form of thought. Thus, at the very moment when German idealism seemed to be most overwhelmed and frustrated by history, he suddenly raised it up and exalted it by identifying it with the proletariat, which was to be the great force of German history. The period of depression and discouragement was thus over and a great hope was set forth, albeit under Marx's mass of irony and sarcasm.

That is what justified Lassalle's political attitude in 1863, during the conflict between Bismarck and the liberals in the Prussian Chamber. Far

from calling on the working class to help the liberals, he invited it to rally against them, even at the risk of playing Bismarck's game, at least temporarily. This tactic would have deserved condemnation, if Lassalle could have believed that the shapeless and helpless German democracy, nothing more than a disaster in 1789, 1830, 1848, was now in a position to accomplish the great national and democratic work that Germany expected, albeit with the help of a more agitated proletarian elite. But Lassalle thought he could see in this liberal turmoil the very symptoms of frailty and collapse that Germany's confused bourgeois and artisan democracy had shown for a century. And he considered it fatal to drown the proletariat's new strength amidst this chronic impotence and defeat. The whole failed history of the German Revolution[5] indicated and undoubtedly imposed this tactic of isolation and proletarian intransigence, just as the French working class's reverse tactic—supporting, despite Proudhon, the republican opposition roused against the Empire—was indicated and imposed by the whole history of the French Revolution, tormented and broken but still-resonating and victorious.

Thus, German socialist democracy was constituted and developed in accordance with the demands of German history, as well as with the thinking of Marx and Lassalle. It seemed that Marx and Lassalle had taken a very long and hazardous detour in dismissing and neglecting this bourgeois liberalism. For it could still appear to be the only immediate force, the only chance of democracy in the near future and by entrusting the whole future to a proletariat that was still but a small sprout. But in fact, since it has been able to act in a relatively unified country, German socialist democracy, has grown with singular strength and speed; for the German proletariat, an admirable force for organization and education. And it has brought together marvellous elements that can help solve the problem to which German democracy has succumbed over the past century.

But the problem is not solved. It remains to be seen how a political democracy will be achieved in Germany that will allow the legal evolution of the proletariat and the gradual realization of the communist plan. It remains to be seen how German universal suffrage will rise from its current subordinate role to that of a ruling and sovereign power. This

[5] Lassalle considered Germany's other political forces a "reactionary mass"; he hoped that this tactic would preserve the independence of the workers' movement.

is where I get to the heart of the great Amsterdam debates.[6] It is here that the aberration of those German socialists who have cast discredit on political democracy—and this, in order to play the game of a few French socialists strangely deviating from the French socialist tradition—becomes apparent. They do so just at a time when German socialism needs to establish political democracy and the effective sovereignty of the people, otherwise risking that the bourgeoisie's failed German Revolution be followed by a proletarian failure.

L'Humanité, September 16, 1904, extract.

"German Controversies"

In this article, Jaurès mounted a frontal polemic against his German comrades, mainly focusing on socialists' attachment to republicanism. Germany was still an empire and the SPD formally called for a German republic; but in reality, this demand was ever less visible. The French socialists like Jaurès were criticised for their attachment to the republican tradition, which many Germans considered secondary or even harmful given its close connections to the bourgeoisie's history. Here, Jaurès reproduced his debate over this question with several German figures who had published articles on it in the SPD's Berlin daily, Vorwärts. He cited them at length in order to highlight their contradictory stances on this subject.

The democratic trend in German socialism—The Vorwärts articles—Kurt Eisner and the Republic. Bebel versus Bebel.

If all the German socialists considered that the monarchy bears more social fruits than the Republic and that it is in many respects preferable for the proletariat; if, instead of facing reality and making a vigorous and methodical effort to prepare the establishment of political democracy in the Empire, they persisted in covering up the impotence to which they are reduced by an authoritarian Constitution, affecting contempt for the Republic and belittling socialism's action in a republican democracy, then any dialogue between German and French socialists would be useless or at least premature. We would only have to wait—without having to explain or debate anything—for the lesson of events, the instinct of life and the very growth of their party to drive the German socialists to strive

[6] A reference to the 1904 Socialist International congress in Amsterdam.

determinedly for political democracy, a necessary instrument of the social cause.

Bebel's real action. But that is not the case. I am sure that Bebel allowed himself to be led astray by polemic[7]: he was trapped by the Dresden motion[8]; and Guesde played a mean trick on him by using German formulas to justify his own tactics. Bebel is too wise a politician to get stuck in a theory of political indifference and helplessness. He will soon realize that in Germany itself there is an increasing need to give the growing electoral power of the proletariat a political form and validation, and to join a democratic cause. What must strike him is that this trend is emerging not only among those called revisionists. The fact that in Amsterdam itself—despite his vigorous intervention—15 of the German delegation voted in favor of Adler and Vandervelde's[9] much broader and more flexible motion (with 30 against) was undoubtedly a warning for this sharp and alert mind. One of the most important members of the German delegation (himself a radical) said: "In his speech, Bebel gave the impression that the party is an end in itself. Yet, the proletariat constitutes the party in order to obtain reforms and develop its means of action."

Eisner's articles. But above all, Bebel must have been impressed by the strength, the energy and the intense conviction with which Kurt Eisner,[10] one of the main editors of *Vorwärts*, took sides for the Republic and for political democracy, and tried to break the false and misleading solidarity that Kautsky's doctrinaire complacency allowed to be established between German socialism and Guesde's conception.

I do not know Kurt Eisner personally: I have never met him and I have never corresponded with him. I can work out his views only thanks to his articles for *Vorwärts*. I hasten to add that he is far from giving unlimited approval to our policy; and he has serious reservations about it, which I will go on to discuss. But he is a free thinker; and from the very center of this semi-absolutist Germany, where the class struggle takes a compact

[7] SPD chairman August Bebel (1840–1913) enjoyed considerable political and moral authority.

[8] The SPD's Dresden congress in 1903 condemned any attempt to question the validity of Marxism.

[9] Victor Adler (1852–1918) was one of the main leaders of Austrian social democracy; Émile Vandervelde (1866–1938), was a Belgian social-democrat.

[10] Kurt Eisner (1867–1919), was prominent in the SPD nationally, a member of the *Vorwärts* editorial team and one of Jaurès's few allies at this paper.

form, he has a sense of parliamentary life and democracy. In an article in *Die Neue Zeit*, which caused quite a sensation, he suggested—from a theoretical point of view, without entering into the examination of Italian and French socialist policy—that in parliamentary democracies socialism could be spurred to participate in government action and majority action. But his obsessive concern (and that is why he passionately desires the unity of French socialism) is that the socialist party should be so strongly constituted and in such constant communication with the proletariat, that the dangers of this parliamentary or even governmental action diminish, and that only the useful effects remain.

He is not "revisionist" or "Bernsteinian." It seems to me, if I understand his thinking correctly, that what he reproaches Bernstein and some of his friends for is that they have spread their theoretical criticism too thinly, that they have spent too much effort dismissing outdated theories like "catastrophism," which in fact no longer had any roots in the party's thinking, and that they have not sufficiently centered their propaganda on the need for stronger and more effective political action. At the moment I am not discussing Kurt Eisner's principal ideas, but just explaining what I think they are, so that there is no misunderstanding about the meaning of his statements. Moreover, he seems impatient at people who try to get themselves out of a fix through the clever use of words, or delude themselves that they are really resolving the problems that face the party when they group together very diverse ideas under some tendentious term, be it "revisionism" or something else.

I would add that it was Liebknecht, if I am not mistaken, who spotted Kurt Eisner's bright and free-thinking mind and introduced him to *Vorwärts*. In any case, I remember that at the Dresden congress Bebel paid tribute to the high philosophical and political value of his articles; and Kautsky, in the most recent controversy between him and Kurt Eisner over the Amsterdam Congress, was upset that *Vorwärts*'s "leading head" had the front to engage in such a dispute.[11]

I will not insult Bebel and Kautsky by assuming that I am providing them with additional cause for grievance against Eisner just by reproducing his articles. These articles are now in the international public domain and I have detailed Eisner's own thinking quite clearly. Writing again in a few days' time, I will put proper emphasis on the criticisms he

[11] Karl Kautsky (1854–1938), the main theorist of German social democracy, bore great influence in this period.

has directed against us, so that no one can accuse me of having arbitrarily put him on our side, or suspects him of having indulged this. If I do not simultaneously quote Kautsky's articles, to which he is replying, this is not for the sake of highlighting only one side of the debate. Rather, this is, firstly, because Bebel, Kautsky and Guesde's theses were already set out at Amsterdam, and secondly because I wish to quote Kautsky soon in order to discuss the sophisms which it is time to drop, if we do not want the socialist movement to be paralyzed by the most fatal and childish abstractions, as deadly to thought as they are to action.

Republic and social monarchy. So, Eisner says in the first response to Kautsky and his complacent formulas for social monarchy: "One might think Bebel reckoned that in a monarchy the classes are not as directly and brutally in struggle as they are in a Republic. Such an opinion, which of course Bebel does not and cannot have, would be a concession to the fundamentally false theory upheld by the domestic professors of monarchical law, namely that monarchy has the wonderful strength of standing *supra partes* and thus achieving the balance of justice between the classes. In fact, historical experience shows—and the internal logic of the social organization of the state proves—that no ruling class can tolerate a strong monarchy that does not give itself up to it, body and soul. That is why when a monarchy is not limited to being an empty formal matter, mere decoration, but is more or less deeply committed to absolutism, it does not make even the most modest attempt to seek a balance between the interests of the ruling classes and the ruled-over classes. It only seeks to establish compromises between the different interests within the ruling classes themselves. It must constantly ensure that it keeps the good graces of the "faithful supporters of the throne"; and thus it must in turn give them, in turn, every imaginable advantage—always at the expense of the proletariat.

The need to rely on the ruling classes and to constantly reconcile the multiple antagonisms of interests that arise between the various fractions of the possessing society, through the evolution of the economy, compel the monarchy to constantly strengthen economic and social privileges in order to avoid itself being torn apart in this conflict.

On the other hand, the ruling classes, in their keen rivalry to win the favour of the crown, become more and more reactionary. As they seek to adapt to the court's very nature, bending to the conditions of finding influence under dynastic regimes, their class egoism manifests itself not only in the coarsest form, but also in the most senseless form, most

contrary even to their own interests. As a result, in no Republic is the class struggle more brutal and at the same time more absurd than it is in monarchical Prussia and monarchical Saxony.

While the absolute or semi-absolute monarchy thus pursues a policy of compromise among the various interests of the possessing classes—and this, at the expense of the proletariat—the ruling classes feel so secure behind the walls of a strong monarchy that they hardly see any need to reach accommodations with the proletariat, to soothe it with concessions. And if the monarchy feels the need to make some semblance of a concession to the proletariat, in order to make it accept the compromises built on its back between the various interests of the possessing classes, then the dominant classes will stubbornly oppose such initiatives. Thus, the only "monarchical social reforms" are the ones allowed by the possessing classes. And that is why nowhere else is there such reactionary and narrow-minded class domination as the one that the bourgeois factory squires and the feudal lords mixed in among them exercise in the Prussian monarchy and the Saxon monarchy.

On the contrary, in democratic republics or in those constitutional states that have only a semblance of monarchy, such as England, the ruling classes are obliged, in their own struggle for interests, to attract the proletariat onto their side through concessions. The social concessions in these states may, sometimes, not appear in such dazzling colors as the bureaucratic social reforms mounted by monarchical states with such self-satisfaction. But their inner value is much higher. And above all, the ruling classes must seek to win, through political freedoms, the sympathy and help of the masses whose assistance is essential to their rule itself…."

Republican superstition. "What Kautsky calls 'republican superstition' is therefore a very revolutionary, very radical and in any case absolutely necessary concept."

Kurt Eisner notes, moreover, that those who, like Kautsky, tried to systematize Bebel's words in Amsterdam, against republicanism, are in contradiction with Bebel himself. For he said at the Dresden Congress: "*If Prussian Germany had a Republic, however timid it might be*, we would most likely have equal, direct and secret universal suffrage for all representative bodies, an allowance for deputies, a fairer distribution of electoral districts, as proportional a representation as possible, much more liberal legislation on associations and meetings, greater freedom of the press, a *more perfect social reform* aided by which our power would weigh much

more heavily than today, a more democratic military system, a government accountable to parliament; in short, a whole series of the most immediate articles of our programme would be implemented, for which we must now still fight long and probably very hard battles and endure many sacrifices.

> And if now Vollmar and Göhre[12] want to claim that the form of government is secondary, what will our Belgian, French, Austrian and Italian comrades think when they read such statements?"

Today, I do not want to add long comments to what I cited from Kurt Eisner, and to what he himself quoted from Bebel. I will say just one thing: it is extraordinary that the Republican Bebel of the Dresden Congress gave himself over to the apology of the social monarchy in Amsterdam, in order to please French socialists and to play their game!

Even assuming no direct, brutal, crude contradiction between Bebel's language in Dresden and his language in Amsterdam, in any case the language of Amsterdam is of completely different inspiration, much less democratic and much less republican. Bebel, obliged to make himself much less republican than he was, in order to play along with Guesde and Vaillant's[13] game, is one of the most extraordinary paradoxes in the history of parties. That Blanquism, in the person of Vaillant, should manage, for the temporary and illusory satisfaction of a sectarian interest, to obtain from the German socialist leader the weakening and near-disavowal of his previous republican declarations—this is the sign of the prodigious distortions that a factional spirit can bring to the revolutionary senses.

Yes, the truth is that in order to defend Guesde and Vaillant's policy against us, Bebel was persuaded to embellish in Amsterdam the same monarchy he had deprecated in Dresden, to deprecate in Amsterdam the Republic he had exalted in Dresden. For the policy of Guesde and Vaillant, this is the most ironic, the most appalling condemnation that can be

[12] Georg von Vollmar (1850–1922), one of the first German social-democrats to raise doubts over Marxism; Paul Göhre (1864–1928), a pastor-become-socialist and a critic of Marxism along with Vollmar.

[13] Édouard Vaillant (1840–1915) embodied the Blanquist sensibility in the socialist movement (so named after the famous nineteenth-century revolutionary Blanqui). An ally of Guesde's, he was often hostile to Jaurès's ideas.

imagined. The presence of Guesde and Vaillant at an international socialist congress, resulting in a boost for monarchy in Europe and a setback for republicanism, is a deeply comical performance, faced with which thought itself bursts out laughing.

But I still have to translate the sharp, insightful article where Kurt Eisner addresses French matters directly.

L'Humanité, September 18, 1904, extract.

Revolutionary Germany

In his Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine, *Jean Jaurès devoted hundreds of pages to studying the French Revolution's effects abroad. A specific volume is devoted to Europe during the revolutionary period, with a special focus on Germany. What may seem obvious for us today was not so at the time: very few French historians back then looked beyond France and took an interest in the Revolution's international consequences. From this point of view, Jaurès's* Histoire socialiste *is a key—but all-too little-known—moment in establishing a common historical narrative embracing both France and Germany, which the two world wars would temporarily break.*

Germany's Political and Economic Condition

The Influence of the Encyclopaedia

Germany was all set to take an interest in the French Revolution. France's intellectual effect on Germany in the eighteenth century had been vast. Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, the Encyclopedia, and the Academy of Sciences had generated ideas and fascinated minds beyond the Rhine. And even when the German spirit became aware of its originality, when it freed itself, in the sphere of art and thought, from the exclusive influence of France and created its own literature, theatre, and philosophy, it remained in living communication with the French spirit. It was Klopstock[14] who first gave the German genius a truly national epic and lyrical expression, and he was stirred with enthusiasm at the first events of the

[14] Friedrich Klopstock (1724–1803), a German poet famous for his 1789 poem greeting the French Revolution.

French Revolution, at the first statements of freedom. In Lessing,[15] who liberated German theatre from the servile initiative of French theatre and gave religious criticism a depth unknown in France, the mark of French critical thinking, so clear and acute, was still evident. When Kant solved the problem of the relationship between thought and being with an incomparably bold solution—when he based the harmony between the world and thought on the primacy of thought in creating the laws by to which the world manifests itself—what else was he doing except to justify science, glorify thought, strengthen the foundations of knowledge and experience, that is, continue in his own way the great tradition of the French eighteenth century? He intervened to protect the magnificent boldness of experimental science from the possible offensive of doubt. He firmed up the path along which the encyclopaedists walked and made it the royal road for thought, the legislator of things.

The decisive features of French culture are conspicuous in all the German minds of the second half of the eighteenth century, among the most modest as well as the greatest. And these were the free concern for universal truth, the hatred or contempt for prejudice, a constant call to reason, a broad human sympathy for all peoples and races, and especially for all efforts at civilization and thought, in whatever form and in whatever nation they might take place; the need to understand and harmonize everything, to break the artificial unity of tradition so as to create the living unity of science and of the mind; the encyclopaedic and cosmopolitan inspiration, the passion for science and humanity; the great movement that the Germans called the *Aufklärung*, a reflection of the word that the French eighteenth century so loved and which then shone out, new and brilliant: the Enlightenment.

At the same time, through a more particular link, through a more singular and penetrating influence, the Genevan Protestant Rousseau, with his religious rationalism, with his pained sense of moral problems, brought France's thinking into deep communication with Germany's conscience. I do not have to tell you what an effect he had on all German thinking.

How could Germany, being so shaped by our own eighteenth century, so imbued with the French spirit, not have been stirred by the great event of freedom which, in 1789, shook all France? How could it not have been

[15] Gotthold Lessing (1729–1781), a writer who was part of Germany's own Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*).

aware of this affirmation of human rights, which seemed to confer the greatness of thought upon a historical fact, and a symbolic and universal value upon the particular action of one people?

But if Germany, at least the thinking Germany, was thus at first willing to sympathize with the Revolution, there could be no such community of action between Germany and France as only the enduring union of minds could create. Germany, despite the boldness of its thinkers, was not in a revolutionary condition: it was not ready to carry out in its own country the revolution of bourgeois freedom and democracy that France, at its own peril, was so gloriously attempting.

The Obstacles to Revolutionary Action

Political fragmentation. There were four main obstacles to revolutionary action in Germany. First, Germany's political fragmentation prevented any movement spanning the whole country. It was divided into several hundred small states. In centralized and more or less united France, even before 1789, the wide and united territory was suitable, so to speak, for mass operations. Despite certain differences in legislation and customs, the French of various regions, of various provinces, lived under the same authorities and more or less under the same law. So, the bourgeois and proletarians of Brittany, Ile-de-France, Languedoc, Provence, Dauphiné, not being animated against each other by violent provincial rivalries, could direct all their energies against the privileges of the nobles and of the clergy, against the arbitrariness of the king and of the institutions: they had obvious common interests, from which a common action soon followed.

On the contrary, the extreme political division of Germany in 1789 dispersed and misled the thinking of the exploited classes. The German bourgeois and proletarians wondered, not what they would themselves become in a great revolutionary transformation, but what would become of the particular state to which they were still attached by multiple bonds of habit, interest, and vanity. The relative autonomy of each of these states, however, damaging it may have been to Germany's general life, economic activity, national strength and freedom, offered immediate benefits to superficial minds. Each of these little courts had its own clientele of government officials, suppliers, and merchants. It appeared as a center of life, a center of wealth. Whereas the impulse to production and trade that would result from a democratic unification movement still

seemed distant or uncertain, the loss that could result for all these small capitals and states from a vast social upheaval could be imminent.

These concerns borne of selfish routinism were sometimes combined with higher level concerns. By its very diversity and fragmentation, Germany offered, here and there, a refuge for free spirits. For some of these little princes, there was glory or personal prestige to be had in taking in the great geniuses who elevated German thought. Goethe along with Wieland, the Humboldt brothers, the Schlegel brothers, Voss, Jean-Paul, and several others, had found a noble freedom in Weimar; who knows what place there would be for thought in a Germany unified by some violent upheval? Thus, the concern for free culture confirmed, among elite minds, the same particularist politics also widespread among the small-town bourgeois, "the German philistine."

The Austro–Prussian rivalry. Further, the rival intrigues of Austria and Prussia, each seeking to dominate Germany aroused legitimate suspicion. When the Prussian-led "League of German Princes" was formed in 1785, it was more a means of combat imagined by Prussia against Austria than a means of emancipation for Germany. Thus the national consciousness had no political center to be attached to and the Reichstag—the imperial assembly where representatives of princes and cities met—had only a semblance of life. No one cared to speak there anymore; princes no longer thought it worth going there in person: they made their will known through statements read by their secretaries. Of course, no movement could be born from this protocolary exchange of diverse and confused thoughts, which denied any deliberation and adaptation.

Germans sought consolations for their inability to create a national life by thinking that they were thereby more freely living a human life. Goethe, in two verses noting this radical incapacity, told the Germans: "You Germans vainly hope to form a nation. But that is one more reason for you to become free men: and that you are able to do."

Childish illusions, lying words! How can we separate man from citizen and producer? How can a man be free, if the citizen is oppressed, if the producer is weighed down by his shackles? Germany like France needed a revolution to liberate "man; yet, this revolution was only possible through a concerted and vast movement, and this movement itself supposed a single, energetic national life."

[…]

Revolutionary Germans

Reforms

Does this mean that the French Revolution's failure in Germany was total? No, of course not. First, when the prodigious spectacle of revolutionary France unfolded in Germany for three years, this was not in vain. As obtuse and sleepy as the German peasants still were, they learned of the abolition of labor service and tithes, and they were surprised by this. The wisest German statesmen understood that in order to prevent an uprising like the one in France, some reforms would have to be implemented to lighten the burden on the people. Some rulers of small states, notably the fickle and despotic margrave of Hesse, got the idea into their heads that repressive measures would be enough to crush the seeds of Revolution. And in some respects, the freedom of the press, of which the Aufklärung Germany had been proud for a third of a century, seemed threatened. It was forbidden to speak of politics in the inns and music halls. "In hostelries there is now," said a satirical review, "only one difference between men and animals: it is that men pay." The secrecy of correspondence was sometimes violated. But Germany was committed to freedom of thought and the reaction stopped.

Thus, little by little, the ideas of the Revolution spread, even in the newspapers and magazines that were against it. And governments felt that the time was approaching for the necessary concessions. In the *Nouveau Museum allemand*, Schlosser, the servant and advisor of Margrave Frederick of Baden, called on rulers to be cautious and to plan ahead: "Let us hope," he wrote, "that in Germany we will be wiser than in France. *It is impossible to prevent the people from seeing, by the very example of the French, that things could go on differently than how they do* and the inclination to obey must remain strong enough to neutralize contrary impulses. *However, so as to strengthen the habit of obedience, princes must make the necessary reforms in time: a fair lowering of taxes, limiting the ravages of game, softening labour service, assistance for the poor, greater facilities for labour, firm monitoring of state employees, faster justice — that is now the only eloquence that can turn subjects away from revolt.*"

Thus, despite everything, ideas were moving forward, and countless seeds fell into the open furrows. The greatest German thinking even became more manly in the moment of action…. Doubtless, many minds withdrew and retreated. But others took their share in the inevitable brutality of all the major movements of mankind. Against the fury and

growing threats of reaction, they maintained and upheld ever higher the ideal of law and freedom. Thus, in the order of thought, they learned how to fight.

Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine (1902), "La Révolution en Europe," Chapters 1 and 5, extracts.

"Peace and Socialism" (Berlin Lecture)

Jaurès was originally meant to give this speech in Berlin but the Reich refused him permission to set foot on German soil. The international situation had until recently been extremely tense due to the French–German dispute over control of Morocco. Jaurès had resisted this operation, fearing war between the two countries. This was also just a few months after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution of 1905 (see pp. 119–122), which goes some way to explaining the enthusiasm he expressed here.

Citizens, I am pleased to be here, as the delegate of the French Socialist parliamentary group, to express our solidarity with you, the unity of the French proletariat and the German proletariat, their common and firm will to ensure peace, to conquer peace through the organization and emancipation of all workers. I am also pleased that at this very moment there is an easing of the tensions between the French and German governments and the Moroccan conflict is being solved. How far has this conflict really threatened peace? And did the two peoples really run the monstrous risk of being thrown into conflict? We cannot answer with any precision: for one of the beautiful things about diplomacy is that we can never be sure how much it jeopardizes the people it intends to save. The Chancellor of the German Empire told a major French newspaper that he was happy that we had finally emerged from a situation that had been "tense and dangerous." These are serious words. It is true that sceptics insinuate that there was mere bluff by both governments, which the people took too seriously. They say diplomacies were trying to test the waters; they were trying to test the magnetic power of their attitudes and their outlooks. I do not know what element of game playing and braggadocio there was in this conflict. It was, in any case, a dangerous game. When two conductors drive their trains right toward each other on the same stretch of track and their intentions are unknown, then no matter how much anyone says that they just want to test each other's nerves, no one can know how things will turn out. It may be that at

least one of the drivers has lost his mind. It is possible that, as a result of their combined braggadocio, they will set their machines running so well that they can no longer stop in time—and the result will be a collision. If this is, indeed, a game, then the passengers would rather play a different one. This time, the collision was avoided: the two train drivers exchanged courteous salutations; they were even prepared to decorate the locomotives with flowers and couple them both to the interminable train of the international conference. That is all well and good; but this dreadful scare, which suddenly occurred amidst a previously total calm and security, reminds peoples and proletarians how fragile and precarious peace is in today's society with today's governments. It reminds the entire working class of Europe, the entire working class of the world, of its duty of international unity and vigilance. The international proletariat must not be a magnificent and vain slogan. It must not be an intermittent and superficial force, showing itself now and then in its international congresses or through the circulars of the International Socialist Bureau.[16] It must be a constant force, ever aware, ever alert, ever in a position to keep control on events as they begin, to monitor from their very first emergence the conflicts which could develop into wars.

Be clear, in these words there is no kind of socialist bravado. We are not here to trade in illusions. We all know very well that in the capitalist world there are great forces driving toward conflict, violent anarchy, and exasperated antagonisms. The universal proletariat, has thus far achieved an insufficient degree of organization and political power and cannot yet flatter itself by saying it can, with any certainty, tame these forces. Economic competition between peoples and between individuals; the appetite for profit; the need to open up at all costs—even with cannon fire—new outlets for capitalist production, cluttered and as if suffocated under its own disorder: all this keeps humanity today in a state of permanent and latent war. What is called "war" is only the explosion of this underground fire raging through all the veins of the planet, the chronic, deep fever running through all life. There is a constant need for distant, exotic, servile markets—for the system takes up a large part of the product of workers' labor and thus restricts free national consumption. Yes, we know this. And we also know that the workers' strength is not yet organized enough, conscious enough, effective enough, to

[16] Bureau responsible for coordinating and directing the International's actions.

repress and neutralize these malicious forces. Either the proletariat will be seduced by a false appearance of national grandeur and corrupted by a derisory share of the capitalist and colonial plunder, and thus only weakly oppose the armed enterprises. Or the ruling classes so cleverly confuse quarrels born of economic antagonism that the proletarians are unable to untangle their real origin. Or, when they do have a better-informed understanding, they cannot do enough to affect the machinery of politics and government, and their opposition is overwhelmed by all the loose and unorganized elements that capitalism sets in motion at times of crisis. Or else the socialist workers of each nation, still too distant from each other, ignorant of each other, will despair of the utility of an action that would have to be international to be effective; and unsure of being supported on the other side of the border, they dolefully abandon themselves to fatalism. Yes, working class's protests are not yet strong enough to avert every storm. The voice of the universal proletariat is beginning to rise above the nations shaken by the eternal rumbling of anxiety and war—but vibrant and strong though it is, it cannot repeat all of Schiller's song of the bell.[17] It may say: *Vivos voco, mortuos plango*, I call the living, and I cry over the dead. It cannot yet say: *Fulgura frango*, I break the lightning. We still have a great amount of work to do, in educating and organizing. But despite everything, now we are able to hope, and act. There should be neither blind optimism nor paralyzing pessimism. There is an onset of worker- and socialist organization, there is an onset of international consciousness. Now, if we so will it, we can react against the fatal drive to war inherent to the capitalist regime. When Marx talked about the first laws to regulate working hours in England, he said that this was the working class's first conscious reflex against oppression by capital. War, like the direct exploitation of workers' labor, is one of the forms of capitalism, and the proletariat can engage a systematic and effective struggle against war, just as it has undertaken a systematic and effective struggle against the exploitation of the workers' labor. Just as there is no iron law of wages that no proletarian action could soften, no iron law of the working day that no proletarian action could reduce, similarly

[17] The speaker had good reason to mention the name of Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805), especially highly regarded among the German social-democrats.

there is no iron law of war that no proletarian action could bend.[18] The present world is ambiguous and contradictory. There is no room for either fatalism or certainty. The proletariat is neither strong enough that peace is secure, nor is it so weak that war is inevitable. In this indecision of things and this unstable balance of forces, human action can do a great deal. The important element of the unknown is not frightening just for us socialists, but so, too, for those who would recklessly wage wars whose political and social consequences and internal repercussions no one can today predict. So, today we can bear some effect n the course of events. And since no one can determine in advance how effective our activity will be, we must devote all our efforts to it, as if it was indeed assured of success.

[…] And do not misunderstand our thinking. We socialists do not fear war. If it breaks out, we will be able to face up to events. We will do our best to set events in the direction of the independence of nations, the freedom of all peoples and the liberation of the proletarians. We do not hate war out of some weak and nervous sentimentality. The revolutionary resigns himself to human suffering, when this is a necessary condition for great human progress and when it drives the oppressed and exploited to rise up and liberate themselves. But now, in today's Europe, it is not by means of international war that the cause of freedom and justice will succeed and the grievances among peoples will be redressed. Admittedly, over the past 150 years, many acts of international violence have been committed in Europe; they have left lasting bruises on millions of minds, and their consequences weigh heavily on Europe and on the world. But it is only through the growth of democracy and socialism that these sufferings will be soothed and that these painful problems will be solved. Democracy makes human persons' consent the rule of national and international law. Socialism wants to organize the human community, but not on the basis of constraint. And when the law of justice and harmony prevails, averting any attempt at exploitation, it will leave nations free self-determination within humanity as a whole, just as it will allow individuals free self-determination within the nation. And in conditions of peace, the growth of democracy and of socialism is certain.

[18] An allusion to Ferdinand Lassalle, founder of the first German workers' party in 1863. Lassalle's notion of the "iron law of wages" held that wage-laborers would be unable to achieve a wage higher than that which would guarantee their most basic subsistance.

A European war could spark a revolution and the ruling classes would do well to take that into account. But it could also lead to enduring crises of counterrevolution, furious reaction, exasperated nationalism, stifling dictatorship, monstrous militarism, a long chain of retrograde violence and base hatred, reprisals, and bondage. We do not want to play this barbaric game of chance—we do not want to make the bloody roll of the dice which risks the certainty of progressive emancipation of the proletarians, the certainty of autonomy based on justice, which the full victory of European socialist democracy reserves for all peoples, for all fragments of peoples, above all divisions and dismemberments.

That is why we, French Socialists, who will not let anyone accuse us of undermining justice, completely repudiate—today, forever, whatever the conjectures of changing fortune may be—any thought of military revenge against Germany, any revanchist war. For this war would go against democracy, it would go against the proletariat, it would therefore go against the rights of nations, which will only be fully guaranteed by the proletariat and by democracy. Today, European peace is necessary for human progress; and peace, an assured, lasting, trusting peace between Germany and France, which has done a lot for the democratic movement and the awakening of the working class in Europe, cannot work against their development. That is why, by dismissing here before you all thoughts of war, all armed claims, by urging France and Germany to renounce all latent antagonisms and mutual suspicions and to coordinate their action to consolidate peace, we believe that we serve, with the interest of the international proletariat, the highest interest of both our nation and your own. I can speak here without contradiction and without embarrassment, both as an international socialist and as a son of France, which has undoubtedly made many mistakes in its long history, from Charles VIII to Louis XIV and from Louis XIV to Napoleon. It has too often taken advantage of its national unity, constituted before that of other countries, to brutalize and offend the still fragmented and unorganized nations. Even during the Revolution, France too quickly colored the pure enthusiasm of universal freedom and humanity with its drunkenness on domination and pride. Through the brutality of its conquering soldiers, as your poet Herwegh said,[19] it deflowered the

[19] Georg Herwegh (1817–1875), A German poet involved in the revolution of 1848.

freedom it offered to the world as a bride. At first driven by a heroic movement to the furthest reach of revolution and democracy, France did not manage to maintain itself there, but instead suffered the vicissitudes of freedom and reaction, sometimes even a terrible Caesarist mixture of demagogy and slavery. It brought the contradictions and ambiguities of France's domestic policy into its international policy, through its sympathies or even its efforts helping nations to emerge, only immediately to stop them halfway through their development or thwarting them with a secret jealousy. It paid with a piece of its own flesh, its own soul for the imprudence and inconsistencies of this Napoleonic despotism, of which it was all at once the accomplice and victim. But through all its carelessness, intoxication, and failure, France gave the best of its blood in the greatest of causes, as the first to shake the old feudal and absolutist world and then to fight the new bourgeois selfishness. It gave great gifts to humanity: a fine and profound culture, a democratic and republican instinct, clarity of spirit and of will, speed of decision, an impulse of sympathy. Today, faced with the harshness of events and the salutary rise of other peoples, France has been brought back to a more accurate appreciation of the role of each and of all; it remains one of the great forces of human progress and of the workers' liberation, a necessary and inviolable force, determined, within the limits of its right, not to be violated or humiliated.

Yes, this is how I speak of France, without the least embarrassment, before you German Socialists. For I know that in your conscience you are determined to judge your country impartially, just as we are trying to judge ours. It was a great failure for idealism that thirty-five years ago, we managed to achieve our Republic, and you your unity, only through war. Thus, we will appear before each other without exclusive and arrogant pretensions and we will remember the past only together to swear to abjure all pride, hatred, and mistrust, to work together, with one heart, to establish a definitive peace between Germany and France. In this way, the two proletariats can entirely devote themselves to the work of emancipation, and the two peoples can devote themselves completely to the work of civilization. In this capital, Berlin, where our soldiers entered before yours entered Paris, we want to strengthen, we want to proclaim to the world, the pact of union between the French and German working class. We want to reject, together, any thought of international violence, we want to detest and denounce, together all those, whoever they may be, who would seek to bring the two nations into conflict. We want to oppose

the peaceful, open, loyal diplomacy of the international proletariat to the reckless, greedy, or sly diplomacy of capitalist and feudal rulers. And we owe you an account of the efforts we are making in our country to thwart suspicious manoeuvres and prevent the influence of harmful tendencies, just as you owe us an account of the efforts you are making in your own country against arrogant and aggressive chauvinism.

L'Humanité, July 9, 1905, extract.

CHAPTER 3

The Philosopher and Historian

A great admirer of the Enlightenment, Jaurès also considered himself a continuator of its spirit. He did so although he was neither a "historian" nor a "philosopher" strictly speaking, but rather a socialist interested in political thought and action and unperturbed by disciplinary barriers. Yet, Jaurès had also started out as a *normalien* (student at the École normale supérieure) who earned his teaching qualifications in philosophy, for a time teaching at the University of Toulouse. Both before and then during his political activity, he published several philosophical texts that sought to draw on the various sources of European philosophy, from Rousseau to Marx. But he was also recognized as a major, indeed unique, historian of the French Revolution and its international repercussions: he put a particular emphasis on the importance of social and economic considerations for understanding the process that began in 1789. He thus contributed to a long tradition of studies that would inspire many historians deep into the twentieth century. In this section, among other texts we reproduce his introduction to his most voluminous work, the *Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine*, whose first chapters on 1789–1794 he himself wrote, as well as the conclusion to this series, an elegant, vivid plea for a world free of capital's grip.

J.-N. Ducange and E. Marcobelli (eds.), *Selected Writings of Jean Jaurés*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3_3

"Idealism and Materialism in the Conception of History"

Elected a socialist MP in 1893 on the basis of the programme devised by the allies of Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue—the men who first brought Marxism to France—Jaurès nonetheless rapidly distinguished himself from them, especially on theoretical grounds. In seeking to understand French history and society he rejected what he considered a mechanical materialism. Speaking before the "collectivist" students (as the French Marxists were frequently labelled in this period) as part of a dispute with Paul Lafargue, he expounded his perspective combining materialism and idealism.[1]

Citizens,

First, I must ask for all your patience, because speaking before you tonight I intend to mount a purely doctrinal deduction.

To begin, I want to warn you against a misunderstanding that could result from the fact that I already spoke about this same subject a few months ago.[2] Then, I presented the thesis of economic materialism, the interpretation of history, of its movement according to Marx; speaking then, I applied myself to justifying Marx's doctrine, in such a way that it might have appeared that I embraced it without reservations.

This time, on the contrary, I want to show that the materialist conception of history does not prevent its idealist interpretation. And, since in this second part of my demonstration one could lose sight of the strength of the arguments I provided in favor of Marx's thesis, I ask you—so that there is no misunderstanding about my thinking as a whole—to correct and complement with one another the two parts of the presentation that we were forced to split apart.

A few months ago, I showed that all historical phenomena can be interpreted from the point of view of economic materialism, which, I would like to remind you, is not at all a physiological materialism. Marx does not in the least mean to say that all phenomenon of consciousness or of thought are to be explained by simple groups of material molecules; this is a hypothesis that Marx and more recently Engels both consider

[1] To read his opponent's intervention, see Paul Lafargue, *Paresse et révolution*, Paris, Tallandier, 2009, pp. 211–239.

[2] On 9 July 1894, Jaurès had given a lecture on Marx's economic materialism to the collectivist students at the Hôtel des sociétés savantes in Paris.

metaphysical and which is rejected by both the scientific school and the spiritualist school.

Nor is this what is sometimes called moral materialism—that is, the subordination of all human activity to the satisfaction of physical appetites and the pursuit of individual well-being. On the contrary, if you remember how Marx treats the English utilitarian conception in *Capital*, if you remember how he speaks with contempt of such utilitarian theorists as Jeremy Bentham, who claim that man always acts only on the grounds of personal interest which he consciously seeks, you will see that there is nothing in common in these two doctrines. It is actually the opposite; precisely because Marx believes that the very ways of feeling and thinking in man are determined by the essential form of the economic relations of the society in which he lives, thus Marx shows the intervention, in an individual's conduct, of social forces, collective forces and historical forces, whose power exceeds that of individual and selfish motives. What he means is the essential factor in history is the economic relations, the production relations, between men.

Depending on whether people are linked to each other by this or that form of economic society, a society will have this or that character, this or that conception of life, this or that morality, and it gives this or that general direction to its undertakings. Moreover, according to Marx, men do not move according to some abstract idea of justice, according to some abstract idea of law: rather, they move because the social system formed between them, at a given moment in history, by economic relations of production, is an unstable system which is obliged to transform itself to make way for other systems. And it is the substitution of one economic system for another, for example of slavery for anthropophagy, which leads to a natural correspondence, an equivalent transformation, in political, scientific, and religious concepts. Hence, according to Marx, the most intimate, profound energy driving history is the way that economic interests are organized.

Economic materialism should thus be taken to mean that man does not pull from his brain some ready-made idea of justice, but is confined to reflecting the economic relations of production within himself, within the substance of his brain.

Alongside the materialist approach, there is an idealist one, which takes multiple forms. I will summarize it as follows. This is the conception according to which humanity has from the beginning, so to speak, an obscure idea, a premonition of its destiny, of its development. Before

the experience of history, before the constitution of such and such an economic system, humanity carries within itself a preliminary idea of justice and law and it pursues this preconceived ideal from one form of civilization to a higher one; and when it moves, it does so not through the mechanical and automatic transformation of modes of production, but under the obscure or clearly felt influence of this ideal. So, the idea itself becomes the principle of movement and action. Far from having intellectual conceptions derive from economic facts, here the economic facts gradually reflect and incorporate, in reality and in history, the ideal of humanity.

Such is the idealist conception of history—independent of the countless formulas that the diverse array of philosophical or religious systems has given to this thesis. However, you will note, citizens, that in fact, these two conceptions that seem opposed to each other, that seem to exclude one another, are, we could say, more or less confused and reconciled in contemporary consciousness. There is not, in fact, a single idealist who does not agree that a higher ideal of man could not be achieved without a prior transformation of the economic organization; and, on the other hand, there are very few followers of economic materialism who do not accept the idea of justice and law, and very few who merely foresee a higher realization of justice and law in tomorrow's communist society.

Is this a contradiction? Marx always wanted to maintain the somewhat harsh integrity of his formula—and had nothing but mockery for those who believe they are adding to the strength of economic evolution and the socialist movement by appealing to the pure idea of justice. He had nothing but scorn for those who, according to his phrase, "want to throw over the reality of history, over the facts themselves, a kind of veil woven from the most immaterial threads of dialectics, lined with flowers of rhetoric and soaked in sentimental dew."

The question, for us, is whether this conciliation between the materialist conception and the idealist conception of history, in fact, achieved in our country through the perhaps blind instinct of socialist conscience, is theoretically and doctrinally possible, or else there is an insoluble contradiction; whether we are obliged to make a decisive choice between the two conceptions, or we can logically and reasonably consider them as two different aspects of the same truth.

It is impossible for me to solve this particular question without linking it to a more general problem, without saying how, in my opinion, the problem of knowledge itself is posed to human thinking today. From my

standpoint, I say and I believe that I can see that the effort of human thought for four centuries, since the Renaissance, has been toward the conciliation, the synthesis of opposites and even of contradictions: this is the mark, the characteristic of the entire philosophical and intellectual movement.

The Renaissance faced a contradiction which seemed unsolvable: that between the persistent Christian spirit and the awakened spirit of Antiquity. But the spirit of Antiquity was less a recognition of nature than its worship and adoration; the Christian spirit was the condemnation, the denial of nature.

And so thinking men at the end of the Middle Ages found themselves faced with a contradictory intellectual heritage, a dualism to be reconciled, to be brought back to unity.

The problem was particularly aggravated by the very development of the scientific mind and of experimental science. For through the rigorous, positive study of natural phenomena, through the application of mechanics and mathematics to the study of natural forces, nature lost the prestige of beauty, the appearance of inner and divine life that it had for the men of the ancient world.

On the one hand, it was necessary to reconcile nature as conceived by Antiquity with the Christian conception; on the other hand, it was necessary to reconcile nature as it was conceived by the new science, nature as a simple sequence of phenomena determined by purely mechanical needs, with the free aspiration of the human spirit.

First of all, Descartes, by a singular artifice of method, began by locking himself within his own consciousness, like the Christian, and by rejecting external life and dismissing nature as a problematic phantom.

Reduced to the observation of his own thought, he again found the idea of God, and thus realized a sort of isolation of consciousness and God, which together with the repudiation of nature is the marker of Christianity.

Then, having thus created the first method for himself, instead of simply organizing his inner life like the Christian, he wanted to know nature itself with certainty. So, having journeyed through the Christian state of mind, he used it only in order to found positive science.

In Leibniz, you see the same attempt to bring man and nature back to their unity—showing everywhere, even in purely material forces, even in this table, even in this ground on which we walk, something analogous to

the spirit, the desire, the very meaning of beauty, harmonious, mathematical, and certain relationships, in the laws of physics and the combinations of chemistry. Here again, we have the same conciliation between universal determinism and universal freedom.

On the one hand, Leibniz argues that every movement in the world is infinitely connected to other movements. The movement that I am currently causing in the atmosphere through the emission of my voice is the result of innumerable previous movements; this movement itself will be reflected in the infinite, imperceptibly shaking the walls of this building and through it the outer atmosphere, thus transmitting itself in forms obscure to us. We cannot produce a single movement, move a single grain of sand, without changing the balance of the entire universe.

But at the same time as this connection of movements, of phenomena and of facts is universal and unlimited, there is no single force that proceeds by way of compulsion. When one billiard ball crashes into another, the second one starts moving; but it does so only according to certain laws of elasticity that are specific to it, which result from its context, and this movement that seems to come from the outside, springs from within: there is continuity and absolute spontaneity, all combined.

For Spinoza, there is this same conciliation between nature and God, between fact and idea, between force and law.

For Kant, as you all know, the philosophical problem was explicitly a matter of finding a synthesis among the contradictory affirmations available to the human mind: is the universe limited or infinite? Is time-limited or infinite? Is the series of causes limited or infinite? Is everything subject to universal and inflexible necessity, or is there some role for freedom of action?

So many theses and antitheses, negations and affirmations, between which the mind hesitates. The entire effort of Kantian philosophy was devoted to resolving these contradictions, these fundamental antinomies.

Finally, it was Hegel who provided the formulation of this long effort, by saying that the truth is *in the contradiction*: those who affirm one thesis without opposing the opposite thesis to it are mistaken, the toys of a narrow and illusory logic. In fact, in nature, in reality, opposites do penetrate each other, for instance, the finite and the infinite: this board is limited, it is a limited surface and yet within the limits of this surface, I can draw one shape after another, indefinitely; such that if you limit yourself to affirming the limits to this square, you only speak one part of the truth, you are mistaken; it is all at once finite and infinite.

Likewise, you are mistaken in separating what is rational from what is real, and what is real from what is rational.

Usually, we imagine that a thing, because it is, is a derogation from some ideal which it cannot be, for example, absolute beauty or truth. We imagine that the ideal can only be a conception, and that as soon as it is realized, it is diminished. These are arbitrary and false ideas; everything rational necessarily enters into life; every rational idea is translated into reality and every single reality can be reduced to an idea and receive a rational explanation.

This great formula of the synthesis of opposites, of the conciliation of contradictions through the identity of the rational and the ideal, has had great influence.

No longer do we say of this or that period of history that it is only a period of barbarism. We say: everything that is, simply because it is, everything that has been, simply because it has been, has its reason and its root in reason—but it was not a total reason.

I think it is pointless to remind the followers of Marx's doctrine that Marx was Hegel's intellectual disciple; he himself declared, proclaimed it in his introduction to *Capital* (and Engels, for some years now, seems—through that winding path which leads a man who has led a long life back to his origins—to have been applying himself to a thorough study of Hegel).[3] There is a striking application of this formula of opposites, when Marx sees today's class antagonism, the state of economic war, opposing the capitalist class to the proletarian class; because this antagonism was born under the capitalist regime, under a regime of war and division, it prepares a new regime of peace and harmony. According to Heraclitus's old formula, which Marx likes to quote, "peace is but a form, an aspect of war; war is but a form, an aspect of peace. We must not oppose one to the other; what is a fight today is the beginning of tomorrow's reconciliation."

Modern thinking on the identity of opposites is also found in another of Marxism's admirable conceptions: humanity has been led so far, so to speak, by the unconscious force of history, insofar it is not men who move themselves; they are agitated and the economic evolution leads them; they believe they produce events or imagine themselves vegetating and always remaining in the same place, but economic transformations take place

[3] Friedrich Engels was still alive at the time of Jaurès's lecture; he died the following year, in 1895.

without their knowledge, and without their knowing it, these transformations act upon them. Humanity has been, in a way, like a sleeping passenger carried by the course of a river without contributing to the movement, or at least without realizing the direction, waking up from time to time and realizing that the landscape has changed.

Well, then! When the socialist revolution has been accomplished, when class antagonism has ceased, when the human community is in control of the great means of production, following the known and observed needs of men, then humanity will be torn away from the long period of unconsciousness in which it has been walking for centuries, pushed by the blind force of events. It will enter a new era in which man, instead of being subject to things, will regulate the course of things. But this coming era of full consciousness and clarity has been rendered possible only by a long period of unconsciousness and darkness.

If, at history's uncertain origins, men had sought deliberately to regulate the course of events and things, they would simply have thwarted the course of these events, they would have wasted the resources of the future. Having sought to act with full consciousness prematurely, they would have denied themselves the means to ever act with full consciousness. They would be like a child summoned too early to the fully conscious life of thinking reason, in whom the unconscious evolution of organic life and the first manifestations of moral life were not allowed to develop, and who, precisely because he was a thinker from the first hour of his life, would not have been able to think thereafter.

For Marx, this unconscious life was the very condition and preparation for tomorrow's conscious life, and thus history must still resolve an essential contradiction. Well, I shall ask whether we cannot or should not—without overlooking the very spirit of Marxism—push this method of reconciling opposites, of synthesizing contradictions, further and seek the fundamental conciliation of economic materialism and idealism as it is applied to the development of history.

I apologize for these long preliminaries, but no particular question can be resolved if there is no agreement on a general philosophy. But note in what spirit I seek this reconciliation of economic materialism and historical and moral idealism.

I do not want to grant each one its part, I do not want to say: there is one part of history that is governed by economic necessities and there is another directed by a pure idea, by a concept, by the idea, for example, of humanity or justice or law; I do not want to put the materialist conception

on one side of a partition and the idealist conception on the other. I claim that they must penetrate each other, just as the mechanics of the brain and conscious spontaneity penetrate one another in man's organic life.

I say that there is not a single movement in the brain that does not correspond in some—clear or obscure—way to a state of consciousness, and there is not a single state of consciousness that does not correspond to a movement in the brain.

And if we could open up the brain and follow the infinitely delicate movements that take place there, are determined there and form a sequence there, then we could follow the whole physiological underside of all the psychological work of our thoughts, our conceptions, our volitions; and yet here there is a singular antinomy, resolved by life without us seeming to have to think about it.

Yes—as I am speaking, what is my idea determined by?

It is determined by a previous idea with which it has logical relationships, and all our ideas are linked to each other according to certain logical and intelligible relationships, either of similarity, or of opposition, or of causality.

In this way, logical forces alone seem to be involved in the course of our thoughts, and moreover, it seems that all the activity present in my conscious mind is determined by an idea of the future.

If I am uttering words at this moment, it is because the idea I am expressing right now has been brought to me at length by a previous idea and by all other previous ideas; but it is also because I want to realize a goal, an intention, an end in the future that I see before me. If I am currently leading my thoughts in the direction they are following, that is because I want to achieve a complete demonstration, with the effect that my present thought, at the same time as it is determined by the series of previous thoughts, seems prompted by an idea of the future.

On the contrary, in the physiological, mechanical development of the movements in the brain, the one that currently accompanies the thought that I am expressing is determined only by a previous movement; in other words, citizens, our life is both physiological and conscious, both mechanical and spontaneous. In the sequence of movements in the brain, the present is only determined by the past, while in the sequence of ideas, of conscious concepts, the present seems determined by the future.

So, it seems that there is a contradiction between the way my cerebral life works and the way the conscious development of our ideas and thoughts works.

And yet, even though there is an apparent antinomy between these two modes, between these two points of view, the synthesis is realized, the conciliation is realized, and there is not a single one of my thoughts that does not correspond to movements in the brain, just as there is not a single movement in the brain that does not correspond to at least some onset of thought.

However, it is the same in history—at the same time as you can explain all historical phenomena by pure economic evolution, you can also explain them by humanity's permanent, restless desire for a higher form of existence. To specify the question here, citizens, this is how I think the problem is posed—these are the additional explanations that I am obliged to ask of Marxism's theorists.

Marx says: "The human brain does not itself create an idea of right, which would be vain and hollow; in all the life of humanity, even in its intellectual and moral life, there is only a reflection of economic phenomena in the human brain."[4]

Well, I accept that. Yes, in all the development of the intellectual, moral, and religious life of humanity, there is only a reflection of economic phenomena in the human brain; yes, but at the same time there is the human brain, and there is, therefore, the cerebral pre-formation of humanity.

Humanity is the product of a long physiological evolution that preceded historical evolution, and when man, through this physiological evolution, emerged from his immediately prior animal state, there were already predispositions and tendencies in the first brain of the emerging humanity.

What were they?

First, there was the faculty for what I shall call selfless feelings. As we rise up the scale of animal life, we see that the purely selfish senses are gradually subordinated to aesthetic and disinterested ones. In the lower ranks of animality, sight and hearing are not very developed; what is developed is the sense of smell and the ability to grasp. What is developed is taste, that is, all the senses above all triggered by an animal's prey, all the senses that trigger its physical and selfish appetites. But as we rise up the scale of animal life, we see the sense of hearing and the sense of sight

[4] Jaurès often cited authors from memory, making it very difficult to find the original text to which he is referring; what he says here is cited not from Marx, but from a chapter summary from Engels's *Anti-Dühring* (1878).

develop. True, it is with the eye that the image of the prey which the animal has to catch reaches it. But at the same time, many other images reach it that cannot trigger its animal appetite. Likewise, with the ear: if the animal collects many noises, rumblings that can put it on the trail of its prey, or that can warn it of danger, harmonies also reach it that have no immediate connection to its physical appetite and the positive conditions of its safety. So, as the sight is flooded with images that exceed the immediate sensitivity of the animal, and as the hearing is penetrated by sounds that exceed the immediate needs of the animal, the universe penetrates into animal life in a form other than that of the struggle for survival. There is, already in the animal, the need, the joy, the marvel of light, there is already the need, the joy, the enchantment of melody and harmony. From the depths of purely selfish organic life, the aesthetic and selfless senses will gradually blossom, and in the deep forest, vibrating with its rumblings and shafts of light, the universe enters the animal as a king.

In addition to this first predisposition that the animal-man carried forth at the beginning of the long economic evolution, there was also the faculty—already awakened even among animals—to grasp the general within the particular, the type of species in the individual, to untangle the generic similarity by way of individual diversities.

In the other individuals who walk before him, with whom the laws of economic development put him into contact, the human individual and the human-animal will not only see associated or enemy forms, but similar forces. Thus arises the first instinct of imaginative sympathy within him which, by the resemblance thus grasped and noted, will allow him to detect and feel the joys of others, to detect and experience their pains. From the beginning of life, alongside brutal selfishness, we find this same sentiment—preparing the fraternal reconciliation of all men, to end their centuries of battles.

Finally, from the beginning of his life, before the first manifestation of his thought, man has what can be called the sense of unity; the first manifestation of his intellectual movement is the reduction of all beings, all forms, and all forces to a vaguely perceived unity. This is how we can say that man is, from his very first hour, a metaphysical animal, since the very essence of metaphysics is the search for total unity in which all phenomena are understood and all laws are enveloped.

The proof of this initial meaning of unity is the spontaneous creation of language, with its hierarchies of words, which only represent hierarchies of ideas enwrapping each other, with its verbal categories reflecting intellectual categories.

To make it short, I agree with Marx that all further development will be the reflection of economic phenomena in the brain. But this, only if we say that there are already fundamental forces in this brain, through aesthetic sense, imaginative sympathy, and the need for unity, that intervene in economic life.

Note, once again, that I do not juxtapose intellectual faculties and economic forces, that I do not want to reconstitute the union of historical factors that our distinguished friend Gabriel Deville[5] so vigorously dispersed a few months ago. No, I do not want this juxtaposition. But I say that it is impossible for the economic phenomena observed to penetrate the human brain without bringing into play these primitive energies that I was analyzing earlier.

And that is why I do not agree with Marx that religious, political, and moral conceptions are only a reflection of economic phenomena.[6] There is, in man, such an interpenetration of man himself and of the economic environment that it is impossible to separate economic life from moral life; to subordinate them to each other, they would first have to be abstracted from each other; yet, this abstraction is impossible. Man cannot be cut into half and organic life and conscious life cannot be separated in him, any more than historical humanity can be cut into half and ideal and economic life separated in it. This is my thesis, of which I find a partial confirmation in Greek philosophy.

The Greeks did not first see the economic antinomies, the laws that establish order in the city, the opposition and conciliation of the poor and the rich, and then project their economic observations onto the universe. No, they combined the economic and natural phenomena, at the same time and in the same conception. Look at Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaximander: in singular formulas, they observed the connections and contradictions of the elements, whether they pertained to nature—hot and cold, light and dark—to the physiological organism—healthy and

[5] Gabriel Deville (1854–1940), a French socialist at that time well-known for his popularising abriged version of Marx's *Capital* (1884).

[6] A doubtless reductive vision of Marx's work, also owing to the fact that many of the German philosopher's texts were then unavailable.

sick—or to intellectual life—perfect and imperfect, equal and unequal. They made a single tabulation of these oppositions, borrowed either from nature or from society. In Heraclitus the same word cosmos means both the world order resulting from the conciliation of opposites and the order in the city resulting from the conciliation of factions. It was from a single perspective that Greek thinkers grasped the order of the world, struggling to free itself from social chaos.

Since I can only skim the surface of the question in the few remarks I am making here—both too long and too short—I will simply ask the Marxist theorists for further explanations. And I say this to them: What judgment do you make, if you do have one (and I am sure you do), on the direction of the movement of the economy, and of humanity?

It is not enough to say that one form of production follows on from another form of production; it is not enough to say that slavery succeeded anthropophagy, that serfdom succeeded slavery, that wage labor succeeded serfdom, and that the collectivist or communist system will succeed wage labor. No, we still have to decide. Is there any evolution or progress? And if there is progress, what is the decisive and last idea by which the various forms of human development are measured? And again, if we want to dismiss this idea of progress as too metaphysical, why has the movement of history been so regulated, from form to form, from economic stage to economic stage, from anthropophagy to slavery, from slavery to serfdom, from serfdom to wage labor, from wage labor to the socialist system, and not in any other way? Why, by virtue of which jurisdiction—I do not say by virtue of which providential decree, since I remain within the materialist and positive conception of history—but why, from form to form, has human development followed one direction and not another?

I think there is a simple reason, so long as we are willing to admit the action of man as a man—the action of these initial human forces of which I have spoken.

Precisely because economic relations of production are addressed to men, there is not a single form of production that does not contain an essential contradiction, so long as the full freedom and solidarity of men have not been achieved.

It was Spinoza who admirably demonstrated the intimate contradiction of any tyrannical regime, of any political or social exploitation of man by man, not by taking up the perspective of abstract law, but by showing that we were there in the presence of a de facto contradiction. Either tyranny

will do to those it oppresses so much harm that they will cease to fear the consequences that an insurrection might have for them, and then the oppressed will rise up against the oppressor; or else the oppressor, in order to prevent uprisings, will spare to some extent the needs and instincts of their subjects and thus prepare them for freedom. Thus, in any case, tyranny must disappear by virtue of the interplay of forces, because these forces are men.

The same shall apply until the exploitation of man by man has ended. Once more it was Hegel who said, with sovereign precision: "The essential contradiction of any political or economic tyranny is that it is obliged to treat as inert instruments men who, whoever they may be, never think they will descend to the inertia of material machines." And note that this contradiction is both a logical and a factual one. It is a logical contradiction, since there is an opposition between the very idea of man, a being endowed with sensitivity, spontaneity and reflection, and the idea of a machine.

It is a factual contradiction since by using man, a living tool, as a dead tool, we violate the very force we want to use, thus leading to a discordant and precarious social mechanism. It is because this contradiction violates both the idea of man and the very law of mechanics, according to which human force can be used, that the movement of history is both an idealistic protest of conscience against regimes that debase man, and an automatic reaction of human forces against any unstable and violent arrangement. What was anthropophagy? It was doubly contradictory, because by forcing man to cut man's throat even outside the hot-bloodedness of the fight, it violated the first instinct for sympathy of which I spoke: and this was the moral contradiction. Moreover, it made man, who has a certain faculty for regulated work, for production, a kind of beast of prey whose flesh alone can be used: and this was economic contradiction. From then on, slavery had to be born, because man's domestication hurt the sympathy instinct less and protected the master's interest better by drawing much more out of man through work, than he gave by providing subsistence.

And one could easily provide the same demonstration for slavery, serfdom, or wage labor. Thus, we understand—since the whole movement of history results from the essential contradiction between man and the usage made of man—that this movement tends not just to its limits but to an economic order in which usage is made of man, suitable for man. Passing through economic forms increasingly less repugnant to its

idea, humanity realizes itself. And in human history there is not just a necessary evolution but an intelligible direction and an ideal sense. Thus, over the centuries man has been able to aspire to justice only by aspiring to a social order less in contradiction with man than the present order and prepared through this present order. Hence the evolution of his moral ideas, well regulated by the evolution of economic forms. But at the same time, through these successive arrangements, humanity searches for and affirms itself, and whatever the variety of environments, of times, of economic demands, one same breath of complaint and hope comes out the mouth of the slave, the serf, and the proletarian; that is, the immortal breath of humanity which is the very soul of what we call justice. One should not, then, oppose the materialist and the idealist conception of history. They fuse in a single, insoluble development. For if one cannot abstract man from economic relations, nor can one abstract economic relations from man; and at the same time as history is a phenomenon that plays out according to a mechanical law, it is also an aspiration that realizes itself according to an ideal law.

And after all, isn't the same thing true of the evolution of life and of the evolution of history? Doubtless, life has passed from one form to another, from one species to another, only under the dual action of the immediately preexisting biological conditions and environment. The whole development of life is open to a materialist explanation. But at the same time, we can say that the initial life force, concentrated in the first living granulations, and the general conditions of planetary existence, together determined the general march of development, as if the plan for life on our planet. Thus, while the evolving beings have been subject to a law, at the same time they themselves have collaborated, as if through some hidden aspiration, in the realization of a plan for life. The development of physiological life, and likewise of historical life, is thus both idealist and materialist fact. And the synthesis I am proposing to you is bound to a more general thesis, which I cannot mention without strengthening it further.

But to get back to the economic question, did not Marx himself reintroduce into his conception of history the idea, the notion, of the ideal of progress, of right? He did not only herald communist society as the necessary consequence of the capitalist order: he showed that in this society, the class antagonism that so drains humanity would come to an end. He also showed that, for the first time, man will achieve a full and free life, that the workers will all together share in the nervous diligence of the craftsman

and the calm vigor of the peasant, and that the ranks of humanity will stand up, happier, nobler, in a renewed world.

Is this not to recognize that the word "justice" does have a meaning, even in the materialist conception of history? Will you not, then, accept the reconciliation I am proposing to you?

Lecture to the collectivist students, Salle d'Arras (Paris), December 1894, full text.

A Socialist History

In this introduction to the vast Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine *which he edited, Jaurès expounded his conception of France's history, a subject which fascinated and enthused him. He invoked Jules Michelet—borrowing his lyrical tone—and to Plutarch, whose* Parallel Lives *inspired Jaurès in drawing up portraits of great revolutionaries, key among them Karl Marx. From Marx, Jaurès drew the decisive importance of social and economic factors in understanding the complexity of the revolutionary process. Following the publication of this work, a specific parliamentary commission (nicknamed the Jaurès Commission) was created, with the purpose of publishing a large number of documents from the revolutionary era. Its activity would continue for almost a century.*

We wish to tell the people, the workers, the peasants, the story of the events that unfolded between 1789 and the end of the nineteenth century, and to do so from a socialist perspective. We consider the French Revolution a vast feat, and a fruitful one, admirably so; but it is not, to our eyes, a definitive fact whose consequences history then only has to continually play out. The French Revolution indirectly prepared the advent of the proletariat. It realized the two essential conditions for socialism: capitalism and democracy. But at root, it represented the political advent of the bourgeois class.

Gradually, a fresh social crisis is being prepared, a new and deeper revolution in which the proletarians will seize power in order to transform property and morality. This is being prepared by the movement of the economy and politics, big industry, the growth of the working class in both number and ambition, the hardships of the peasants crushed by competition and besieged by both commercial and industrial feudalism, and the moral stirrings of an intellectual bourgeoisie, all of whose delicate sensibilities a brutal, mercantile society does so much to offend. So, here

we will try to paint in broad brushstrokes the onward march—and the interplay—of the social classes since 1789. Drawing limits and imposing sharp divisions in the uninterrupted, multifaceted progress of life is always rather arbitrary. But it is quite accurate to distinguish between three periods in the history of the bourgeois class and the proletarian class over the last century.

First, 1789–1848 was the period of the revolutionary bourgeoisie's triumph, in which it established itself in power. It used the proletarians' strength against royal absolutism and the nobles; but despite their prodigious activity and the decisive role they played at certain key moments, the proletarians were always subordinate, a sort of historical auxiliary force. They did sometimes strike real terror into the hearts of the propertied bourgeois; but fundamentally they worked on these latters' behalf and had no radically different conception of society. The communism of Babeuf[7] and his handful of disciples was but a sublime convulsion, the final spasm of the revolutionary crisis before it was quelled under the Consulate and the First Empire. Even in 1793–1794 the proletarians were mixed up in the Third Estate: they had neither a clear class consciousness, nor the notion of another form of property or any desire for such a thing. They hardly went beyond Robespierre's meager thinking: a politically sovereign democracy, but which would stand still in economic terms, being made up of small peasant proprietors and the artisan petty bourgeoisie. The marvellous lifeblood of socialism, the creator of wealth, beauty, and joy, did not flow through their veins: in terrible days, they burned with a harsh flame of rage and envy. They knew not of the seductive appeal, the powerful sweetness, of a new ideal.

Yet barely had bourgeois society begun to calm and establish itself in place, before socialist thought began its early ventures. After Babeuf, from 1800 to 1848 there came Fourier, Saint-Simon, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc. Under Louis-Philippe there were the worker uprisings in Lyon and Paris. Barely had the bourgeois revolution definitively triumphed, before the proletarians wondered: what is the source of our suffering, and what fresh revolution will put an end to it? In the waters of the bourgeois revolution, at first bubbling and troubled, then calmer and clearer, they saw the reflection of their worn-out faces—and were shocked. But

[7] The socialists of the time considered Gracchus Babeuf's "Conspiracy of Equals" to be the "first truly active communist party," as Marx put it.

despite the proliferation of socialist schemes and worker revolts, up till 1848 bourgeois domination remained intact.

The bourgeoisie could not believe that power would escape its hands—and that property would be transformed. Under Louis-Philippe it had been strong enough to fight the nobles and priests at the same time as it fought the workers. It crushed the Legitimist uprisings in the West, just like the proletarian revolts in the famished big cities. With the arrogance of a Guizot,[8] it naively considered itself the very endpoint of history, that it had acquired the historical and philosophical deeds to an everlasting power, that it was the conclusion of France's centuries-long strivings and that it was the social expression of Reason itself. As for the proletarians, despite the convulsions of hunger and poverty they faced they were not conscious revolutionaries. They could barely even glimpse the possibility of a new order. The socialist "utopias" above all found followers among the "intellectual" class. Moreover, the socialist schemes were drenched either in capitalist thinking, as in the case of Saint-Simon, or petty-bourgeois thinking, as in the case of Proudhon. It would take the revolutionary crisis of 1848 for the working class to become conscious of itself, to carry out—as Proudhon put it—its definitive split from the other elements of society.

The second period was also troubled and uncertain. It ran from February 1848 to May 1871, from the provisional government to the bloody repression of the Commune. It is true, socialism already in this period asserted itself as both an idea and as a force; the proletariat affirmed itself as a class. The workers' revolution serried its ranks as such a threat to bourgeois order that the ruling classes rallied, in coalition against it, all the might of the bourgeoisie and the peasant proprietors panicked by the red specter.[9] But there was still indecision and confusion among the socialist doctrines: in 1848, Cabet's communism, Proudhon's mutualism, and Louis Blanc's statism hopelessly crashed up against one another. The mold of thought that ought have given the working class form was unfinished and lacking in consistency; the theorists fought over the molten metal as it came out of the furnace, and as they quarreled, reaction—led by December's man—smashed all the unformed molds and cooled

[8] François Guizot (1787–1874), a major liberal figure under the July Monarchy (1830–1848).

[9] Indeed, both the workers' uprising of June 1848 and the Paris Commune of May–June 1871 sparked panic among the ruling classes.

the metal.[10] Even under the Commune, Blanquists, Marxists, and Proudhonians imprinted various different directions on working-class thought: no one can say which socialist ideal a victorious Commune would have applied.

Moreover, there were convulsions and confusions in the movement itself, as well as in terms of ideas. In 1848 the revolution was prepared by radical democracy as much, if not perhaps more, than by working-class socialism, and during the June Days bourgeois democracy lay the proletariat flat on the burning cobblestones of Paris. Again in 1871, the Commune movement emerged from an uprising of the commercial bourgeoisie angered by the law on terms due and the harshness of the squires of Versailles, as well as from Paris's intensified patriotism and defiant republianism.

The socialist proletariat did not delay in putting its revolutionary mark on this confusion, and Marx was right to say, in his powerful and systematic study of the Commune, that for the first time the working class took power. This was a new development of incalculable importance. But the proletariat also benefited from a kind of surprise. In the isolated and overexcited capital, it was the best organized and most perceptive force, but it was not yet able to pull France behind it, to make it identify with itself. For France belonged to the priests, to the big landowners, and to the bourgeoisie of whom Mr. Thiers was the leader.

The Commune was like the tip of an iron, reddened in the fire, which breaks up against the resistance of a large block. But from 1848 to 1871 the proletariat made huge progress. In 1848 the proletariat's stake in power was all but fictitious: Louis Blanc and the worker Albert found themselves paralyzed in the Provisional Government, and a perfidious bourgeoisie organized the swindle of the "national workshops" against them. The socialists had their platonic discussions at the Luxembourg Palace, they abdicated and resigned themselves to be no more than a powerless academy. Not having the strength to act, they speechified. Then, when the cheated working class rose up in June, it was crushed before it could have even the briefest hold on power. In 1871, the sons of the fighters from the June Days did hold power and exercised it; they were not a riotous crowd, but Revolution itself.

[10] A reference to Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and his coup on 2 December 1848.

The proletarians thus raised to power may have been brought down again; but even so, they gave fresh working-class generations a sign of hope—a sign that has been understood. The Commune marked the end of the second period, in which socialism asserted itself as a front-rank force, albeit a still confused and convulsive one. Yet the Commune also made possible the period that followed, the one we are all involved in today, in which socialism is methodically proceeding toward the total organization of the working class, to the moral conquest of a reassured peasantry, to the rallying of bourgeois intellectuals disenchanted with bourgeois power, and to the total seizure of power, for new forms of property and ideals.

No longer need we fear confusion. There is a unity of thought among the working class and the socialist party. Despite the conflicts between groups and the superficial rivalries, all proletarian forces are fundamentally united by one doctrine and one activity. If the proletariat seized full power tomorrow, it could right away begin using it in a defined and decisive way. There would certainly be conflicts between tendencies. Some would want to strengthen the centralized actions of the community and raise it to its highest degree, while others would want to provide local groups of workers the greatest possible autonomy. An immense intellectual effort would be required in order to regulate the nation's new relations—relations of professional federations, of communes, of local groups, of individuals—and to establish both perfect individual freedom and social solidarity. There will be disagreements, amidst all this complexity. Whatever that may be, today the socialists and the proletarians are driven by a common spirit, and socialism is no longer dispersed among hostile and impotent sects. It is an ever-greater living unity, multiplying its hold on life. It is from socialism that all the great human forces, labor, thought, science, art, even religion—understood as humanity's ability to grasp hold of the universe—now expect their renewal and stimulus.

How, through what crises, through what human efforts and evolution of things have the proletariat growth into the decisive role it will play tomorrow? This is the story which all of us, socialist militants, here set out to tell. We know that economic conditions, the form of production and property, are the very foundation of history. For most human individuals, their profession is the essential element of their life, just as their profession—the economic form of individual activity—that most often determines their habits, ideas, sorrows, joys, and even dreams. Similarly, in

every period of history it is the economic structure of society that determines the political forms, the social mores, and even the general direction of ideas. So, in each period of this narrative we will endeavor to uncover the economic foundations of human life. We will attempt to follow the movement of property and the evolution of industrial and agricultural techniques. In broad brush strokes—as suits this necessarily simplified landscape—we will bring out the influence of economic conditions on governments, literature, and systems of ideas.

But we do not forget that Marx—too often run down by his narrow interpreters[11]—never forgot that it is upon men that economic forces act. Men have a prodigious variety of passions and ideas, and the near-infinite complexity of human life does not lend itself to being brutally, mechanically reduced to an economic formula. What is more, though man lives above all as part of humanity, even though he is subject to the all-embracing, continuous influence of his social milieu, he also lives, through his senses and his mind, in a yet vaster environment, the universe itself.

In the poet's imagination, the light of the remotest stars most foreign to the human system doubtless only awakens dreams that are also in conformity with the general sensibility of his time and the deepest secrets of social life, just as the light fog that floats over the meadow is formed by the moonlight from the earth's hidden humidity. In this sense, even the vibrations of the stars, however, distant and indifferent they might appear, are harmonized and appropriated by the social system and the economic forces that determine it. Upon entering a factory workshop one day, Goethe was seized with disgust for his clothing, which demanded such an imposing productive apparatus. And yet, without this early industrial rise of the German bourgeoisie, the old Germanic world could never have felt or understood the magnificent impatience that made Faust's soul burst.

But whatever the human soul's relationship—in even its wildest and subtlest dreams—with the economic and social system, this soul also travels beyond the human world into the immense cosmic environment. Contact with the universe makes mysterious and profound forces vibrate within the soul, forces of the eternally moving life that both preceded human societies and will also survive past them. Thus, as vain and false

[11] An allusion to "Marxist" socialists like Jules Guesde.

as it would be to deny the dependence of ideas and even dreams on the economic system and the particular forms of production, it would be just as puerile and crude to summarily explain the movement of human thought by the evolution of economic forces alone. Often, the human mind must rely upon the social system in order to withstand and surpass it; between the individual mind and social power, there is thus at once both solidarity and conflict. It was the system of modern nations and monarchies half-emancipated from the Church that allowed for the free science of Kepler and Galileo; but once it has grasped the truth, the human mind is no longer the prerogative of the prince, of society, or of humanity. Rather, the truth itself, with its discipline and its logic, in a way becomes the immediate setting for the mind. And even though Kepler and Galileo rested their astronomical ideas on the foundations of the modern state, after their observations and calculations these ideas were solely the province of themselves and the universe. The social world, which had been their support and their stimulus, blossomed and their ideas knew no laws other than those of the sidereal vastness.

We should be glad if, amidst the half-mechanical evolution of economic and social forms, we can continue to make felt the great dignity of the free mind, liberated from humanity itself by the eternal universe. The most intransigent of Marxist theoreticians could not reproach us for this. In one admirable passage, Marx wrote that all human societies have hitherto been only governed by fate, by the blind movement of economic forms. Institutions and ideas were not the conscious work of free men, but the reflection in the human brain of unconscious social life. For Marx, we are still in only prehistoric times. Human history will not truly begin until man, finally escaping the tyranny of unconscious forces, governs production through his reason and his will. Then, his mind will no longer have to endure the despotism of economic forms created and directed by him, and he will contemplate the universe with a free and unmediated gaze. Marx thus glimpses a period of full intellectual freedom where human thought, no longer distorted by economic servitude, will no longer distort the world. For certain, Marx did not deny that already in the darkness of this unconscious period, some great minds have raised themselves to freedom; through them, humanity prepares itself and heralds its own arrival. It is up to us to grasp these first manifestations of the life of the spirit; they provide us an anticipation of the great, ardent, and free life of communist humanity which, freed from all serfdom, will appropriate the universe through science, action, and dreams. This is like the first breeze through

the forest of humanity; for now it rustles only a few leaves, but it heralds great gusts and vast upheavals.

Thus our interpretation of history will be both materialist with Marx and mystical with Michelet. Economic life has indeed been the basis, the energy, behind human history. But across the succession of social forms, man, a thinking force, aspired to the full life of thought, the ardent community of the troubled spirit eager for unity and the mysterious universe. The great mystic of Alexandria[12] said: "The high waves of the sea raised my boat, and I was able to see the sun at the very moment it rose from the waters." Similarly, the vast rising waters of the economic revolution will raise the human boat so that man, that poor fisherman exhausted by a long night's work, can greet from the highest point the first light of the growing spirit that will rise above us.

Notwithstanding our economic interpretation of the great human phenomena, nor we will dismiss the moral value of history. To be sure, we know that for the past century fine words of liberty and humanity have all too often served as a cover for a regime of exploitation and oppression. The French Revolution proclaimed the Rights of Man; but the propertied classes took these words to mean the rights of the bourgeoisie and capital.

These words proclaimed that men were free when the wealthy had no other means of domination over the poor than property itself—but property is the sovereign force that disposes of all others. The basis of bourgeois society is thus a monstrous class egoism, complicated by hypocrisy. But there were times when the nascent Revolution blended the interests of the revolutionary bourgeoisie with the interests of humanity, and a truly admirable human enthusiasm more than once filled men's hearts. Similarly, in the countless conflicts unleashed by bourgeois anarchy, in the struggles between parties and classes, there have been abundant examples of pride, valor, and courage. Raising ourselves above the bloody melees, we will still salute the heroes of the will with equal respect; we will celebrate both the bourgeois republicans outlawed by the triumphant coup in 1851 and the admirable proletarian combatants who fell in June 1848.

But who could blame us for devoting special attention to the militant virtues of the insulted proletariat, which has, over the last century, so often gave its life for a still vague ideal? The social revolution will not

[12] A reference to Philo of Alexandria (First century BC) a Jewish Bible exegete who compared his interpretation with Greek philosophy.

be achieved through force of circumstance alone; rather, this will come through the force of men, through the energy of consciousness and wills. History will never exempt men from the need for individual valor and nobility. And the moral level of tomorrow's communist society will be marked by the lofty individual consciences of the militant class of today. So, to offer the example of all those heroic fighters over the last century who had a passion for the ideal and sublime disregard for death, is itself to do revolutionary work. We will not laugh at the men of the Revolution who read Plutarch's *Lives*; doubtless, the great impulse of inner energy that this text stirred in them did little to change the march of events. But at least they withstood the tempest; the lightning bolts of the great storms did not show their faces contorted by fear. And if the passion for glory animated their passion for liberty and their courage in combat, no one can hold this against them.

So, in this socialist history, which runs from the bourgeois Revolution to the period preparing the proletarian revolution, we will endeavor to leave out no part of human life. We will strive to understand and translate the fundamental economic evolution that governs societies, the spirit's ardent aspiration for total truth, and the noble exaltation of human consciousness defying suffering, tyranny, and death. In pushing the economic movement as far as it can go, the proletariat will free itself and become humanity. It must thus become fully conscious of the historical role of both economic activity and human greatness. At the risk of momentarily surprising our readers with such disparate great names, we write this modest history under the triple inspiration of Marx, Michelet, and Plutarch. Each of the militants who contributes to this history will add in his own nuance of thought, but all will uphold the same essential doctrine and one same faith.

Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine, Introduction (1900), extract.

The Social Balance-Sheet of the Nineteenth Century

In this text concluding the Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine, *Jaurès expressed his great optimism, highlighting the progress that had been made over the previous century. The unification of the SFIO in 1905, his own growing influence in the party—especially upon the Toulouse Congress*

in 1908—and the resurgence of worker mobilisations (despite Clemenceau's tough repression) explain this enthusiasm, which we also find in other texts by international labour movement leaders from this same period. Indeed, many militants were convinced that they would imminently see a political upheaval leading to socialism…

Reaching the end of a long, serious effort, my collaborators and I do not hide the fact that our work has necessarily been insufficient and incomplete. But it does mark a new direction in historical research. The concern to bring out the economic pattern behind the facts, the deeper origin of political and social events, leaps forth from every line. As Andler suggested in his weighty introduction to Albert Thomas's study on the Second Empire, to grasp the movement of social reality with any certainty, and to catch in the continuity and familiarity of everyday life the secret of the great crises which periodically come to the surface, took an immense collective research effort.[13] This was particularly true when it came to gaining a deep understanding of the movement, the activity, and the life of the working class in the society that emerged from the French Revolution. To this end, it was necessary to be able to trace, year by year and almost day by day, all manner of events—especially economic ones—that impacted the proletarians' existence and their thinking. These ranged from scientific discoveries to variations in technique, transformations of industrial machinery, the expansion of markets, price fluctuations, and the price of commodities and of labor. But such an inquiry required the concerted effort of many generations of researchers. We could only just embark on this endeavor—and, through a few partial results, bring out the importance of the fundamental method that sustains all our work. The vast collective research effort which can alone enlighten history has already begun to be organized. The Society for the Study of the economic documents of the French Revolution has published a few considerable volumes, and I am delighted to note that these publications confirm the general observations which I had advanced. But more accurate findings could be reached!

May this digging uncover new seams to be mined! Research of a similar order has been planned[14] with regard to 1848. This will be one of the

[13] Charles Andler, a French socialist and Germanist responsible for several Nietzsche translations. He published a preface to the section of the *Histoire socialiste* devoted to the Second Empire, entrusted to Albert Thomas (1878–1932).

[14] The 1848 History Society was founded in 1903.

functions of the Bourses du travail[15] when they have truly become the organs of working-class consciousness: to keep true, real, living statistics on proletarian existence and to keep them up to date. They will prompt research which, in seriously analyzing and confronting the facts, will head back to the past and then, through an opposite movement, work forward along the course of evolution. Then, history will truly be the consciousness of the great human collectives. It will no longer be a sort of partial—in both senses—light shone on a few privileged individuals alone; rather, the whole vast multitude of men will finally enter the light. And the true god of history, labor, the dark blacksmith who has forged human destinies in his obscure cavern—like the scorned and buried Vulcan who forged arms for the gods above—will come to light and show his creative force in the brilliance of science and the glory of the mind. Our work will not have been for nothing if, by shedding a little light, it can feed the taste and the demand for greater clarity.

After the admission which I have just made, it would be quite the contradiction to claim to deduce overly formal and imperious conclusions from this first socialist-historical inquiry which we present to the proletariat. We can, nonetheless say, that what the working class can take from the facts we have just illustrated is a great lesson in action and in hope. Yes, in hope.

Of course, the proletariat remains very far from the goal that it has set itself. By no means has the essential injustice been banished. Property's effective monopoly endures, and the capitalist class's economic domination has the effect of diminishing and exploiting the vast multitude of men who own nothing but their labor power. La Bruyère said that "Faced with certain miseries, one feels ashamed to be happy." Faced with the iniquities and the suffering that torment society today, concentrating their effects on the working class, it would be rather improper for our overall judgment on how France has evolved since the Revolution to vaunt a sort of blissful, satisfied optimism. Yet, there is a robust, sharp optimism that makes no mystery of the effort still to be made, but which finds in the first hard-won results new motives for action, for struggle, for taking the battle ever higher and further.

[15] Originally offices to find jobs for workers, the Bourses du travail (labour exchanges) became the key sites of the trade-union movement, offering workers numerous activities, including popular education.

In truth, the French Revolution did reach a successful conclusion. Its boldest, most generous elements triumphed. France's political and social evolution from 1789 to the beginning of the twentieth century bears two characteristic traits. The first is the advent of full political democracy. All the royalist compromises have been swept aside; all the combinations of traditional monarchy and sovereignty done away with; all the Caesarist frauds rebuffed. The mixed Constitution of 1791 was sunk by the stupidity and the treachery of the royals. The monarchy restored in 1815 got lost in its own narrowmindedness. The monarchy of 1830, with its limited suffrage, revealed the French bourgeoisie's incapacity to govern alone, for it could not defend itself against the lingering forces of the past without calling on the forces of the future. Napoleonic democracy twice became mired in disaster. Now, under the republican form, it is indeed the people that govern, through universal suffrage. It is up to the people to conquer power. Or rather, it has already conquered it, for no force can thwart its legally expressed will. But it does not yet know how to make use of this power. It does not know how to employ this power in a vigorous bid for its full economic emancipation. Theoretically, the millions of toilers, be they workers or peasants, are no longer passive citizens. They still too often remain so, through their resignation to the old servitude and indifference to the new ideal that will liberate them. But the fact that progress in the proletariat's education would suffice to turn its formal sovereignty into a substantial sovereignty, is itself an enormous development.

There has also been major progress over the last century in terms of teaching. All the nation's children are required to come to school; Condorcet's great ideal has become reality or is being realized. And it is no longer the Church, the accomplice in society's tyrannies, that dominates education and molds the people. It has been reduced to nothing more than a private association; and it is science and reason that inspire public education. The great light of the *Encyclopaedia* fills the horizon, but now wider and brighter. Socialist thought, heir to the very boldest initiatives of the eighteenth century, has begun to imbue the nation's teachers.

Similar can be said from the social point of view; even among that portion of French democracy that has not yet adhered to an explicit socialism, a still-bourgeois but—even so—social conception of property has prevailed. This is not, as according to the constituent assembly, the condition of political sovereignty; the poorest and most deprived man

is the political equal of the richest. Nor has it remained untouchable, In demanding a growing part of public resources from Capital through progressive taxation on inheritances, in proclaiming that the state has the right and duty to make the propertied contribute to insure the unpropertied against natural and social disasters, French Radicalism theoretically subordinates the right to property to the higher right of the nation. It adopts, in its own manner, Robespierre's line defining property as the portion of goods guaranteed to the citizen by law. Maybe, after accepting this formula, Radicalism hesitates in applying it boldly and in full. Maybe it fears that this same formula, if wielded by a vigorous, strong proletariat and applied to a society where economic power is again concentrated among an oligarchy, might gradually lead to the general socialization of capitalist society. But even such a possible failing by Radicalism in government does nothing to deny the effects of the idea that has developed within French democracy.

Socialism would then replace Radicalism in implementing this social idea of property and pushing it toward its necessary consequences. The breach through which it will pass is already open. So, after a century of trial and error, of reaction, of dreams that started out impotent, of half-finished revolutions, the most extreme, most logical, most democratic formula of the French Revolution has finally entered into the order of facts. What the revolutionary genius had glimpsed, asserted, and attempted amidst the fever and the exaltation of combat has become the normal, reliable reality. After a series of explosions, landslides, and resurgences, the volcanic peak has finally fixed itself at its highest level: it has now consolidated and expanded into a vast plateau that can provide the bedrock for the great new city. No, all those who struggled, suffered, and hoped over the last century did not waste their efforts; their suffering has not been in vain; their hope was not an illusion. The proletariat can rejoice in this victory for revolutionary democracy, not only because this triumph allows it to hope and prepare for a further, still more decisive victory, but because, even in its still weak and uncertain state, it was the proletariat itself that secured the Revolution's victory. It was the proletariat that brought the Revolution up to the level of 1793 like a burst of flames; it would soon fall back down, but it has relentlessly surged back to that same level. It was the proletariat which helped the Revolution along and forced the bourgeoisie to put an end to the ancient regime's resurgent pretensions. It was the proletariat that stripped the bourgeoisie of its narrow privileges and finally created a vast political democracy that will

evolve into a social democracy. What would the republicans have done, all century-long, without the workers? The proletariat's action can be seen in all the moments of the struggle that has prepared or realized political democracy. I believe that one of the great merits of the historical work whose final lines I am now writing is to have highlighted the traces of this action.

So, having already proven its strength in the past, the working class can confidently embark upon fresh struggles. There is now underway a fight to the last between capitalist oligarchy and socialist democracy—that is, the complete form of republican democracy. The privileges of property will be defeated. But for the proletariat to succeed, it must properly understand the lessons of its own experience over the last century and more. It enjoyed its first successes through continual daily effort, through ceaseless propaganda. If anything stands out from the story we have told, it is this deep continuity of proletarian thought and action. When the burning tips of the irons went cold, when the popular democratic revolution of 1793 paled and faced eclipse, when the generous revolution of 1848 was brutally suppressed, one might well have believed that night had fallen forever. But those who look deep into minds and souls can see that the ideal survived in secret in workers' consciousness and that, should events provide the slightest opening, the light would shine forth once more. This is a great lesson, indeed, for all repressive governments, of whatever type and whatever name. This is also a great lesson and great comfort for the fighters for socialism. For they learn that the constant, obscure efforts that each of them make will be paid back in full at the moment of great crises. The persistence of Babouvian communism through all the persecution and reaction, the persistence of republican faith and working-class hope even under the arrogant triumphalism of the Second Empire, surely count among the most remarkable facts in all our history. If the impassioned energy of workers' consciences could save freedom and socialism from mortal oblivion and final disaster—even with no legal rights and none of the resources of public organization—surely it is today assured victory, now that it has the multiple means of action that the proletariat has conquered?

Over a century, socialism has grown; it has become a power through either simultaneous or alternating use of two apparently contradictory methods, which the workers' free genius has reconciled. Sometimes it

has mixed itself up, with Babouvism and Blanquism,[16] in all the movements for democracy, in all the people's agitation. Sometimes, as with Fourier and Saint-Simon, and with some of the first workers in the International, it has sought to make socialism distinct, either in thought or in action. Sometimes it has been considered that the conquest of political freedoms is the prior condition for the workers' social advance; and it concentrates all its effort on this first task. Sometimes, it warns the workers against ever turning their outlook and their action away from their ideal and their final objective. In all the pages of the *Histoire socialiste*, we find this conflict among tendencies and methods. But in truth the proletariat never sacrifices the one for the other. It never turns away out of disinterest toward the confused and far-reaching events where it could test its strength and develop its action. But even in this impatient drive for movement, which throws it into all political and intellectual battles, it does not lose its basic intransigence. It has the very vivid sense that all action is useful only as a way forward, only as training for the revolution over property; that every reform is worthwhile only as a step toward the higher goal. The great tactical problem of the present is how to reconcile these two equally necessary methods—and do so not only instinctually, but deliberately. We can say that Marxism was originally an attempt to synthesize these two great tendencies, for it urged the proletariat to take part in all democratic movements but to immediately turn them toward the victory of communism. Today we face the same compelling problem, even if in different circumstances. In the era of the *Communist Manifesto* the democratic revolution had not been completed in France; in Europe, it did not exist in even outline form. Marx could thus believe that the proletariat would be strong enough to make the predicted agitation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution serve its own purposes.

Now, the working class develops and acts in a forcefully established democracy which evolves under the higher law of universal suffrage. The conditions of action are no longer the ones that Marxism had foreseen, but the proletariat's essential method should indeed be the one Marxism sketched out. That is, the complex method of a very vibrant and sharply focused class, which involves itself in all movements in order relentlessly to draw them toward its own end. How can it passionately contribute to the efforts of reform, and ceaselessly attach it to its revolutionary ideal?

[16] See footnote, p. 53.

How can it contribute to the development of production and intervene as a class in the functioning of capitalist life, without becoming stuck within its structures? Resolving these difficulties is not part of *Histoire socialiste*'s ambitions; tomorrow, the Parti socialiste and the Confédération générale du travail will hasten to do just this.[17] But what this history shows is that socialism has grown within the society born of the Revolution, because it has proven able to either expand its forces or concentrate itself—or sometimes, both at once. It has been all together in democracy and above it. And it is the sign of the French proletariat's vital force that it has not succumbed to the apparent difficulty of this task—instead, it has drawn strength from it.

Over a tormented, fruitful, great century, the working class's endeavor has been to create democracy while also going beyond it. Leading democracy while overcoming it, and forcing it finally to raise itself to the level of socialism—that will be its great endeavor for tomorrow.

Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine, Conclusion (1908), extrait.

[17] Jaurès sought to promote a dialogue between his party and the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), controlled by revolutionary syndicalists.

CHAPTER 4

Internationalism, Peace, and the World

Jaurès's name will forever remain associated with his tragic assassination by a nationalist fanatic on 31 July, 1914: he paid with his life for his fight for peace. This final section brings together a series of interventions and texts relating to the international situation. This illustrates the multiple aspects of Jaurès's fight for peace and his defense of the rights of all the exploited—from his conviction that the capitalist system leads to war, to his denunciation of colonial policy (especially in Morocco, at the time the object of everyone's attention), if not of colonialism as such. Other texts concerning the international situation—especially the Russian Revolution of 1905, which so enthused Jaurès, but also the Young Turk movement and Chinese republicanism—allow us to grasp the powerful internationalism which drove him. We also include an extract from his main book from this period, *L'Armée nouvelle*, where he proposed a root-and-branch reform of the French army, shortly before the outbreak of the Great War.

Capitalism and War

In 1893, Jaurès was elected an MP on the basis of the Parti Ouvrier's socialist programme. Speaking on the question of national defence two years later, upon a budget vote, he made a famous intervention in which he

J.-N. Ducange and E. Marcobelli (eds.), *Selected Writings of Jean Jaurés*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3_4

denounced capitalist society which "carries war within it just as a dormant cloud brings the storm".

Jean Jaurès–Gentlemen, firstly I thank the Chamber for its willingness, despite the fatigue that comes from this very important but long debate, to allow us, my friends and I, to explain ourselves before this tribune. I must further appeal, not to some indulgence to which we have no right, but to all your sense of fairness. For when we come here, in the name of the socialist idea, to discuss the present war budget with you, we come up against difficulties which are both grave and particular. Indeed, there is dissent among us, not only regarding the specific allocation of the budget, not only this or that particular point of military organization, but the social conceptions that determined the very principle of this organization. That is to say, gentlemen, that there is among us a fundamental, irreducible disagreement—and this creates a very great difficulty for any discussion.

Moreover, right from the outset I arrive upon—and I could not do otherwise—troubling, even poignant problems, with regard to which sharp polemics have been directed against us for two years already: war, militarism, the idea conceived by the socialist proletariat with regard to the army, to the *patrie*; French socialism's relationship with international socialism; the aspect that these territorial questions, which our friend Vaillant just spoke about, assume for us, for our party; these questions, as formidable as they are, are not something that we can or should avoid. They are posed before the country and must be posed before Parliament. And gentlemen, if you follow closely—as you surely have done—the great discussions that have taken place in foreign parliaments, you will see that everywhere, in London, in Rome, in Berlin, in Vienna, in Budapest, they have spoken of all kind of matters and, in particular, of French matters, in full freedom; they have spoken of our country, of those who govern us, of our heads of state, of our institutions, of the development of our domestic politics, of the repercussions that France's domestic politics could have on European affairs as a whole. It seems to me that the same fundamental freedom of discussion should also be ensured here (*from the far left: very good, very good!*) And if some oppose us, out of a scruple for patriotic caution—something which is not foreign to us, believe it—saying that it is the painful memories of twenty-five years ago that counsel all of our excessive reserve or this excessive sensitivity, I will answer very clearly that our country, in the trials that it has gone through, has perhaps momentarily lost something of its substance, but it has lost nothing, renounced

nothing of its real power, of its pride, of its full right to freedom and to life (*applause*).

Gentlemen, you want peace; you want it deeply. All the ruling classes in Europe, the governments and peoples visibly want it, with equal sincerity (*a member on the Left—"or unequal!"—commotion*). And yet, even amidst this vast, shared love of peace, war budgets everywhere swell and rise year after year, and war—damned by all, dreaded by all, reproached by all—can at any moment break out over all our heads. What is its source? At the risk of appearing to be afflicted by the cruellest monotony, I must say here, first of all, what is, for us, the deep reason for this contradiction, for this perpetual danger of war amidst the universal desire for peace (*commotion*). So long as, in each nation, a limited class of men possesses the great means of production and exchange, so long as it possesses this and governs other men, as long as this class can impose its own law—boundless competition, the relentless struggle for life, the daily combat for fortune and power—on the societies which it dominates; so long as this privileged class, in preserving itself against all the possible tumult from the mass, relies either on the great military dynasties or on certain professional armies in oligarchic republics; so long as Caesarism can profit from this deep rivalry among the classes to dupe them and have the one dominate the other (*applause on the far left*), crushing the parliamentary liberties of the bourgeoisie by means of the embittered people, crushing the republican reawakening of the people by means of the bourgeoisie gorging on business; so long as this is the case, this political, economic and social war among the classes, among individuals, in each nation, will spark armed wars among peoples (*very good! very good! on various sides*). Conflicts among nations arise from the profound division among classes and interests within each country.

For a century, such has been the case of Poland, turning between war among its peasants and nobles to war abroad.[1] Such was revolutionary France, casting forth its challenge to Europe, first to respond to the gnawing betrayals by the privileged, and then the better to get rid of its nobles and royals amidst the heightened crisis. Such was the British aristocracy, arming all the monarchical and feudal forces in Europe against us in order to save its privilege and its colonial fiefs. Such was Napoleon, continuing and amplifying the war beyond necessity and justice out of

[1] Poland had been divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1795.

instinct, by habit perhaps and through ennui, but also to perpetuate his absolutism, which would surely have been relaxed in times of peace, and to make the idealist and violent people of the Revolution into a heroic and subaltern democracy.

Later, such were the adventurists of December,[2] risking France on a mighty roll of the dice with an old and trembling hand. And such was the military aristocracy of Prussia, led by the Hohenzollerns, as it imposed its political and social domination on Germany through its victory over France and thus impregnated with feudal militarism the German unification which could have been achieved by other avenues.

Everywhere, in the great colonial competition, the principle of the great wars among European peoples appears in its most naked form. For perhaps all it ever takes to threaten peace in Europe is the uncontrolled rivalry between two trading posts or two groups of merchants. So, how do you hope to prevent international warfare always being on the point of breaking out? How do you hope to stop war being ever-possible, when in our societies—delivered up to the infinite disorder of competition, to class antagonisms and political struggles which are often merely social struggles in disguise—human life itself is fundamentally nothing but war and combat?

Those men of good faith who imagine they want peace, while they defend the present society against us, while they glorify it against us, are in reality defending—without knowing or wanting it—the permanent possibility of war. What they seek to prolong is, simultaneously, militarism itself.

For in order to defend itself against the troubles that constantly emerge from its very foundation, this tormented society is perpetually obliged to build up its armor, against the armor of others; in this century of limitless competition and of overproduction, there is also competition between armies, and military overproduction. Since industry itself is in combat, war becomes the primary, most excited, most feverish of industries (*Very good! Very good! from the far left*).

And it is not enough for nations to exhaust themselves like this in maintaining armed forces against each other; it is further necessary—and here I beg permission to state my thinking clearly—that the privileged, possessing classes of all countries isolate this army as much as possible

[2] An allusion to Napoleon III and his entourage.

from free democratic life, through the barracks and the discipline of passive obedience (*Applause on the far left; interruptions from the centre*).

For twenty years it has no longer been any secret that this is how the professional army is conceived in today's Europe. The National Assembly acclaimed the illustrious rapporteur on the military bill[3] when he said "When one speaks of the army, one must no longer talk about democracy"; it drenched in boos Denfert-Rochereau, the defender of Belfort, when he denounced the dogma of passive obedience (*Very good! Very good! from the far left*).

And in the very moment when, across the border, a military emperor recently told his soldiers that he now especially needed their loyalty against the enemy within and that they had to be prepared to shoot without hesitation or weakness against their own fathers and brothers enrolled by Social Democracy[4]—at this very moment or a few days later, we were told in this very discussion that the army was the great safeguard, both internally and externally. We understood what this meant. And I thank the speaker for the conservative party, as I thanked him the other day, for his sincerity and frankness.[5]

And that is how, gentlemen, you end up with a double contradiction. On the one hand, though all peoples and all governments want peace, and despite all the international philanthropic gatherings, war can still start from an ever possible accident; and on the other hand, while the spirit of democracy and freedom has everywhere developed, also developing are the great military organisms, which, in the judgment of the republican thinkers who built our doctrine, are always a chronic danger to the democracies' free existence. Your violent and chaotic society bears war within it, even when it wills peace, even when it is in a state of apparent rest, just as a dormant cloud brings the storm (*Very good! Very good! on the far left*).

Extract from an intervention in the Chamber of Deputies, 7 March 1895.

[3] Military bill presented to the Assembly by General Chanzy in May 1872, raising military service to five years for whoever drew the unlucky number.

[4] The 1793 Constitution never entered into effect but was an important reference point for the nineteenth-century socialist movement.

[5] An allusion to the intervention by Jules Delafosse who had the previous day declared that the army was "the best safeguard of our security, externally and internally."

For Peace

In this article published in La Dépêche *in 1900 Jaurès highlighted two factors that risked undermining peace. One was what was then called the "yellow peril", the Asian threat that could strike at Europe; the other was the expansionist and colonial ambitions of the European countries themselves, which could also drive them to war against one another. He thus proposed the creation of a great party of peace in Europe, to ward off this danger.*

The events in China are a grave threat to peace in Europe.[6] No one can know, at this time, whether the European forces will be able to easily overcome the Chinese nationalist movement. How well organized is China militarily? How fanatically patriotic are the Chinese? We do not know. For many years, Europe's representatives in Peking and Shanghai were much busier quarrelling over railroad concessions or territories than finding out any precise information on the mood in this vast empire. And when we see how mistaken England—so long established in South Africa—was with regard to the Transvaal's force of resistance, we must ask ourselves whether there are no terrible surprises in store in China. In the vigorous, incisive speech he made to the House of Commons a few days ago, Sir William Harcourt[7] noted that at the start of hostilities the Chancellor of the Exchequer had foreseen 12 million pounds sterling of total spending, and that this expenditure has now risen to 24 million pounds. The difference is a measure of the weight of England's optimism and ignorance with regard to South African matters. Who knows if Europe does not today have a similarly blind optimism with regard to matters in China? It may be that the 16,000 European soldiers will manage to seize Peking and install a regular government capable of assuring the existence of the European traders and engineers. But it may also be that the vastness of the territory to be pacified, the proliferation of hotbeds of violence, will force Europe into a very long, very costly effort.

For this effort to succeed, there would have to be an all-encompassing, cordial agreement among the European powers. Yet there is every reason to think that they are divided by ulterior ambitions and by secret jealousies, even in the very moment that they appear to cooperate. These gnawing rivalries could lead to disaster. Most importantly, when the time comes to settle accounts and for a system of guarantees to be organized in

[6] The Boxer rebellion.

[7] William Harcourt (1827–1904), a major British liberal politician and journalist.

China, these rivalries could result in acute conflict among the European powers. There lies the danger; there is the germ of war. And European opinion must be alerted in time. The popular consciousness has to be shielded against chauvinist surprises, against all kinds of capitalist and nationalist passions that could compromise world peace.

The German emperor is already affecting an intolerable bellicose tone. One could say that it is Germany which is charged with avenging Europe's quarrels, and the emperor—a friend of theatrical rhetoric—addressed the most incautious calls for violence to his soldiers: "no prisoners! no mercy!" European "civilization" spoke the language of Asiatic barbarism. Officials tried to dampen down this odious advice, pretending that the emperor had meant to tell his soldiers: "Prepare yourselves for a merciless war in which the enemy will take no quarter and kill." But why, then, did Wilhelm II praise Attila and the Huns? Why does he want the Germans to bequeath to China a great and terrible legend like the Huns bequeathed to Europe? No, there is an unfathomable spiral of violence, and we have every right to fear that in finding a difficult settlement for Chinese affairs, Germany's rulers have neither the necessary modesty, sang-froid or moderation.

For its part, England tried to play Europe's part in China all by itself. Lord Salisbury tried to pitch England's ally Japan into immediately dispatching a sizeable army corps in order to march on Beijing. It was thus possible that the ambassadors would need to be delivered earlier, which would be very costly. But England proposed to Japan that it would take on the financial costs of the operation, and it clearly sought to draw sole benefit from the re-establishment of order in China. In these days, faced with the allied troops' delay in marching on Peking, the big English dailies openly expressed their impatience over the joint operation. "We will never arrive if we have to waste time on coordinating; only a clear, rapid plan for action can succeed. Did we need Europe to help us subjugate India?" And the conclusion was that the Japanese and Anglo-Indian troops who were ready first ought not to wait for the rest of the "allied" forces before beginning their march on Peking. In this, there is a spirit of English particularism, that will certainly be there again at the moment of settling accounts—and which will add greatly to Europe's embarrassments.

The English press's tone with regard to Russia is rather malicious and sarcastic. The English note the Russians' inaction and conclude either that Russia has a different policy from the rest of Europe and wants to spare

the Chinese government, or that it has been caught unawares by events and did not have troops available on the Chinese border.

As for Russia itself, for many years it has visibly been following the same criminal policy in China as it has in the Balkans and Armenia. Its tactic is self-evident. It consists of frustrating the serious reorganization and effective reform of the countries over which it wants to extend its domination. It is happy for the Balkan populations rise up against the Turks at the right moment—that will give Russia cause to intervene, and for over a century it has been stirring trouble there. But it will not accept these populations trying to organize as autonomous nations; it would rather put them back under the Turkish yoke. Hence the terrible tragedies of Bulgaria, caught between the dreadful Turkish oppression and the even more dreadful Russian help.

Similarly, when the Russians saw that they could not lay their hands on Armenia, they preferred that the sultan slit its throat.[8] In China, for many years there had been a great party of reform, all-powerful in the court. It wanted to reorganize China's finances, to break the appalling mechanisms of waste and theft that leave the central authorities with barely a tenth of the taxes taken from the people, to change the routinist, corrupt administrative personnel, and to guarantee China's territorial integrity at the same time as opening up the Chinese empire to European capital and commerce. This reform policy was good news for England, whose interest in China did not lie in territory, but simply in the country being wide open to its mighty commerce, and in its populations—organized by a good system of government—having enough income to be able to buy its products. This policy, conforming to the interests of China, of England, and of civilized humanity as a whole, had a great chance of success. The emperor approved, and his leading minister began to put it into practice. But this did not suit Russia at all. What?—China being well administered? China having a budget? China having an army and a fleet? A China open to world trade could have an independent policy! And what, then, would become of Russia's dreams of supremacy? And how could it govern or dismember a regenerated China? For Russia to be able to dominate or dismantle China, it needed a barbaric and weak China. And in 1898, a coup was mounted in Beijing with Russian instigation and

[8] See Madeleine Rebérioux, 'Jaurès et les Arméniens', *Jean Jaurès bulletin de la SEJ*, no. 121, May–July 1991, pp. 4–9 and Vincent Duclert, *Jaurès. Il faut sauver les Arméniens!*, Paris, Mille et une nuits, 2006.

with Russian assistance. The reforming emperor[9] was dethroned and the dowager empress took power with the nationalist party, with the party of ignorance, theft, routinism, murder, and hatred. And the coup d'état that Russia perpetrated against civilization in Peking today imperils European lives and world peace. Alas, France—these last ten years dragged along in the furrow of Russian policy—was complicit, through its passive endorsement, in the barbaric coup d'état which tore China from the reformers and handed it to the Boxers. How many times we have said, in the press, in parliament, amidst murmuring and booing, that our blind submission to Russian policy would drag France into complications in the Orient, in which we would play the lamentable role of servants of Moscovite ambition! That is beginning, and we are reaping its first fruits.

But it is clear that, when we analyze the powers' interests and their policies more carefully, we can see that they may very well enter into conflict, and that this conflict could become aggravated to the point of war, unless a great party of peace takes form in Europe, starting right away. And it seems to me that the most pressing duty for international socialism, today, is to found a universal league for peace, calling to its ranks, alongside all the socialist proletarians, all clear-sighted and upstanding men who want to spare humanity the horror of bloody conflicts. This league will have a simple program: to moderate in all countries the impatient chauvinist urges and the gluttonous capitalist appetites which are only waiting for their chance to dismember China; to maintain the territorial integrity of the Chinese empire, to favor the establishment of a system of reforms and guarantees, and, if difficulties do crop up among the various powers with regard to the regulation of Chinese affairs, to force arbitration as defined by the Hague conference.[10]

This is more or less the same program adopted by the interparliamentary conference that reached its conclusion in recent days. But what can this conference do without the only international force for peace that has even a little organization, by which I mean the working class? That is why I think it is the international socialist partys role—as it meets for its Paris

[9] Namely, Guangxu (1871–1908), whose 100 days of reform were brought to a total stop by the dowager empress.

[10] The international conference met in The Hague from May to July 1899, adopting international conventions in order to promote arbitration and settle conflicts.

Congress on 21 September[11]—to become the rallying point for all forces for peace. The danger is a pressing one. Immediate action for peace is needed. And what an admirable role this is for socialism to play! What a service it will render to civilization! What fresh cause this will be for it to draw the confidence of the human race!

La Dépêche, August 12, 1900.

"In the Orient"

This article for La Petite République, *published in 1901, delved into French–Turkish relations and the Armenian question.*

The difficult thing to understand in Mr. Delcassé's speech and in his policy[12] is that he imagines he can separate the Armenian question from the Oriental question as a whole. He stated that this would be the object of a special debate, but in his speech—despite the insistence of Sembat[13] and Mr. Cochin[14]—he was as evasive as can be on this point.

For my part, I do not blame him for supporting economic and material-type claims in Turkey. Either France abandons all commercial expansion, all peaceful activity in the outside world, or it must ensure that the contracts that guarantee Frenchmen's positive interests are not violated. By no means is it impossible to reconcile this with a policy of peace. Quite the contrary, a sensible firmness will head off any irresolvable conflicts.

But it was childish for Mr. Delcassé to imagine that he could mobilize the French squadron and the French flag just in order to protect a few loans. If they were, indeed, under threat, this was because France's general situation in the Orient has been unsettled and, logically enough, the squadron was sent in the interests of firming up this general situation.

[11] In fact, the fifth international socialist congress took place in Paris from 23 to 27 September.

[12] Théophile Delcassé (1852–1923) was French foreign minister from 1898. He came from Gambettist circles, more moderate than radical, despite the name. See Louis Cleys et al. (eds.), *Delcassé et l'Europe à la veille de la Grande Guerre*, Foix, Archives départementales de l'Ariège, 2001.

[13] Marcel Sembat (1862–1922), a socialist MP for Grandes-Carrières in Paris (18th arrondissement). Close to Vaillant, he was already an authoritative figure in Parliament.

[14] Denys Cochin (1851–1922) was the son of the historian Auguste Cochin. A Paris MP from 1893 to 1919, he was one of the main spokesmen for the Catholic Church.

Already, despatches from Constantinople announce that our chargé d'affaires has demanded that the sultan provide legal recognition to the schools and hospitals France has created in the Orient.[15] That these schools and hospitals mostly belong to clerics, that in the Orient France is protecting associations of monks whom it combats on its own soil, is a contradiction that weighs on our entire foreign policy. A vigorous and persistent effort could and should put a stop to this.

Unable to separate out the essential traditions of our country from diplomatic routinism and clerical sophistry, this is not how Mr. Delcassé understands the problem. This is not the right moment to discuss that with him. But how did he not foresee that the Armenian question would come up during this conflict? And how could he have said nothing to the Chamber such as would allow it to hope that our diplomacy would not be caught unawares?

In fact, the Armenian question, which Mr. Delcassé artificially ruled out of this debate and tried to wall off from it, weighs even on the conduct of naval operations. It seems that Admiral Caillard's squadron will take possession of the island of Mytilene, and from the information communicated by *Le Temps* it seems that we had initially dreamed of occupying the ports of Beirut, Salonika, or Smyrna. But "this measure had the drawback of disturbing the economic interests of other powers, or of prompting agitation among the sultan's subjects which would have prejudiced the maintenance of the political situation in the Orient."

Thus, Mr. Delcassé feared that our squadron's arrival near the coasts of Asia Minor might have encouraged revolt among the populations oppressed by the sultan—doubtless including the Armenian populations. But is Mr. Delcassé sure that the occupation of the ports of Mytilene, or simply the appearance of the French flag in Turkish waters, would have none of the same effect? There is no chance that the Armenians would not consider France's vigorous action as a promise, as a pledge.

They will thus now be less patient about enduring this terrible yoke. And if, spurred on by the French–Turkish conflict, their demands become

[15] Two bankers who—like many Ottomans of Western European origins, also had French nationality,—called on France to recover the funds they had loaned to the Ottoman government. France sent warships stationed in Toulon to the isle of Mytilene and occupied the customs posts. France secured the recovery of the debt the Ottoman government had taken out with the Levantine bankers, and official recognition of all French cultural and religious institutes on the Ottoman empire's territory.

more energetic, if they more strongly remind Europe and France itself that the Treaty of Berlin is constantly being violated and they are the victims, then will France allow the sultan to repress a legitimate agitation, drowning it in blood, even though France has herself—whether or not deliberately—encouraged it? That would be a real crime. Either Mr. Delcassé is proceeding with unpardonable absent-mindedness, or he must have foreseen that the Armenian question could suddenly rise to the surface, and thus the French–Turkish conflict could grow. What preparations has he made to prevent this possible extension of the conflict resulting in France's isolation in Europe, or pitching Armenia into sordid diplomatic combinations? That is the important thing to know. That is the burning point of the crisis.

The worst danger would come from France engaging in this operation without knowing what it would do if the Armenian question were posed.

Nothing, even in Mr. Delcassé's language itself, allows us to suppose that he has taken precautions to ensure that France will honor its word and protect the Armenian people, without exposing itself to fearsome adventures. Mr. Delcassé's embarrassment over the mere mention of this question, which could at any moment become the very focus of conflict, is highly troubling.

But what would be even more troubling, even more serious, would be if Mr. Delcassé had left the Armenian question up to Russia alone. Already in advance of the debate the day before yesterday, we knew that Russia was trying to take advantage of present circumstances to extend a sort of exclusive protectorate over Armenia. We sounded the alarm over this manoeuvre a few years ago, in Parliament itself.

Russia has left it up to the Turks to take care of getting rid of the most energetic Armenian elements, and it is now trying to insinuate its influence among an Armenian people weakened by the massacres and exhausted by Europe's long neglect. Just recently, Russian agents went around Armenia saying: "Yes, prince Lobanof[16] was wrong to abandon you during the great massacres; but the Tsar loves you. He will support you, if only you have confidence in him."

Has Mr. Delcassé consented to this sort of division of oriental difficulties between France and Russia? Will France limit itself to ensuring the payment of a few loans and the security of a few monasteries? And will it

[16] Prince Alexis Lobanov-Rostovsky (1824–1896), Russian foreign minister in 1895–1896.

allow Russia to present itself to the Armenians as the sole guardian of the Treaty of Berlin, to the exclusion of Europe and France itself? It would be senseless, if not surprising, if Admiral Caillard's squadron served above all to cover for the "moral" annexation of Armenia to Russian influence, substituting the Tsar's despotism for the sultan's.

Through a singular contrast, in the same moment that Mr. Delcassé is doing as much as he can at the parliamentary tribune to separate the Armenian question from the Franco–Turkish conflict, the Russian ambassador has made urgent, threatening approaches to Constantinople, in defense of the Armenians. The Armenian question is ceasing to be a European question, even if Europe's signature appears at the bottom of the Treaty of Berlin. It is ceasing even to be a Franco–Russian question. It seems to be becoming an exclusively Russian question.

To play prince Lobanof's game, Mr. Hanotaux[17] has delivered the Armenians up to the sultan's knife. To play the game of Lobanof's successor, will Mr. Delcassé deliver them up to an exclusive Russian protectorate? Mr. Delcassé has no right to say: "this is a question for Russia." No, this is a question for Europe, of which France, despite everything, is one part.

La Petite République, November 7, 1901.

Aguinaldo and the Philippines

The text that follows is the preface to the book Les hommes de la révolution. Aguinaldo et les Philippines, *by Henri Turot (1865–1920), a journalist at* La Petite République *and a socialist councillor in Paris (1901–1910). Turot explored many colonies, including Indochina. This text provided Jaurès the opportunity to take sides with the people exasperated by their oppression under first the Spanish and then the American colonists. After the Spanish-American War (April–August 1898) the US took* de facto *possession of several former Spanish colonies like Cuba and the Philippines. In early 1899 there was a violent war setting the United States against the Filipino independence fighters.*

[17] Gabriel Hanotaux (1853–1944), a historian and alumni of the Ecole Nationale des Chartes, republican MP for Aisne, foreign minister from 1894 to 1895 and 1896 to 1898, often the object of sharp criticism by Jaurès.

Turot's weighty, energetic book has come at just the right time. In the very moment when American opinion is called on to settle the fate of the Philippines, it is right that the public in all countries should be accurately informed of the Filipino people's magnificent strivings for independence. Certainly, the imperialist passion and the might of capitalist interests in the United States will not give into the wishes of the human conscience enlightened in all countries by the sincere friends of piece and right. Yet there is, today, a moral solidarity among peoples, and there are inevitable repercussions, in opinions and sentiments, from one country to the next. It is no paradox to say that the vanquished Filipinos will be better treated if all civilized countries are familiar with and admire their heroic fight for freedom.

Turot studied the documentary evidence on this drama: and added to that, he went to the Philippines themselves, during the struggle. A quiver of unconfessed sympathy and of pained anger mix into his narrative. And how could one not be moved by this drama, by this terrible disappointment of a people which seems to have encountered a new and definitive subjection, precisely through its striving toward freedom? For centuries, these intelligent, proud populations, who have many ties of analogy with Japan, were placed under the stifling domination of Spanish generals and monks. Observed in the most secret movement of their thoughts, systematically turned away from exact, living science by their educators and blinded with theological subtleties, their masters hoped to exploit their troubled minds; subjected to a perpetual regime of inquisition, torture and terror, stripped of all the fruit of their labors by prevaricating functionaries, they never ceased—especially in the last century—to show the energy of their inner life by way of heroic uprisings. The best-off young people went to Europe or to great Chinese ports already penetrated by European thinking, and they returned to the Philippines with the impassioned desire to sow the seeds of freedom and right in this ardent land sterilized by the monk's shadow. The life and death of Rizal[18] is doubtless one of the most moving episodes in the history of man. In Europe, he absorbed all modern science; he returned to the Philippines not to prompt an uprising, but to attempt a supreme effort among their masters, to open their minds to the latest necessities. But he was arrested, condemned and shot: and before he died, on the very night that preceded his sacrifice, as

[18] José Rizal (1861–1896) was one of the great figures of the Filipino resistance to the Spanish invaders.

his fiancée kneeled weeping by his cell door, he wrote an admirable poem in which the love of freedom blends with some sort of pantheistic worship of land and sky. Turot is right to give us the details of this drama: Rizal's life and death leave a sort of sacred frisson in the soul, and it seems impossible that the people which inspired such devotion should not, at last, be free.

But what cruel irony events had in store! War broke out between the United States and Spain, over Cuba; and the Philippines could believe that the moment had come for their national independence. At first, the United States seemed to be encouraging them. But soon, the Philippines realized that the United States quite simply intended to substitute its own domination in place of the Spanish, and they were forced to admit to themselves, with despair, that they were to remain subjects and that—added to that—they had been duped by those who had purported to be liberating them. To be freed from Spain and not yet free—any prophet who had told the Filipinos in advance of this strange fate would have murdered all the fibers of their hearts.

Turot has a deep sympathy for the Filipino leader Aguinaldo,[19] who after fighting the Spanish tyranny combatted the American betrayal. Perhaps such great sympathy conceals a little some of the errors that Aguinaldo made. Indeed, it seems that he rather rashly placed his trust in the United States. He did not demand any written engagement and did not take any precautions. But he really ought to have known that capitalist interests govern United States policy, and that powerful sugar combines called for annexation. Perhaps also in the plans for a provisional Constitution he formulated, Aguinaldo gave himself a too-overtly dictatorial role, which played into the hands of the American press's polemics.

But these reservations cannot diminish the admiration that courage is due. They cannot play down the wrong done by the United States. At this point, one would hope in vain for the whole of American opinion to be drawn to a more equitable policy. Even if Bryan's candidacy is successful,[20] what would be granted to the Philippines would not be full

[19] Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) was another pro-independence figure and president of the Filipino republic before he was captured by the Americans.

[20] William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925), Democrat candidate in the 1896 presidential election, defeated by the Republican William McKinley after a memorable campaign. Bryan was the big name of American "progressivism"—with notes often marked by a strong religious feeling—and became Wilson's Secretary of State from 1913 to 1915.

independence, but a conditional and limited autonomy. There is not a single man in the world conscious of what human right is, who does not wish that the United States would wholly refrain from abusing its might. The United States can repair a lot of things by guaranteeing the Philippines a regime of civic and political freedom, developing instruction, science, and economic activity among them.

Will blind, egotistical Capitalism allow it?

Preface to Henri Turot, Les hommes de révolution. Aguinaldo et les Philippines, *Paris, Leopold Cerf, 1900.*

Against the Colonial Policy

In a moment in which the French intervention in Morocco was taking on an increasingly sharp military character, a debate began in the Chamber of Deputies. At this stage, Jaurès criticised excesses by military hierarchs and indeed colonial policy itself, but did not go so far as to put in question France's interests in North Africa. Such convictions may seem rather moderate, in light of subsequent history, but at the time this was a bold move faced with the many republicans convinced that France's entire colonial policy was well-founded.

Jean Jaurès–Gentlemen, I do not want to touch on general questions of foreign policy, which have already been so amply elaborated upon here. I simply want to say a few words about the Moroccan question. A few weeks ago, I sounded the alarm over the attempts or pretentions of certain colonial and military circles who seemed impatient to force an expedition in Morocco. It is not—as Mr. De Castellane just said—that a very firm governmental resolution had been conceived in this sense. Quite the contrary: what I found so grave, what I found so worrying, was that a few military chiefs, perhaps acting under mediocre discipline (*Protests among the centre and the right*).... Truly, it is extraordinary that even here we cannot frankly pose the question (*Very good! Very good! on the far left*). Over these questions, over African policy, there was what I consider a dreadful precedent, of such a nature as to encourage certain types of imprudence and certain attempts at undisciplined initiatives. I make no judgment on the expedition in the Saharan oases itself, on

the taking of Touat.[21] I make no judgment at all on the consequences and the results, though I am compelled to note that an expedition that cost 50 million, which still today imposes a 10 million a year charge on our budget, which has put France in contact with nomadic or anarchic peoples, which has created new causes for strains and clashes between us and Morocco—I am compelled to note that this expedition was not deliberated upon here, was neither wanted nor voted for by Parliament, that we have been reduced to sanctioning and legitimizing after the fact the perhaps accidental, perhaps premeditated result of military exercises that turned into what were, definitively, military expeditions (*Applause on the left and far left*). And why, therefore, gentlemen, do you not want a similar temptation—like that which led to the problem of the Algerian and south-Oran oases—to crop up once more? Precisely what I feared was that the emotion stirred by the El-Moungar incident, by the massacre of one of our columns, would be exploited—as it began to be—by those who, rather than limit themselves to the necessary measures of repression and policing, wanted—under the pretext of pursuing the anarchy we had suffered into its Moroccan hotbeds—to begin, to launch, a fresh expedition.

It was not going to be announced clearly and with great hubbub; at first it would be just a policing operation, but one which we took onto the Sultan's territory. There would be a clash and then someone would tell Parliament: our flag is at war; now we cannot step back! National honor is at stake, it demands that the expedition continue (*Applause on the left and far left*).

And it was quite simply in order to ward off this danger that I signalled it in advance. I imagine that in so doing I rendered service—within the limits of my capacities—to those whose precise intention was a policy of careful penetration of Morocco.

If you do want French influence to penetrate it, to spread there, to establish itself, then you—parliament, government—have to remain responsible, the masters of this policy. You have to remain free to choose the moment for it, to choose the approach for it, to choose its form (*More applause*). What I am bringing to this tribune, when it comes to the Moroccan question is not—I hasten to add—a purely negative policy, a policy of pure defiance, nor an inert and uncertain policy of biding

[21] The Touat oases were occupied by French troops in 1900–1901, which in turn sparked a revolt.

time, which would itself be prey to chance, at the mercy of events. I am convinced that France has interests of the first order in Morocco; I am convinced that these interests themselves create a sort of right.

The Muslim or Moroccan populations cannot be turned, whipped up, gathered against us with impunity. There is a close solidarity among all parts of the Muslim world, which has asserted itself on many occasions, and this obliges us to extend our country's moral action even to parts of the Muslim populations which are not directly incorporated into France's empire. The danger appeared already twenty years ago, in the same moment when in Egypt—notwithstanding the quite major distance—the progress of the Mahdi[22] awakened ambitions and appetites across all of Muslim Africa. Foucauld, our explorer in Morocco, noted at this point that the Mahdi's progress had been amplified, that legend had it that he was already master of Tunis, master of Algiers. Appetites were awakened—and got organized. We thus have the right to surveil these events and to take precautions against dangers of this order.

Mr. Gayraud—And the duty to do so.

Jean Jaurès—I will add that France has all the greater a right to extend its economic and moral action to Morocco given that—apart from any surprises or any military violence—the civilization that it represents among the indigenous population of Africa is certainly superior to the Moroccan regime's own, in its present state. My friends and I do not count among those who have always approved of the policy pursued with regard to the indigenous population; we have denounced its flaws, or vices, or violence, or injustices; but at least there is a possibility of control which makes it possible gradually to repair, to redress iniquities and to develop a regime of growing justice, to the profit of the Muslim populations. And I am compelled to recognize—I gladly do so—that despite its infirmities and its vices, the French regime in Algeria and Tunisia gives the indigenous population, the Muslims, guarantees of security, guarantees of well-being, means of development, which are infinitely superior to those of this despoiling, anarchic, violent, wicked Moroccan regime, which absorbs and devours all the country's resources and is continually shaken by fits of morbid and bestial fanaticism. Yes, it is desirable, precisely in the interest of the indigenous population of Morocco as in the interest of France, that our country's economic and moral action extends there

[22] Mahdi (1844–1885), leader of a religious-political revolt and founder of a theocratic state, which lasted from 1885 to 1898.

and establishes itself there (*Applause on many sides*). But how will you make this so, gentlemen? Through war, is it? None of you desire it, none of you want it. First, it should be properly recognized that this would be a cumbersome and difficult enterprise. The tribes are disunited, but they are also armed, and it may well be that the appearance of the foreigner in arms could provoke the sudden reconciliation of these divided tribes—a reconciliation aimed against us. And then, we could not take this military enterprise very far without perhaps being driven to undertake cruel, bloody operations, whose effect would persist in generations-long rancor among the very men whom we want to assimilate into our nation. And this would be the most dreadful danger that could arise, for us, from the use of force. Finally, gentlemen, what a confession of impotence it would be if we were reduced to that! One can understand that in a time when France had not yet set foot in Algeria, under the Restoration, when France went to punish the pirates of Algiers, it was obliged to resort to force to penetrate into the interior and to establish itself there. But now that you have been established there for three-quarters of a century, now that you possess an organized Algeria, now that you can act on neighboring Morocco with all the moral, political, and economic resources available to a great country like France, it would truly be moral bankruptcy to be forced to confess that you have no means of penetration there other than force of arms (*Applause on the left and far left*).

Intervention in the Chamber of Deputies, November 20, 1903.

Race War

This article, published in L'Humanité *in 1904, once again marks Jaurès's distance from the colonialist policy pursued by the Third Republic, which was also supported by the Radicals. Indeed, this article revolves around statements made by the former governor general of Indochina (occupying this role from 1896 to 1902) Paul Doumer (1857–1932), a Radical and an important figure in the Third Republic. His nomination to this role illustrated his party's support for the colonial policy.*

Yesterday, Mr. Doumer did not settle for attempting a new nationalist-reactionary combination, designed to replace the one which has just collapsed in the face of universal suffrage. For he also tried to engage France and Europe's international policy in the most odious and the most foolish race war. He proclaimed the eternal indignity and the eternal

incapacity of four hundred millions; he set a whole continent outside of history, outside of the right to progress and to life. Listen to these savage, inept words: "Do not be mistaken, gentlemen. Today, we are not talking about those diplomatic conceptions which are made and unmade at the whim of politicians. Anyone would be blind not to see that the struggle has been engaged between two civilisations, between two worlds, between Europe and Asia, between the white race and the yellow race; on the one side, this race which is our own, this heir to so many glories, with its rich inheritance of science and discovery, this educator for the globe; and on the other side, a both very old and very young people, to which it has brought its high culture, and which has turned against Europe the very benefits which it had received from it. That is the real question, the only one. And some Frenchmen might hesitate? What! Then this country — forever placed at the head of civilisation and, we can say it, of all of the most profoundly European Europe — would find itself on the side of the yellow race! (*Applause*)."

Truly, if the cooperative workers present at the banquet applauded this language, then they have quite the unique idea not only of the rights of man but also of the conditions of proletarian emancipation. What! Should we proclaim, a priori, that the millions of Chinese and Japanese are barbarians to be surveilled and oppressed? That in all the conflicts that may emerge between them and the ambitions and appetites of a group of Europeans, it is necessarily *they* who are wrong—and their claims should properly be smothered in fire and steel? But it is Mr. Doumer who is the barbarian. And so those who applauded him are also the worst barbarians—that is, if they gave their considered support for this savage imperialism and did not simply allow themselves to be carried away by the bonhomie of a banquet.

This policy is not just inhuman but, added to that, dangerous and deadly. What does "yellow peril" mean? That production in Asia may, one day, present competition to European labor? Does it mean that through the growing organization of its military forces it will one day be capable of going head-to-head with European armies and fleets, and to throw out of Peking the atrocious invasion of murder, fire, and rape that has so repeatedly torn through it?

But will Europe exhaust its own strength, its own genius, in keeping four hundred million human beings as serfs, forbidding them work, stripping them of the means to defend themselves? If there is, indeed, a peril, there are but two means of warding it off. The first is to always treat

the yellow peoples with fairness and moderation, so as not to awaken irredeemable hatreds among them. The second is to prepare, to hasten, a European entente, such that a united Europe's collective, international force will discourage the yellow world from all thought of aggression, and that finally the peoples of Europe—retaining only that of their military force that might eventually serve the defense of their common interests—will lighten their production of a damaging burden and make themselves better able to withstand the inevitable economic competition from a new continent. Then, the economic progress of China and Japan, far from throwing up obstacles to Europe's industrial rise, will expand the world market for our producers, once a vast continent has joined it.

But Mr. Doumer everywhere defies all sense. His policy consists of insolent provocations and savage contempt with regard to Asia, and of narrow, aggressive chauvinism with regard to Europe. And what sentiments toward the yellow peoples, from a man who only yesterday was governor-general of Indochina!

L'Humanité, May 17, 1904.

The European Revolution

On 9 January 1905 a peaceful demonstration in St. Petersburg was repressed by troops. This was the beginning of the first Russian Revolution; while it is often overlooked in favour of 1917, in its day it triggered huge enthusiasm across Europe and especially among socialist ranks. All Russia was hit by a major strike wave, which Jaurès comments on here.

What the Russian workers rising up from one end of the empire to the other are demanding is the institution of national sovereignty; a Constitution based on the equal rights of all citizens. Denied the right to suffrage, they are revolting against a regime that compels them to prove, by way of force, that they are not a negligible quantity, a nothing. They have already blocked up Petersburg and Moscow, cut off from almost all communication with the outside world, with a general railway strike—the prelude to a total strike across all industries. Our conservative and moderate dailies from the Paris *Écho* to *Le Temps* and *Débats* are scandalized, indignant about all this. One would deign to admit that workers can use strikes over their economic demands, albeit while also countering the exercise of this right as far as possible through violent police measures. But to declare a strike to conquer universal suffrage, to impose the calling of a constituent

assembly—well, that is a scandal, terrorism. But—what? By what means would these gentlemen wish that the Russian workers protested? At the ballot box, perhaps? Tsarism just refused this, in the very moment when, in creating the imperial Duma, it purported to grant the nation certain guarantees. The exclusion affecting the working class is all the more outrageous given that the authorities can no longer cling on to the old regime of untrammelled bureaucracy. There is nothing more logical than their response. To authorities who consider them as like nothing, they reply by reducing themselves precisely to nothing. For if one does not deign to admit them into exercising national sovereignty for themselves, this is doubtless because they are useless, non-existent—so why, then, should they continue to work, to produce? Since their work, which keeps social life running, is not a sufficient qualification for their freedom, for political power, they stop working. If, as it seems, they can be passed over, then may society go on without them. And the general strike, through which they themselves reduce their productive power to nothing, is the admirable, appropriate response to senseless Tsarism's action in denying them any political power. Have *Le Temps* and *Débats* forgotten France's own revolutionary history? In Mirabeau's speaking tour of Provence, when he launched thunderbolts against the pride of nobles and the arbitrary power of kings, he cried out "Careful not to reduce to despair this people which produces everything and which, to show its formidable strength, would only have to become immobile." Such was the general strike threat made in the name of the Third Estate. And if the Revolution had not found its path, if the monarchy had not called on the whole nation to form the Constituent Assembly, if it had not granted the Third Estate this pact which guaranteed it power, perhaps a general stoppage of production and exchange would have broken royal obstinacy and the pride of the privileged.

Visibly, what is playing out in Russia is a very deliberate revolutionary plan. The socialists, long divided over tactics,[23] have come together and arrived at common decisions. Doubtless, they have resolved to employ all forms of action, meaning, to try to bring some of their own to the Duma, whatever that is, in order to make the people's protest heard there, but first of all to pressure the authorities through a great revolutionary movement, in order to tear from it a democratic Constitution

[23] Since 1903, the Russian Social Democrats had been divided between Bolsheviks ("Majoritarians") and Mensheviks ("Minoritarians").

and the enactment of universal suffrage. The obvious watchword was that of not complicating the general strike with any pointless violence. What has, alone, been withdrawn is labor power—and all social life has collapsed or fallen away. The workers' movement has all the more chance of success given that all the secret or declared sympathies of those who want freedom are with it. This is no longer just a class movement: it is the great national movement of all those who need to be free and who find no decisive means of asserting this demand other than in the strength of the working class. The engineers solidarize with them, and the boss-class itself is obliged to wish that the proletarians' victory over a deplorable regime will allow the inevitable conflicts of labor and capital to take a less chaotic and tumultuous form. The imbecility of Tsarism, refusing the Russian people a system of universal guarantees, such as the industrial bourgeoisie needs just as the proletariat does, has coalesced all the living forces of the modern world against the bureaucracy. The false sages may mock what they call the political inexperience of the Russian people. The authorities have taken on the job of rapidly educating them—and never has Proudhon's line that "the stupidity of governments makes for the science of revolutionaries" been more fitting. In this regard, there has never been a superior science to that of the Russian Revolution. This fresh uprising, vaster and more methodical than previous ones, appears calculated to demoralize all the forces who attempt to resist it. In the moment that the exhausted, breathless tsar—hoping to recover a little from the emotions and moral fatigue of the Manchuria war[24]—imagined that through the paltry invention of his sham Duma he had blunted the whole revolutionary upsurge; when he hoped that the flame of rage would go out amidst a mass indifference, like a fire lost under the falling snow; the Revolution got back on its feet, more imperious and more ardent than ever, and demanded that he account for the hypocrisies that he had piled on top of his violence. Where would he find refuge? Would the intolerable charlatan who gave off airs of victory upon the definitive defeat he had brought back from the [Treaty of] Portsmouth manage to ward off the disaster with braggadocio alone?

What is more, with the revolutionary struggle for universal suffrage already engaged in Russia, a revolutionary struggle for universal suffrage also set underway in Austria-Hungary. The emperor finally understood

[24] An allusion to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, which ended in Russian defeat.

that he could not resist Hungarian nationalism, if not by offering universal suffrage to all the peoples of Hungary—to the groups dominated by the Magyars, as to the Magyars themselves. But he still wanted to deny it to the peoples of Austria. What childish calculations! For, in this earthquake, the proletariat of all Austria—Bohemia and German Austria—demands full political rights. There has now begun the most vehement, powerful agitation that the Austrian working class has thus far undertaken. It will continue pushing forward, if necessary, up to the mass strike and revolution. And, through an admirable historical coincidence which is the good fortune of the rising classes, it so happens that in Austria as in Russia the proletariat, in saving itself, saves the nation. For nothing but universal suffrage can maintain the Austrian state, now being pulled at by so many different forces. This alone can be its bind, its cement. But the advent of democracy in Russia, as in Austria, will necessarily have repercussions in Germany. How can the German empire maintain what is left of its absolutism and feudalism, when the great peoples of eastern Europe, including the very one that had been immersed in the deepest bondage, have finally asserted their free will? Then, the Kaiser's Germany will be isolated, not by a plan of aggression among hostile powers, but by the contradiction between its arbitrary and caste regime with all Europe's emancipated democracy.

After the Russian Revolution, after emancipation in Austria, will the German people allow themselves to be the only people in Europe still prey to the irresponsible will of one man—one who does not seem ever so concerned to settle Europe's nerves? At a moment when moods seemed to be calming, his toast to gunpowder and the sword again excited troubled commentaries and panic, whether real or put-on. Time echoes such a language of modern savagery, transposing it from Germany to France. "We know France and Europe's position. So, hurrah for gunpowder and the sharpened sword, for the ever-clear goal and the always tensed muscles." Perhaps the fallout of the events in Russia will inspire reflection of a different order in the German emperor's mind. But that is where Europe is at. Such is the troubled, agitated life that is to be made for it. Such is the nightmare of war and violence it will live through, so long as democracy and the working class are not sovereign. That is why we follow the heroic, fruitful struggle of the Russian proletariat with such passion.

L'Humanité, October 28, 1905.

The Renewal Movement in China

Jaurès dedicated this article to the anti-royalist movement in China, advocating a Chinese republic on the Western model. The country was highly conservative and found itself under the yoke of Japan and other foreign powers after the Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895) and the repression of the Boxer rebellion (1899–1901). Jaurès backed this movement for renewal, which would in 1911 result in the republican insurrection and the proclamation of the Republic of China.

The other day, *l'Humanité* spoke of the renewal movement that has begun to take shape in China. Having been oppressed and exploited for so long, this great country aspires to reform its political system and its education system. This is not a blind fanaticism like that of the Boxers. The new Chinese revolutionaries bear no ill-will toward foreigners. But they do not want foreigners to humiliate and despoil China; they call on the Chinese to become conscious of their own dignity and of the value of foreigners, in order to introduce to China the progress that has been realized elsewhere. One of my friends sent me a letter from one of his comrades who is this very moment travelling in China. This is a well-informed observer who does not exaggerate matters and whose observations are sure to be balanced.

If the best minds in China are working to educate it and to transform it, France would be wise to adapt to the new situation without delay. First, it will have to avoid anything that would risk wounding the natives of Indochina. Parliament's duty is to redouble its vigilance and its monitoring effort. Secondly, it is important to dissipate all the misunderstandings that may be prompted by an article in the recent Franco-Japanese treaty. When France and Japan mutually commit to maintaining order in China, in the regions where each most particularly exerts its influence, this is doubtless a matter of protecting the life and security of the foreign residents. But I would very much imagine that we would not guarantee the present "order" of China against the efforts of the forces of renewal who want to save it by reforming it. That would be a crime against civilization—and the worst imprudence.

L'Humanité, July 30, 1907.

"Speech by Citizen Jaurès"

On 24 January 1908, intervened in a parliamentary debate on Morocco. Here are two extracts from his speech, published in L'Humanité, *where we see Jaurès distancing himself ever further from colonial policy. His denunciations of this policy became both more frequent and sharper than in previous years.*

… My friends and I have long persisted in saying, in writing, in repeating, that your intervention in Morocco, in the form in which it is now taking place, can have no effect other than to excite, to rally against France, and against France alone, all the hatred in Morocco, to assemble against you, and against you alone, the passion of religious fanaticism and national independence and to finish off the already-shaken sultan, who you daily make, in Moroccans' eyes, the hated tool of the foreigner, of the invader, of distant usurers (*Very good! Very good! On the far left*). That is what we said—and that is how things have turned out. The sultan to whom, after much uncertainty, France rashly tied its fate, today has his authority in almost utter ruin. He now holds only one of the two Moroccan capitals. On 19 August he was forced out of Marrakech, the capital of the South. On 3 January he was forced out of Fez, the capital of the North. When his agent El Mokri came to France, he was hit by the news of the revolution in Fez, but attempted to regain his composure and said: Yes, but not all is lost for the sultan, he still has Medinez, he still has Ouezzan. And then Medinez proclaimed the other sultan, and, in turn, the religious authorities in Ouezzan proclaimed Mulai Hafid; all that is left to the sultan, to whose fate France has tied itself, is a few ports on the coast, and even that probably because France imposes it by force. I do not have to delve into the circumstances surrounding the movement that has emerged in Fez. Some will claim that it was the crowd which forced the religious authorities' hand, that there was a sort of popular riot. But the more you say that, the more that you will see that in Morocco, where the religious authorities have such a grip on the people, the crowd forced the religious authorities' hand themselves, because they judged them too circumspect; the more you say that, the more you will see that in Morocco we are facing a vast and imposing movement. …

So, gentlemen. Let's be wary of all this—and not head into this adventure. Let us not abandon the only role that can today suit France. After having experienced the drunkenness and the enchantments of force, experienced disappointments and bruisings, its ideal is to be the world's great

worker for peace and right. Its duty, its role, is to seek to dispel and ward off all the conflicts that might threaten the world's peace. And if, one day, exacerbated economic rivalries risk setting Britain and Germany at loggerheads, your duty is to bring a word of peace before all Europe, to ward off, to dispel the storm (Very *good! Very good! On the far left*). How can you do this, if you are engaged in this murky intrigue in Morocco, where all manner of interests clash and all manner of appetites rub up against one another? How will you have a free conscience and free hands if you get bogged down there and do not clearly have justice on your side? I will add: if you are now, for the Moroccans, the people in Europe which most violently exercises the force of arms, how will you look to the Islamic world which is beginning to wake up, and where France had such an interest in gaining ever wider sympathies? You are well aware that this Muslim world, tyrannized and bloodied by the despotism of its masters as by the force of the European invader, is assembling and becoming conscious of its unity and its dignity. Two movements, two rival currents, are disputing its leadership: there are the fanatics who want to end up with hatred, a battle of fire and steel, with European and Christian civilization; and then there are the modern men, the new men, today, like Mustafa Kameh, like the Muslim elite in India united with the Hindus, like the Muslim elite in Turkey who have just extended a hand of brotherhood to the Armenians who have been bled so dry. There is an entire elite that say: Islam can only save itself through self-renewal, by interpreting its old holy book according to a new spirit of freedom, brotherhood, and peace (*applause on the far left*). And this elite's aspiration is not to break the scaffolding of European administration and European civilization; it recognizes for example, the admirable services that England has sometimes rendered to the oppressed castes, but at the same time it says that it is necessary to raise the Muslim population to the point where it can participate, dignified, in European civilization. And at the very moment when this movement takes form, you provide the Islamic fanatics the pretext, the opportunity, to say "What reconciliation can there be with these brutal Europeans? Look at this France of justice and freedom which has turned toward Morocco with nothing but mortars, cannons and guns!" You, gentlemen, are pursuing an odious policy against France (*applause on the far left*).

L'Humanité, January 25, 1908.

Turkey and Morocco

Jaurès once again shows himself ready to support any movement for democracy and liberation from colonial interference. Here, he provides an exhaustive panorama of the many European interests in the North African countries.

There is an enormous gulf between the political and social state of Turkey and of Morocco. You will excuse me from identifying each of these differences. But the bigger these differences are, the more striking it is to acknowledge the profound analogy between the Turkish movement and the Moroccan movement.

Everywhere in Morocco as in Turkey, the Muslim world is agitating to conquer or safeguard its independence, to shake off the foreign yoke—or foreign threat. Fundamentally, the Turkish revolution is above all a national revolution. For sure, the Turkish liberals have the noble concern of giving their country greater freedom and greater justice. But what they want, first of all, is to unshackle themselves from the ever-more burdensome tutelage, the ever-greedier interference, of the European powers. They want to reform Turkey themselves, in order to deny the hypocrite doctors any pretext to make a place for themselves at the sick man's bedside and carve up his inheritance. They combat absolutism because it suffocates individuals, but also and even more so because it is deadly for the nation itself. By different means—at a much lower level of historical development and with less concern for civilization in general—the Moroccan part of the Muslim world is rising up against the usurers who come from the outside, against the brutal and cunning invaders.

As far as France is concerned, the Moroccan and Turkish movements are linked, their forces combined. By that, I mean that France can hardly remain the loyal and useful friend of a liberated Turkey if it persists with its criminal, violent assault against the Moroccan people. How could the Muslims of Turkey not be wounded by the attack France commits against men who profess the same faith, who live by the same sacred text? And most importantly, what authority will France have to protest all the manoeuvres attempting to impose a renewed oppression on Turkey, if from Europe it offers the example of an enterprise in brutality and injustice?

One ought not misunderstand the sincerity of Europe's welcome for the Turkish revolution. It has smiled upon it—but this is the forced smile of the covetous heir who sees the sudden resuscitation and rejuvenation of

the ill man whose death he had been hoping for—and whose spoils he had already appropriated. There, Germany is losing the profitable protection it had exercised over a hated sultan. If Abdul Hamid stays true to his word and really applies the Constitution, he will find infinitely more strength and guarantees from the collaboration of his people than he would from the self-interested goodwill of the Kaiser. Official Germany affects that it will continue to give liberated Turkey the sympathies and the assistance that it extended to the sultan's Turkey. But it is little satisfied at having become less needed.

Austro-Hungary gazed longingly at Salonika; and the Turkish revolution has, in part, been made against the Austro-Hungarian intrigues in the Balkans. Its "eminently civilising" railroad combinations have had to come to a stop. Russia was in a rush to resume its centuries-old policy of "friendly" penetration in the Balkans and "disinterested" protection. Italian thinking gently drifted toward Albania and eventually reached the shores of Tripolitania. Like nocturnal birds poising their nests in every angle of a ruined building, all the diplomatic corps with their pointed beaks and silent flight find some obscure niche for themselves in all the nooks and crannies of a dislocated Turkey. The Waking up to repair the building, the Turks have set all these dark birds to flight again. Can we imagine that perhaps the European powers' enthusiasm is not altogether unalloyed?

Already, with notes full of hints and innuendoes, Russia has made it known that it would not abandon its policy of reform. The Tsar is so impatient to get rid of abuses that he will not extend much credit to a free Turkey. Thus, the Turkish people will see a buildup of intrigues against it. Each step it makes will be watched closely, and fault will be found with each of its moves. There will be an incessant effort to deny constitutional Turkey the sympathies of a distracted and deceived European public opinion, and all manner of rats will nibble away at the honeymoon which is still shining so brightly.

How can France help Free Turkey to thwart these intrigues? How can it influence Europe, if at this very moment it is trying to establish itself in Morocco by force and by ruse, regardless of what the Moroccans want? The powers interested in carving up or domesticating Turkey will have an easy time saying to France: look at yourselves, and at least have the modesty to shut up. And fundamentally, it can only take this risk in Morocco by buying the tolerance of Europe through the most shameful indulgence of all the machinations which will threaten free Turkey. Either

France must renounce the great moral role which it could henceforth play in the Muslim world, or it must renounce its odious Moroccan policy. Instead of creating traps for Morocco it must help it—without ulterior motives—to affirm its independence and organize itself autonomously.

In persisting in our enterprise in Morocco, we will bring up the fearsome question of Tripolitania: and this question will draw us in either with free Turkey or with Italy, with whom we have only just re-established a long-lost friendship. When Mr. Delcassé drew up his plan regarding Morocco, he negotiated it with Italy, and in exchange for a free hand for France in Morocco he gave Italy freedom of action in Tripolitania. Note that Tripolitania is part of the sultan's field of action. But Mr. Delcassé deals with the universe as if he were its sovereign ruler. After our action of conquest in Morocco became clear, Italy visibly began to get agitated—and by that, I mean that its ambitions on Tropolitania became impatient. But the Turkish revolution has just dealt a considerable—doubtless deadly—blow to this hope. At a stretch, it would have been possible to tear Tripolitania from a discredited sultan, from a decomposed Turkey. It would be more morally difficult to take it away from a Turkey regenerated by freedom which has only just carried out a national revolution to save what remains of its domain or its power.

So if we continue our offensive against Morocco, we will corner Italy into the most difficult of situations. Rather, to avoid being taken for a sucker in the negotiation with Delcassé—and to avoid leaving its chips on the table while we rake in ours—Italy will lay its hands on Tripolitania and do so in conflict with the new Turkey. Or, it will decisively give up on Tripolitania, but it will see, disheartened, that the "balance in the Mediterranean" is decisively broken and that from a treaty which handed Morocco to France and Tripolitania to Italy, only the benefit for France stayed afloat. And as for us, either the new Turkey will hold us responsible for a dismembering which our egoism would have all but imposed, or Italy will hold us responsible for its misadventure in the Mediterranean.

Before the Turkish revolution, getting bogged down in the Moroccan enterprise was a grave error. After the Turkish revolution, it is more than an error.

L'Humanité, August 30, 1908.

The New Army

Alongside the Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française, *Jaurès's other important book is* L'Armée nouvelle. *It in fact originated as a bill to reform the French Army; transformed into a book, it was widely read and discussed in this period, especially among the ranks of international socialism. A plan for peace*, L'Armée nouvelle *sought to ensure France lasting security for its own borders. Jaurès enlisted history to justify his vision of a nation in arms which could enter into conflict only in the event of a defensive war. The passing in 1913 of a law which lengthened military service to three years marked the defeat of Jaurès's own project.*

It is from the questions of national defense and international peace that I propose to begin explaining my plan for the organization of France on a socialist basis, which I shall submit to Parliament in a succession of bills. For socialism as for the nation, it is urgently necessary to define what, according to socialist thinking, the military institutions and foreign policy of republican France ought to be. For France to be able to hasten and accomplish its evolution toward full social justice, to inaugurate and even to prepare a new order in which labor is organized and sovereign, France above all needs peace and security. We must release her from the sinister diversion of adventures abroad; we must release her from the threat of foreign violence. Thus, the first problem confronting a great party of social transformation, resolutely determined to achieve that transformation, is: how can we raise to the maximum the chances of peace, for France and the uncertain world that envelops it? And if, despite France's efforts and wish for peace, she is attacked, how can we raise to the maximum the chances of salvation—the means of victory? It would be childish and futile to propose a vast program of works, a great, sustained, and systematic project of reform to a country which is not its own master, which is forever at the mercy of adventurers within eager for conflict, or exposed to aggressors from without, and always facing the threat or actual outbreak of war. To ensure peace by a plain policy of wisdom, moderation, and rectitude, by the definitive repudiation of all aggressive enterprises, by the loyal acceptance and practice of the new methods of international law which can solve conflicts without violence; and, at the same time, to valiantly ensure peace through the establishment of a defensive organization so formidable that all thought of aggression is dispelled even among the most insolent and rapacious—the Socialist Party has no higher objectives than these. Or rather, they are the very condition of its action and of

its life. It is not enough that the party has this double, indivisible wish for international peace and national autonomy. It must persuade the whole country, the whole democracy, of the sincerity and the strength of our designs. For how can the party invite and persuade the nation to support bold social transformations if the nation feels that its very existence is threatened by this party? In order to perform the task of higher justice which socialism proposes to it, France needs the whole of her life, that is, the whole of her liberty: and how can the sap rise to the fruit of the tree if we have damaged its roots? How, most importantly, can the socialist party propose with any authority the forms of national defense which it considers most effective, if even a single man suspects it of not taking an interest in national defense as such?

Through action—and through action alone—will it disperse the misunderstandings created by ignorance and perfidy or through the intractable paradoxes of great movements of ideas. Of course, it will not disarm the calumnies of the charlatan patriots who invoke the "national interest" as a pretext in order to conceal the appetites—and the violence—of their class spirit; but it will, little by little, win around the good citizens who want to spare France the convulsions of war and the humiliation of enslavement. The important thing for socialism is, therefore, to translate into deeds the essential resolutions of its national and international congresses, applying them day-to-day[25]; to make visible and tangible its entire thinking, without letting it be denatured or mutilated. May socialism ceaselessly tie proletarian liberation to the peace of humanity and the freedom of all nations; may the organized, thinking proletariat, as it gradually educates the still half-unaware or inert mass, cure it of chauvinist illusions and warlike persuasions; may it denounce all that is odious and ridiculous about war, whose role in human history has been terribly ambiguous, both deadly and fruitful, but which today, in the world of democracy and labour, is entirely retrograde, absurd, and criminal; may it seriously threaten, with an act of revolutionary despair, any government that is so senseless as to be guilty of triggering a conflict without having manifestly exhausted any possibility of peace and all the means of conciliation by

[25] An allusion to the motion at the Socialist International's Stuttgart Congress in 1907, which notably declared "If war does threaten to break out, it is the duty of the working class in the countries concerned … to spare no effort in preventing the war by whatever means it deems most appropriate…".

arbitration, and without having garlanded the nation with the approbation of universal consciousness; may it place in service of this salutary threat, both patriotic and human, the accumulated forces of its developed and combined organizations; may it establish ever closer international relations with the proletarians of all countries and thus build in practical terms the beginning of a working-class humanity able to insert a little order and equity amidst the chaos of national rivalries; may it intervene at every opportunity to restore truth and full force to the first guarantees of peace so timidly—sometimes so hypocritically—sketched out at the Hague[26] by the governments themselves; may it demand the insertion, in all the treaties between countries, of clauses promoting universal arbitration and reciprocity clauses everywhere protecting wage earners and creating, through the free consent of the historic nations, a social fatherland of labor; but in this great work, in bringing it to its proper end, may it maintain constant vigilance regarding the nation's independence and means of defence; may it not stick to the general formula of militias, but specify the robust form of organization it takes this word to mean, for each country; may it demonstrate the excellence and effectiveness of this form of organization; may it prove, through the conduct of its militants and through their propaganda among the working people, through their assiduousness and their zealous contribution to the living works of military education, of gymnastic and shooting clubs, of open air manoeuvres and exercises in varied terrain whose effectiveness will replace the sterile mechanics of barracks-room teaching; *may it thereby demonstrate, through its enthusiastic activity, that when it combats militarism and war it does not at all do so out of fearful egoism, servile cowardice or bourgeois laziness, but that it is as resolute and ready to realise the full functioning of a truly popular and defensive military system as it is to abolish the factors for conflict: then, it will be able to defy the calumnies, for it will bear within itself, with the accumulated force of the historic fatherland, the ideal force of the new fatherland, the humanity of labour and of justice.*

It is in this spirit, to contribute as much as my strength will allow to this necessary action and to this necessary, that I will try to define before Parliament both the conditions in which the defense of the fatherland must be organized, and the guarantees that must be established in order to maintain peace. And it is vitally important that any misunderstanding

[26] There were two international congresses at The Hague, in 1899 and 1907.

regarding the relationship between socialism and the nation should be dispelled. A country that could not count, in the days of crisis when its very life is at stake, on the working class's devotion to the nation, would be nothing but a miserable piece of junk. Through what aberration would French democracy insist on raining calumnies on the thinking of the French proletariat which ceaselessly proclaims the proletarians' will and duty to defend the nation's autonomy? What it demands from the nation, it has a right and duty to demand of it. It simply demands that the nation should spare it a crime as harmful for France as for the working class itself—the crime, that is, of throwing the workers into a war against their brothers in other countries without clearly having put France on the side of justice. But when France so nonchalantly took a lead over arbitration policy at the Hague, proposing that any country on the verge of conflict should put the matter before the Hague congress, she made a moral commitment to put this policy into practice. For it to fail to do so would be a scandal. And the workers of France are not really taking things too far when they implore France not to cruelly and rashly tear up the ties of solidarity that bind them to the workers of all countries. They implore it to remain loyal to what is best about it; and by protecting its highest ideal against a surprise outburst of passions or the manoeuvring of subaltern interests, they serve the fatherland as the proletariat. What they further demand, and have the right and duty to demand, is that the nation should organize its military force without any class or caste criterion, and with no concern other than that of national defense itself. I will be so bold as to beseech the officers themselves to reflect, without prejudice or passion, on the general idea of socialism and the application of it to the military institution. It would be harmful for them—and by that I mean, for the life of their minds—to blindly give into hateful preconceptions about men they do not know, about systems of thought that may at first clash with their assumptions. In the drama of the Dreyfus affair, they saw how dangerous such misunderstandings really are. They believed, trusting in a few compromised leaders, that they could save the army while in fact fighting against truth and justice. I do not know what private conclusions they drew from that tragedy. The worst would be for them to make a senseless wager, and thereby silently persist in their initial error, or, out of disgust at a drama where their conscience, their reason, was committed to such a false cause, they turned their minds away without drawing the necessary consequences. But if they have enough courage to seek out lessons and a chance of renewal even from the most painful tests and the

most mortifying errors, they will certainly have concluded that they must keep their minds open and a free conscience. Should ever the nation's existence be at stake, they would have to lead millions of proletarians into battle: what weakness there would be, what a wretched prospect, if there was a kind of moral divorce between them and these men, an irreparable misunderstanding in their conscience and their thinking!

…

All that France does to add to its own defensive might will increase the chances of peace in the world. All that France does in the world to organize peace on a legal basis and permanently ground it in arbitration and law will add to its own defensive might. That is why I am presenting this inextricably linked set of bills organizing defense and organizing peace; I do not want only to work on propagating ideas and creating currents of thinking. I am committing myself to something more than just expounding doctrine, and my objective is something more than just dispelling those misunderstandings from which both the noble fatherland I so love and the great party that I serve may suffer. My intention is to promote a practical endeavor of immediate interest and imminent effects. I am convinced that the initiative sketched out at The Hague can—if we will it—be made more specific and given greater heft. I am convinced that France's military institutions cannot long remain stuck in the ambiguous and contradictory condition created or acknowledged by the two-year law, and that it must, without delay, proceed to a well-thought-through system of national militias, if it is not to regress back toward the old ways. And may no one be so disdainful as to set up any prior anathemas against us. May no one stoop to the facile, puerile game of denouncing my lack of military experience and my incompetence in technical matters. I do not decide, I propose. It would, moreover, be all too easy for me to reply that in a country where a Parliament which is not, in its majority, composed of military technicians, decides on everything, it would be odd, to say the least, for an objection of "incompetence" to be levelled against any citizen or to discredit any idea. I could add that I have had the opportunity to seek information and instruction from elite officers—an opportunity I did not pass up. But most importantly, I will venture that what is now most missing in the work of military reorganization, already today being pursued in our country, is an overall perspective—the audacity, the robustness, of logical constructions.

L'Armée nouvelle (1911), extract.

Speech on Asian Emancipation

In this speech to the Chamber in 1911, Jaurès gives an overview of the colonised countries and proposes the idea of international arbitrariness.

Mr. Jaurès. Gentlemen, this morning I have sought to demonstrate, after analyzing the various elements of foreign policy, the conditions that would allow France to operate in the world in a useful, noble fashion. I have said that there are three conditions for this. The first is that France should autonomously affirm its own thought and will, with the dignity befitting a great country, without breaking its system of allies and friendships; the second is that, in an era in which financial powers are increasingly intervening in the game of diplomatic combinations and alliances, the forces of finance and credit must be the servants, not the masters, of the nation's policy; and I would add—and this is the matter I want to briefly address now, to finish—that France must pursue a great and generous policy of idealism in the world. Here, gentlemen, I sense that I am touching on what you call utopia and what for us is the most profound reality. I am convinced that today, if it so wishes, France can work usefully, effectively in the world as a great worker for peace and justice.

Gentlemen, what I am formulating here is not some empty idea. I could cite the words of a German philosopher who, from Königsberg,[27] every day set along the road to France to have news of the French Revolution as early as possible. In his admirable study on universal, perpetual peace,[28] Kant said that the victory of the great and generous idea of right would not suffice to make peace prevail in the world—rather, peace would only triumph once the forces hostile to peace had been ruined by their miserable contradictions.

Well, I will say that this hour has come! I will say that, increasingly, not only can we claim the strength and the beauty of the idea of peace, but also the absurdity, the miserable contradiction of the contrary state of affairs, which dares neither to unleash the great tragedies of war nor to clearly devote every human effort to working for peace and social justice. In our current state, there is neither the lightning bolts of war nor the sunrays of peace, but the murky, miserable, drawn-out fog of an armed

[27] The city where Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) lived, at that time in Germany (and today Kaliningrad, Russia).

[28] An allusion to Kant's *Project for a Universal Peace* (1795).

peace in some ways even more ruinous, more disastrous, than war itself (*Applause on the far left*).

Gentlemen! I will say that the time has come to put an end to all this—and that this is within our grasp. And to complete my line of argument I would like to demonstrate two things. Firstly, that there is no longer any excuse for war, because it no longer has any object. And next, that the elements of a new order, an order of justice and peace, are emerging—and that France's honor and strength will come from working determinedly for the advent of this order.

Gentlemen, I say that war no longer has any object.

Why should nations want to tear each other apart? The time of what the ancien régime called *guerres de magnificence*—wars for prestige—has long since passed. In this half-monarchic, half-feudal ancien régime world, in which states were passed down the line of descent as an inheritance, it could happen that a man from one dynasty had inheritance rights over a very distant state, for instance, when the brothers or descendants of St. Louis[29] had patrimonial rights over Naples and Sicily, or when Charles V[30] had rights over the scattered fragments of the universal monarchy. These dispersed, disseminated, indefinite claims, just like the peasant's claims to all the dispersed parcels of the paternal holdings, were the basis on which wars of grandeur multiplied and spread.

That period is now over. It disappeared with feudal right itself. The wars of the age of the French Revolution have also gone away. Why did the Revolution give rise to such formidable conflicts? It is not that the Revolution sought war. In its initial moments it bore the illusion that wars of conquest were over; but then it saw all Europe close ranks against it. War could happen because there was not sufficient homogeneity between France, concentrated and ripe for Revolution, and the other states of Europe. Outside of France the feudal system remained powerful; and many nations were still dispersed. And the day that Savoy entered into the French family, Hérault de Séchelles[31]—welcoming the Savoyards who

[29] Louis IX, king of France from 1226 to 1270.

[30] Charles V (1500–1558), king and emperor of a vast empire on which, it was said, "the sun never set."

[31] Héraut de Séchelles (1759–1794) a deputy in the National Convention during the Revolution, condemnedat the same time as Danton in spring 1794. See Claudine Wolikow, 'Hérault de Séchelles Marie-Jean' in Albert Soboul (ed.), *Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française*, Paris, PUF, 1989.

had joined France, in the name of the Convention—told them: "We will freely take on your strength in order to grow, but we do not want to use it to threaten the other peoples who are not yet prepared. Italy is fragmented and enslaved, Germany is divided and languid. With you, we summon them to freedom. From the heights of the snowy Alps, from the heights of their splendid glaciers, in the name of freedom the Revolution salutes the nations which are yet to be born."

But, gentlemen, because these nations had not yet arrived at the same social and political state, the despots could launch wars against our country. Today, the world is more homogeneous. If one people took the initiative toward great social progress and then the despots closed ranks in order to crush these people from all sides, then among the very people these despots tried to rouse against this social progress, enough forces would stand together, through the community of action of the universal proletariat, to stop these despots getting away with their oppressive endeavor (*Applause on the far left and various parts of the left*).

Mr. d'Elissagaray.[32] That's not been proven, I'm afraid!

Mr. Jaurès. The time when the people could usefully dispute the great organized and constituted colonies has also passed. The eighteenth century was full of struggles between France and England to lay their hands on, to dispute, India, Louisiana, and Canada. But today, gentlemen, all these peoples, all these colonies, have reached such a political and social state that if nations did try and dispute them, this problem would be resolved not in favor of the conqueror but in favor of the colony's own independence.

Think of the current state of Egypt, Canada, or India. Yes, England has preserved great freedom of action in these countries; but Canada is advancing its own claim to become a free state, and whoever sought to fight the English nation for this colony, disputing its bonds with England, would be doing such violence to the Canadians' own freedom as to ensure that their endeavor would fail miserably.

But let's turn to Egypt, or to India. There was a time when these peoples were, with their divisions, with their powerlessness, with their lack of national instinct, the wholly passive prey of the European peoples who battled over them. Today, in Egypt, in India, a great national instinct is awakening. Perhaps England itself will not be able to banish this instinct,

[32] Armand d'Elissagaray de Jaurgain (1871–1950), a deputy from the Médoc, a rather moderate independent.

except on condition that it accepts a gradual evolution in the direction of freedom and independence. In India itself—in the very country in which centuries of resignation seemed to have weighed like the oppressive sun—new forces were awakened and the Hindus turned back to their sacred texts. They did not seek any kind of sustenance from outside their own nation, in books from afar in Europe or in the formulas of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man; rather, they looked for some source of strength in their own holy books. But which? In those which preach some sort of divine obliteration? No, today they look for some sustenance in that part of the sacred texts where the wisdom of the ancient Hindus tells the new generations: the worship of the whole, the mystical adoration of the universe, does not impede all action; rather, it commands action, and for you warriors the only way to be consistent with the universal order is to fight courageously.

And, when people dig into the deepest sources of its own thinking in this manner, in order to bring forth its spirit of action and freedom, it would be imprudent in the utmost for other peoples to try and strip this people from those who have thus far exercised their protectorate over it.

It may be that India will never escape England, because England will be wise enough to grant India the necessary freedoms. But if India should one day escape England, and Egypt does so the next, this will not be to the benefit of some other people, but that of the Hindus and the Egyptians (*Applause on the far left and various benches*).

Mr. Abel Ferry.[33] That would mean war.

Mr. Jaurès. But no! I said—Mr. Abel Ferry—and we ought to understand each other properly—that the wars fought over great possessions, as in the eighteenth century, would now be vain, for these peoples are not livestock whom different masters can battle to control.

Mr. Thalamas.[34] And isn't Bosnia the proof?

Mr. Jaurès. And if one did try to trigger war crises for the sake of this sort of conquests, one would end up fighting with the peoples themselves as they asserted their independence. And for the other regions, those that have been appropriated, those where European states have set themselves up as masters, well, the civilized states of Europe have better things to do

[33] Abel Ferry (1881–1918), a French politician, MP for les Vosges, and nephew to Jules Ferry.

[34] Amédée Thalamas (1867–1953), the radical-socialist MP for Seine-et-Oise.

than tear-off strips of territory. They have a whole cause of morality and justice to pursue. Look at Belgian Congo, French Congo,[35] the Congos of yet other nations; how abominable it would be to quarrel over border disputes and scraps of territory when all civilized people that want to honor their programs are now compelled not to fight over these territories, but everywhere to put a stop to the appalling trafficking in slavery, exploitation, and oppression which so dishonor European civilization (*Applause on the far left and various benches on the left*).

That is why the more that war ceases to have any purpose, the more right I have to say that fighting, even between the peoples of capitalist civilization, no longer has any reason to exist. Their interests are today so interlinked—economic interests, financial interests—that the ruin of the defeated is prejudicial to the victor.

Not long ago a book on "the Great Illusion" by Mr. Angell came out in England,[36] having a great impact there. At the mass meetings I attended during the few days I spent on the other side of the Channel, any mention of this book was greeted by a hail of applause; and when I had the opportunity to discuss with English Conservatives and Unionists, they were unanimous in telling me: what this book says is the truth. And what does it say, gentlemen? It says that today, with the growing internationalization of trade and industry, all peoples are so interconnected that a disaster for any one of them is a disaster for them all.

You saw this when the United States was shaken following president Roosevelt's measures[37] against the panic contrived by the great trust organizers: the banking and economic crisis there brought a trail of ruins and disasters on the markets across Europe. Thus, increasingly, the web of interests forces all peoples to make accommodations with one another, to avoid the great catastrophes of war (*Very good! Very good! on the far left and various benches on the left*). And what is so striking, indeed the characteristic trait of today's epoch, is that it is increasingly clear that the

[35] Under the colonial domination of that era there was a Belgian Congo—ancestor of today's Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire, sometimes called "Congo Kinshasa")—and a French Congo, ancestor of today's Republic of Congo (sometimes called "Congo Brazzaville").

[36] Norman Angell's book *The Great Illusion*, London, Putnam's, 1911 (its 1909 first edition was entitled *Europe's Optical Illusion*).

[37] Theodor Roosevelt (1858–1919), Republican president from 1901 to 1909.

violence left to history by the brutality of the old regimes can no longer be rectified by force of arms.

Look at the conquered peoples, or sections of peoples: Ireland, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine. Two things are clear. The first is that it is not possible for the victor, be it the English landowner, the Prussian aristocrat, or the Austrian or Russian conqueror—it is no longer possible for a single master, a single conqueror, whoever that may be, to wipe out the living memory of the ancient nationality among the peoples he has conquered and brutalized, that is, the enduring power of instincts, traditions, and culture (*Applause*). The second is that these conquered, brutalized peoples no longer rely on the use of force to repair the crimes done by force—and nor can they—but as democracy grows, they find new means of asserting themselves and making their strength felt.

Ireland has given up on the Jacobite uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[38] It no longer hopes—and today it would be senseless—to enter into war with the Englishman. But because Irish consciousness has proven indomitable, because the Irish tradition has perpetuated itself, because the Irish soul has remained alive and because democratic combinations allow all its moral forces to assert themselves—well, what did you see one year ago? That in a moment when the two traditional parties were disputing control of England, the Conservatives and landlords on one side, the liberals and the party of on the other side, it was vanquished, despoiled, crushed Ireland that became the arbiter. And today, all England, if it wants to live on and develop in normal fashion, is obliged to find a regime of autonomy for Ireland comparable to that enjoyed by all free peoples. That is the real revenge being prepared (*Applause on the far left*).

And who will speak, gentlemen, of the impact that Polish and Alsatian demands could have for the fate of central Europe?

Poland, for her part, has not allowed herself to die away, to be crushed. She has preserved such a flame of inner life that a few years ago the Prussian conqueror was forced to propose land expropriation laws in order to get the better of the ferment in Poland—and these laws have just collapsed miserably.[39]

[38] The Jacobite revolts were a series of uprisings, rebellions, and wars in Britain between 1688 and 1746.

[39] Part of Poland, which at this point lacked any kind of territorial autonomy, was under German domination.

And what do you see on the other side of the Vosges? Gentlemen, I do not want to venture—and will not venture—any statement that would be painful and distressing, on account of the disproportion because of what is and what could be.

I know that all the incautious statements made on this side—even if born of a generous-spirited imprudence—have the repercussion, over there, of further vexations and oppression. But I have every right to say that in Alsace and in Lorraine the old democratic and French culture has remained alive; I have every right to say that Alsace and Lorraine are like trees which one might divide from the forest with a wall, but which, through their deep roots, join up with the roots of the primitive forest under the wall enclosing it (*Stormy applause*).

What today makes these men so strong? Do they throw themselves into demonstrating, protesting, making demands which would call for war as their supreme arbiter? You well understand that the answer is no. But, within the very framework that the brutality of history has imposed upon them, they claim enough autonomy for themselves to be able to develop all their thought and all their genius.

For my part, when I read the addresses that the democrats, the socialists, the citizens of Alsace wrote to the authorities, I was deeply moved as I read that within this new framework they demanded independence, freedom in the name of old traditions, in the name of the spirit of democracy and freedom which had swept above them in different times.

So, gentlemen, what am I saying here—what do I mean by this? That today two things are becoming clear: the impossibility, for the conqueror, to put out these flames; and the impossibility, for the conquered, to look for great—but uncertain—reparations through some great hurricane of force. But freedom really is growing, there; democracy really is building, there; and the universal proletariat is really developing its organization, there; and it is these forces that gradually raise up all nations, and will elevate them, together, to the level where reconciliations become possible (*Applause on the far left*).

That is why I say that today no longer has any purpose or justification and that with the world being in such a condition, France can play a great and admirable role. This, not only by promulgating principles, but through a practical effort. And as I come to a finish, this is the point which I would like to allow our colleagues to reflect upon.

France, as I see things, has several possible means of starting right away in working for the cause of peace. The first is that in her relations with

those others weaker than her, France should herself set an example of the spirit of equity and generosity. At the beginning of his speech yesterday, Mr. Foreign Minister spoke about Morocco—and I do not want to open up the debate about the Moroccan question again. I am glad that at a critical moment I made the fullest of efforts, as indeed was incumbent on me, to warn against and to put limits on reckless action. And I shall take matters starting from the point they are at today.

You have spoken with absolute optimism; and yet there will continue to be difficulties. I do not know if those who assumed responsibility for this operation, who took the initiative, to kick out any influence other than France's from the areas neighboring Algeria, had initially foreseen the de facto occupation of the Rif, on Algeria's border, by Spanish forces.

Gentlemen, let us not wallow in any illusions: in Morocco, and not only in the Rif where the French have no rights of acquisition, but in Casablanca, where our consuls, our officials are suffering notable difficulties with Spanish nationals, the problem has not been solved.

Today, you on the Chaouia side, or Spain in the Rif, can cut into Morocco. But as these two influences develop, the difficulties will keep growing. You can peel off the leaves of the artichoke from both sides—but when you get to the heart, that is when the difficulties start among those who are dividing it.

In the meantime, let me tell you that—contrary to what I said this morning to a great diplomat—you have abused your victory. To speak with the utmost seriousness, gentlemen, I fear that you have not left today's Moroccan government—you had not anticipated it at first, but you have accommodated to it very sensibly (*Laughter*)—I fear that you have not left it the minimum of financial resources without which it is impossible for it to proceed with its work of administration and organization.

Gentlemen, you may well laugh. Nothing is easier for France than to tell the Moroccan sultan: "As a guarantee for the debt I will take all your customs duties, all the revenue from your mines, all your domestic products."

A marvellous sight. You are the strongest, here, and it's something quite admirable, when one is not the strongest everywhere, at least to make one's strength felt somewhere (*Complaints from the centre and on various benches*).

Mr. Thalamas. That is not the reality, in the slightest.

Mr. Jaurès. But here, we get to the problem. If Morocco no longer has the necessary resources, you will be obliged to take responsibility for it. And that is where your material realities will begin—and the moral difficulties will also sharpen.

For—and I'll repeat—by what right can you raise a justified process over the moral and political violence being perpetrated all around the world? In what name can you uphold the threatened independence of the noble land of Persia if, in some other part of the Muslim world, you yourselves give an example that hardly shows the utmost care in dealing with rights and interests?

That is why, gentlemen, a first move through which France can work toward the cause of peace and justice, is herself to give an example of the spirit of equity.

Mr. Marc Sauzet.[40] And she does do so.

Mr. Jaurès. There is a second thing that I wish to specify, before the Chamber: the most imminent danger to world peace is the possible conflict between England and Germany. I have said, and I will insist in repeating—for me, it is a vital truth—that England and Germany cannot enter into a decisive conflict, unless they hope to drag France into it, wrap her up in it. If there should emerge some grouping in England that wishes, for economic reasons, to put an end to German competition, to declare war on Germany, it will be able to do so only if it can simultaneously count on not only—whatever anyone may say—the far from negligible support of its naval strength, but most importantly, the great diversion of a continental conflict, with France backing up its efforts.

And Germany for its part, knows what difficulties it would run into in a purely maritime conflict with England. At the moment of such a conflict, Germany would see pan-Germans springing up, brutal men who would say, as did a certain Schiemann[41]—against whom national pride here unanimously revolted—that Germany should seek compensation from France. Thus the two peoples will not deliberately enter into battle without each hoping—for their own separate reasons—to involve France and wrap her up in the conflict.

[40] Marc Sauzet (1852–1912), Radical MP for the Ardèche.

[41] Professor Theodor Schiemann (1847–1921), a historian, confidant of Wilhelm II, and conservative pan-Germanist.

And I will say that the greatest service that we can render to world peace, the greatest service that we can render in England to the many Englishmen who want peace and in Germany to the many Germans who want peace, is to make clear that we will not be taken in by any intrigue or manoeuvre and that, ready as we are to defend ourselves against any aggression, we would not seek any means of entering into the conflict.

Gentlemen, when I said these same things a few years ago, Mr. Clemenceau treated me rather sharply; but today I have an authority such as I did not then have… (*Laughter*)—gentlemen, I am not speaking of my own authority; please, I had not finished my sentence, and I could not have imagined for a second that anyone would put such a personalized interpretation on my words—but I have an authority to draw on, one outside of my own person, an authority that I did not have at that time. By that, I mean Mr. Tardieu's book[42]; I mean *Le Temps* newspaper; I could not cover myself with a bigger and more useful shield. I do not make a habit of agreeing with *Le Temps*, and for me it is comforting, a reassurance, to be able to mention it in certain moments.

So, in the course that Mr. Tardieu offers at America's Harward (sic) university, where he explains the French policy—a course which also took the form of a book by Mr. Tardieu on France and its alliances, which I read with the keenest of interest—what purpose does he ascribe to the Franco–Russian alliance? That of making us strong enough that we will not be dragged into the conflict between England and Germany, that England and Germany will hesitate to wrap us up in such a conflict, and that if it should break out, we could "create," as Mr. Tardieu puts it, "a league of the neutral, which will perhaps be tomorrow's approach."

Gentlemen, do not turn your ire against me; your indignation really ought to be raised against Mr. Hébrard's newspaper. I speak for *Le Temps*—I do not associate these words with myself except through a sort of derivation. I say that what it says is wisdom itself, and that the conflict will never break out, if it is apparent that it would be localized in this way.

Lastly, gentlemen, there is one final thing I would like to tell you, and one last fact I would like to submit for your attention. The idea of international arbitration is, slowly, making progress: peoples more and more have

[42] André Tardieu (1876–1945), who in 1908 held the Chair in French Literature at Harvard. The following year he became professor of contemporary diplomatic history at the l'École des Sciences politiques and lecturer at the École des langues orientales, before becoming a professeur at the École de Guerre in 1911.

the feeling that just as the barbarian relations have between individuals and cities and provinces have come to an end—with matters instead being regulated by juridical means—equally, the difficulties between nations can ultimately be settled according to an arbitration process governed by the principles of international law. You have said as much. And at our international congresses, after a moment's hesitation at the intrigue or ruse that sometimes appeared to be hidden behind the first propositions made, the resolution was taken to set the growing, ineluctable strength of the organized universal proletariat in service of this propaganda for international arbitration.

Gentlemen, as for the first arbitration treaties that have been concluded, I am not unaware of their value, but they leave the vital questions outside of their domain, outside of the system they establish. The watchword up till now had been, and still is, that conflicts are to be settled by arbitration, on condition that they do not hurt nations' vital interests or their honor. This was a step forward—a small one, but a step forward.

And now a second step has been taken. For through its former president, Mr. Roosevelt, who passed through Paris a few months ago, but most importantly through its current president, Mr. Taft, the United States decided gradually to submit…

Mr. Charles Benoist.[43] That is easy for them—you are forgetting that the ocean exists.

Mr. Jaurès. Mr. Charles Benoist, your argument is inaccurate, but I shall give you an answer. Let me start by explaining what is happening.

As I was saying, the United States is making a further step—and this great republic is proposing to the world that we should agree resolutions on arbitration that apply to all conflicts. As you know, Mr. Taft is a jurist, a great and mighty jurist, and he has given his proposal a juridical form. What does he say? That up till now arbitration has remained first and foremost a compromise, and compromise is not always justice—for it did not address vital questions. And what he proposes is that, in the event that these first arbitration solutions do not produce success, an arbitration court should make a decision, with its conclusions applying to all conflicts—even, the United States president formally says, conflicts which concern the gravest and most disputed objects, whether that means money, territory or honor (*Interruptions from the centre*).

[43] Charles Benoist (1861–1936), republican MP for the Seine from 1902 to 1919, who frequently—albeit politely—contradicted Jaurès.

Well! Gentlemen, I understand perfectly. Mr. Charles Benoist tells me that the United States, separated from other peoples by the ocean, has an easy time of formulating similar propositions. Firstly, let me reply that the arbitration treaty which the United States wishes to renew with all peoples is one that it had already proposed to England fourteen years ago, in 1897, and that this Olney–Pauncefote Treaty[44] was adopted by England's Parliament and government, only to fall three votes short in the American Senate, because the American Senate wanted to retain its prerogative for deliberating and concluding all international treaties. But Mr. Taft has resumed this approach after already having negotiated with the Senate, and all the parties in England are unanimous in declaring themselves ready to welcome the treaty. So, you are about to see two powers which, although they are enveloped by the Ocean, do have to debate, I imagine, even among themselves, the most important of interests, and know that to create a precedent of this order is to drive forward an effort that will develop further. You are about to see the day when England and the United States conclude this treaty.

And the President of the American Republic has said:

> This is only the first link in a web of peace and justice which we want, as far as we can affect matters, to spread from nation to nation across the entire earth.

So, gentlemen, the question is if, faced with this movement which will take place whatever you do, you wish the French Republic to remain hesitant, inactive, and inert, or if you wish her for own part—her important part—in this tormented old world, to take the initiative with a great policy of peace, justice, and reason.

And I would understand your ever-so-wise objections if you also raised another one: that generations pass, that demands which, you say, must result from the sword, only persist in peacetime; the years go by and memories can fade (*Denials from the centre and various benches*).

Ah ! je comprendrais vos objections de sagesse si vous en aviez une autre; mais les générations passent; les revendications qui, d'après vous, devaient se produire par le glaive, se prolongent dans la paix; les années

[44] The Treaty of Olney–Pauncefote, signed between Great Britain and the United States in 1897, for the purposes of settling various disputes between the two countries, was defeated by the United States Senate.

s'écoulent, les souvenirs peuvent s'émousser. (*Dénégations au centre et sur divers bancs.*)

Mr. Admiral Bienaimé.[45] See if they are fading in Metz!

Mr. Le Hérissé. There are memories that cannot fade.

Mr. Jaurès. I am not talking about those ones.

In any case, what I want to say is that it would be all the easier for them to formulate their demand for freedom and autonomy if they could do so in an atmosphere of peace. And I will say that you have no alternative solution.

Be it us here or someone else, when the debate comes around again in ten years' time, it will have to be acknowledged that you have no other solution to the problem.

Do you really imagine that you can indefinitely make a people, millions and millions of proletarians exhausting themselves in production, bear the double burden of feeding both the capital of peace and the voracity of war? (*Lively applause on the far left and various left-wing benches; interruptions on various benches.*)

No! No! The workers of all countries are stirring; and not only the workers of all countries, but the men of good sense of all countries.

Yesterday, I admired how the miserable contradiction of today's state was apparent even in the words of Mr. Foreign Minister. What a splendid journey around the world we made yesterday, led by Mr. Pichon! We had allies and friends everywhere. Whenever he reached some port or alighted at a station, in Athens, in Constantinople, in Rome, in Madrid, in Petersburg, anywhere, as he disembarked he always found a smiling ally, a friend bringing flowers (*Laughter on the far left*). Only that, as we made our return journey, he told us: we have made so many alliances and friendships that, in order to deserve them, we have to double our number of soldiers (*Applause on the far left*).

Mr. Stéphen Pichon, Foreign Minister. I said "in order to retain them"—we would not have these alliances if we were not strong enough.

Mr. Jaurès. … and after this triumphal tour, he needs cannons to escort his bouquet-laden carriage (*Applause and laughter on the far left*).

Some ask us—why should we go first? But are we asking this of France alone? Does it depend on France alone to go ahead with organizing this new state of affairs? (*Applause on the far left and various benches*). We

[45] Admiral Amédée Bienaimé (1843–1930), a nationalist MP for Paris.

are saying that today, the same thinking, the same will, the same hope for peace, the same universal wish to escape not only war but the armed peace that is its hideous caricature (*Applause on the far left*)—the same thinking, the same will, is surfacing among all peoples, among all fractions of democracy, above all among all fractions of the universal proletariat, and it would be a great thing if, the same day or at the same time as a call for peace through law is raised from the other side of Atlantic, this republican France of which Mr. Deschanel spoke yesterday….[46]

Mr. Daniélou.[47] The United States has not been defeated in war, and that does not stop it from arming itself beyond all measure.

Mr. Jaurès. So, you are saying that France has no right to speak of peace, because she has been defeated? I will say that, whatever the accidents of history… (*Complaints from the centre*).

Mr. Daniélou. Will you vote for the naval program Mr. Jaurès? Mr. Taft proposes to spend 800 million on the American one!

Mr. Jaurès. What a strange misunderstanding there seems to be, among men who ought—despite their party hostilities—to understand one another rather better! And how can you be so scandalized by an expression with which, rather than attributing our reversals to some essential fault, to some national infirmity, I impute them to an external happenstance which the might of French genius is still now rectifying (*Applause on the far left*)? So, I shall say, if you will, that this people, whatever the tests it has been through, remains materially and morally a great people and a great force, a force such that no one can attribute a generous thought of universal peace and universal justice to any faintness of the French heart.

The day that the call for peace surges forth from this people, appealing to all the democrats, to all the proletarians, to all the workers of the world, the cause of peace and justice will make itself felt everywhere throughout the world. (*Stormy and repeated rounds of applause on the far left and various left-wing benches.*)

Speech to the Chamber of Deputies, second sitting of 13 January 1911, extract.

[46] Paul Deschanel (1855–1922) was president of the Chamber of Deputies at this point.

[47] Charles Daniélou (1878–1953), a moderate MP for Finistère, later a minister.

Speech on Turkey and China

1914 address to the Chamber on China and on the French interests in the Ottoman empire.

Mr. Jaurès. If the Chamber will allow it, I would like to advance two very brief comments from my seat this evening (Speak! Speak!).

I have no wish to get involved in examining all of the very substantial statements that Mr. Foreign Minister has made. Nor do I want to address the very important problems that Mr. Denys Cochin has just touched upon in his typically eloquent fashion, with particularly piercing, original viewpoints that I myself, in certain moments, might not have dared to venture.

Nor do I want to say what his proposal on the subject of Morocco makes me think. We will have the chance to return to this subject. But if he does not want us to spend too much gold, too many men, too many soldiers, in the critical period he thinks he has made out, I do not know whether the rapid and total occupation of the whole of Morocco is the most appropriate method for achieving the objective that he has proposed.

But that is not what I want to speak to the Chamber about this evening, in a couple of comments. I want to call Parliament's and the Government's attention to two orders of facts.

Mr. Foreign Minister has said that France would lend financial support to Turkey only if it had assurances that Turkey used this financial strength coming from France in the interests of peace, and with a mind to respecting its international engagements.

Gentlemen, my friends and I entirely approve of Mr. Foreign Minister's concern. But if Turkey has particularly suffered amidst the recent events, if you ask in the interests of peace—and you are right to insist on that—that Turkey should accept without any ulterior motives a state of affairs which it must find particularly cruel, it is also the case that in this Balkan tangle, in which sometimes yesterday's conquered appear as conquerors, or sometimes also the other way around, and where peoples and states question the value of the results obtained, Turkey is not only the one that might be tempted to question the international situation such as it has turned out, and which Europe has granted a moral aura in order to avoid frightful catastrophes. And hence we ask that the watchful, prudent method that you want to apply to Turkey upon granting France's financial

resources should be applied to all other Balkan states in the same spirit (*Very good! Very good! on the far left*).

Gentlemen, on the markets there will not only be Ottomans seeking loans. I do not believe that the Bulgarians, Romanians, Greeks, and Serbs have already decided to swear off any help that they could find here. And I would hope that it is understood that the same thing applies to them—that is, that the absolute, prior condition (*Very good, very good! on the far-left and various left-wing benches*) for French financial help is to accept, without any ulterior motives, an order of things that may well wound this or that claim, but which will allow all the Balkan states to develop, if they recognize that their true interest lies in their solidarity (*Applause on the far left and various left-wing benches*).

Gentlemen, there is another point that troubles me. I will confess that I was a little stirred and distressed by some of the words that Mr. Foreign Minister applied to today's Chinese regime.

I do not want to bring up questions of Chinese domestic policy—our own ones are quite enough to keep us occupied. But you said that the current regime guarantees order and calm.

Well, gentlemen, if we counted up the thousands, tens of thousands of men who have died in the rival camps in China—a country in the midst of a civil war—often in the most appalling fashion, I think it would be impossible to use words like calm, order and tranquillity. Rather, I feel compelled to say that if France itself had a tranquil spell after 2 December [1851], there is, perhaps, something that our conscience, our reason, may find rather troubling in the measures through which the Chinese head of state has achieved what you call calm and order.

That he purloined the Chinese Republic—well, I do not want to raise controversy and grievance over this point. But he has gone further still: he has abolished *even* the system of representation that the ancien régime had granted; and yesterday, he broke up even the provincial assemblies which even the most timorous men in the ancien régime had seen as the means of preparing the setting-in-motion, the education of public opinion. But he was able to do this because a financial consortium provided him with funds.

The Chinese Republic, the true republican party in China, was crushed not by the armies of Yan-Shi-Kai,[48] but by European financiers' gold (*Very good! Very good! on the far left*) and we, too, provided our share in this. And if my information is right, if certain financial dailies are not tricking me, if the information that has recently reached me from what I believe to be highly reliable sources is not inaccurate, a major loan of 160–180 millions is being prepared, to come very shortly, on our market, to allow the dictatorship that has established itself through terror and the coup d'État to firmly entrench itself in China.

We are not calling for intervention or for remonstrances to be made. But is it a show of good caution, is it noble and fair, is it wise, for the French Republic to officially contribute to crushing the first freedom movement to have arisen over there, in countries that one was accustomed to considering lands of immovable traditions? When our people claimed their freedom, then, too, we found that it was a chimera. And if there is a chimera over there, it is a contagion of our own (*Applause on the far left and the left*).

That is why, just as I demand that we do not set our financial resources in service of certain tumultuous and agitated Balkan powers, but only—over there, in eastern Europe—in service of peace, I demand that we do not dedicate France's resources and, with its money, its moral responsibility, to a policy that would translate into the definitive crushing of freedom (*Applause on the far left and on various benches*).

Speech to the Chamber of Deputies, second sitting of 10 March 1914, extract.

Too Late

This article for L'Humanité, *delving into the situation in Peru, displays Jaurès's breadth of interests, engaging in a great variety of causes not often taken up in this period. He also shows that in 1912 he was still ready to consistently take sides with the weakest and the exploited, as had been the case right from the beginning of his socialist adventure during the strikes in Carmaux.*

[48] Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a Chinese military leader during the Qing dynasty. He clashed with Sun Yat-Sen's republicans before joining their side and briefly becoming president of the Republic in 1913–1916.

The British government, stirred by the cruelty perpetrated in Peru, sent an investigator on-site. He wrote a report, of which the *Times* has published long extracts.[49] It is truly ghastly. The unfortunate Indians of the Upper-Amazon region, fallen into slavery under the whip of the rubber exploitation companies, have been subjected to an appalling regime. England's envoy saw bloody traces on many Indians of the martyrdom which they have suffered. They were made to carry a given quantity of rubber on their backs over long distances, and if the amount they had collected did not reach exactly the weight set by the masters, they were whipped bloody and sometimes even to death. They became so used to this horrifying regime, reduced to such passivity, that when they saw that the needle on the scales did not entirely make it to the desired point, they lay on their stomachs and waited, wordless, for this savage execution.

The Peruvian government defends itself by alleging that these things are going on in a near-inaccessible region. The truth is that in all-too-great a part of Latin America, capitalist companies rule as absolute masters, and through fear that they will exercise reprisals against the Latin-American states' credit over in Europe, the governments there very often do not dare to resist.

It seems that the Peruvian government, stirred by the echo of the report, announced that it would intervene—and England suggested sending a religious mission. All very touching. But there is one sinister detail, which denies these belated good intentions any value. A few years ago, before the arrival of the rubber company, there were sixty thousand Indians. Now, there are no more than ten thousand. The governmental philanthropy will be exercised over a people of cadavers.

L'Humanité, July 18, 1912.

[49] A blue book—whose main author was the British consul Roger Casement (1864–1916)—denounced the atrocities perpetrated against the Indians in the areas surrounding the rubber plantations in the Putumayo region of Peruvian Amazonia. The company coerced the Indians into inhumane forced labour and massacred them when they attempted to flee. This book was recently published in Spanish translation: *Libro Azul Britannico. Informes de Roger Casement y otras cartas sobre las atrocidades en el Putumayo*, Lima, CAAAP/IWGIA, 2012. Roger Casement's life inspired Mario Vargas Llosa's novel *The Dream of the Celt*. Thanks to Luc Capdevila for these references.

"On the Need for Sang-Froid"

The last article Jaurès published in his lifetime, this editorial for the 31 July 1914 issue of L'Humanité *serves as a testament to its author. Here, Jaurès expounded his analysis of the international crisis that was now unfolding, but he was unable to provide any further explanation of what he would do, should war break out… Jaurès was assassinated on the evening of 31 July 1914. Like many socialists, he placed a great deal of hopes in the Socialist International congress that was meant to take place in Vienna in August 1914, but which would never meet.*

If one so wishes, one may well assume the worst and take the necessary precautions in view of the most dreadful hypotheses. But one should do so, only provided that one continues to be lucid of mind and robust in one's use of reason. Judging by all the elements known to us, it does not seem that the international situation is ever so desperate. It is certainly grave, but not all chance of a peaceable solution has been lost. It is clear that if Germany already had aggressive designs on us, it would have proceeded according to the famous method of sudden attack. It has, instead, allowed the days to come and go, and France like Russia has been able to put this period to good use—Russia, to proceed with a partial mobilization, and France, to take all precautions compatible with keeping the peace. For their part, Austria and Russia have entered into direct negotiations. Russia asked Austria what treatment it has in store for Serbia. Austria replied that it would respect its "territorial integrity." Russia considers this insufficient—and that it is also necessary for "Serbia's rights of sovereignty to be guaranteed." The conversation has been engaged. Even if a disagreement between Austrian and Russian views becomes clear, it will be possible to measure how far apart their ideas stand and work for a solution to a problem whose details are to be determined. That, it seems, is when England's mediating thought—which currently seeks the right form and means of expression—can intervene. And this will, indeed, end up prevailing, because it responds to the deep feelings of the peoples themselves, and without doubt also to the desires of the governments who see the peril of war—a threat which in one moment they thought they could play with, as a tool of diplomacy—looming toward them, as if by way of retribution. And if one considers what the war itself would mean, and the consequences of panic, sinister rumors, economic disarray, monetary difficulties, and the financial disasters that the mere possibility of conflict triggers—thinking that it is even now necessary to push back payment deadlines and prepare to decree

the circulation of small denomination banknotes by fiat—one should ask oneself if even the most foolish or villainous of men are capable of causing such a crisis. The greatest danger in the present moment does not lie, if I can put it like this, in the events themselves. It does not even lie in the real measures taken by chancelleries, however blameworthy they may be, or in the real wishes of the peoples. Rather, it lies in the increasingly frayed nerves, in the spreading unease, in the rash impulses driven by fear, the acute uncertainty, the prolonged anxiety. Crowds can give into these crazed panics—and there is no certainty that governments will not do so. They pass their time (a splendid job) in frightening and in reassuring one another. And that, we should not be mistaken, can last for weeks. Those who imagine that the diplomatic crisis can and must be resolved in a few days are mistaken. Just as the battles of modern warfare, developing across a vast front, last seven or eight days, diplomatic battles—now setting in play the whole continent and the formidable, multiple apparatuses of powerful nations—necessarily continue across several weeks.[50] To withstand such a test, it takes men with nerves of steel—or rather, a robust, clear, and calm use of reason. We must today appeal to the intelligence of the people, to its thinking, if we want it to be able to remain its own master, repress the panic, tame the frayed nerves and keep vigilant watch over the march of men and things, so as to spare the human race the horrors of war. The danger is severe, but it is not invincible if we retain our clarity of mind and firmness of will, if we are capable of both heroic patience and heroism in action. The clear view of our duty will give us the strength to fulfil this task. All members of the Socialist Party's Seine Federation are called to convene in the Salle Wagram on Sunday morning, for a meeting where the international situation will be explained and the action the International expects of us will be defined. Scores of meetings will keep the proletariat's thought and will active, and they will prepare what will certainly be a magnificent demonstration as a prelude to the work of the International's Congress. The most important thing is continual action, to keep the working class's thought and conscience constantly at the ready. That is the real safeguard—the guarantee of the future.

L'Humanité, July 31, 1914.

[50] Jaurès doubtless underestimated the gravity of a crisis that would pitch the world into the Great War in little more than a week….

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J.-N. Ducange and E. Marcobelli (eds.), *Selected Writings of Jean Jaurés*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71959-3